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The first and the main unifying theme of this dissertation is the use of innovative
techniques in the design and control of queueing systems, where design and control
decisions significantly influence system performance. Special attention is given to
real-world applications in (a) the design and control of patient flow in the hospital
emergency departments, (b) the design and control of call centers, and (c) the design
and control of supply chains. With respect to application (a), we show how better
patient prioritization and enhanced patient flow designs allows emergency depart-
ments to significantly improve their performance. In application (b), we investigate
how effective control and design strategies that make use of (partial) flexibility of
servers can be implemented to achieve high performance regimes. In application (c),
we study how supply chains can boost their performance using better control and
design strategies that specifically take into account disruption risks.
A second unifying theme is the use of better information in making superior de-
sign and control decisions. For instance, in application (a), we demonstrate that en-
hanced triaged systems that collect additional up-front information regarding patient
ultimate disposition and/or medical complexity can yield better control and design
1
mechanisms. Regarding application (b), we show how information about server dis-
ruptions (e.g., absenteeism) can be used to improve the performance of the system
by using this information in a more sophisticated dynamic control policy. In appli-
cation (c), we study how collecting disruption risk information (through monitoring
unreliable suppliers) can enhance the overall performance.
A third unifying theme is the use of flexibility in the design and control. For in-
stance, we propose to create bed and physician flexibility in emergency departments
(application (a)). We show how this flexibility will yield higher resource utilizations
and thereby improve the performance. In application (b), we study how much server
flexibility is required to achieve a good performance. Finally, with respect to applica-
tion (c), we show how the use of flexibility in the supply system can create superior
supply chains that can respond to disruption risks.
1.2 Motivation and Research Objectives
Many systems in both service and manufacturing sectors can be modeled and an-
alyzed as queueing networks. In such systems control and design can be an important
issue that may significantly affect the performance. An example is hospital Emer-
gency Departments (ED’s). Between 1996 and 2006, annual visits to ED’s in the U.S.
increased by 32% (from 90.3 million to 119.2 million), while the number of hospital
ED’s decreased from 4,019 to 3,833 ([114]). This trend has elevated ED overcrowding
to crisis levels in many U.S. hospitals. Similar trends have intensified pressure on
ED’s around the world. The consequences of ED overcrowding can be tragic. For
example, in 2006, 49-year-old Beatrice Vance arrived at the busy ED of Vista Medical
Center East in Waukegan, IL, complaining of nausea, shortness of breath, and chest
pain. Triaged and sent to the ED waiting room, Mrs. Vance waited there for two
hours without further attention. When she was finally called, she failed to respond
and was found dead of an acute myocardial infarction ([134]).
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The most direct way to alleviate crowding and improve responsiveness is by adding
resources. But, since this is also the most expensive approach, it is generally not the
preferred option. Analysis in control of queueing systems, however, can be imple-
mented to improve the performance of ED’s without adding expensive capacity. These
analyses, however, need to be tailored to match practice and to consider detailed spec-
ifications in ED’s that may deviate from traditional assumptions in queueing networks
(e.g., as will be discussed, physicians do not take more than seven patients at the time
in practice, or the objective function in the ED is different for different patient types).
Chapters 2 and 3 devise tailored analyses for the ED’s. Specifically, Chapter
2 shows how a new patient flow design that separates the service stream for those
predicted to be admitted to the hospital and those predicted to be discharged home
can improve ED metrics such as Length of Stay (LOS), Time to First Treatment
(TTFT), and percentage of patients Left Without Being Seen (LWBS). It is also
shown how stochastic control analysis can be used to determine effective patient
prioritization for (a) bringing patients from the waiting area into examination rooms,
and (b) decide which patient to visit next while they are in examination rooms. In
addition to tailored queueing control analysis, a high-fidelity simulation calibrated
with a year of data is developed to gain further insights.
Chapter 3 builds upon the previous chapter and suggests a new triage system
that revolutionizes the current practice of triage in ED’s by collecting information
regarding the medical complexity of patients (in addition to their urgency). Given
the new triage system, it is found that modified versions of the cµ rule that take into
account patient misclassifications can be effectively implemented to increase both
patient safety (i.e., reduce risk of adverse events) and operational efficiency (i.e.,
reduce length of stay).
Managment of service center operations is another application where control and
design plays a significant role. The use of partially flexible servers or cross-trained
agents makes the design and control a challenging issue in call centers. Considering the
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use of such partially flexible resources, the literature can be divided to the following
three main themes: (1) System Design of specific paradigms for creating flexibility to
maximize an objective, (2) Server Scheduling and Control policies to reap the benefits
of flexibility, and (3) Performance Analysis of specific systems and policies. Chapter 4
contributes to all three themes, especially the second theme. In this chapter, a special
attention is given to a structure with two servers and three customer classes forming
a “W.” In this structure, servers are trained to serve a shared task in addition to their
fixed (specialized) task. Similar to some other structures studied in the literature, the
“W” design is highly efficient; it requires only a small amount of cross-training, but
performs almost as well as a fully cross-trained system. We show that (even allowing
disruptions) a version of the cµ rule, which prioritizes serving the “fixed task before
the shared,” is optimal under some conditions. However, our results show that, in
general, the optimal policy is complex, and not well-structured for implementation
in practice. Hence, a powerful and yet very simple policy to control the servers in
parallel queueing systems is proposed. This heuristic (which can also be implemented
in any parallel queueing system) effectively combines the intuition underlying two
widely used policies: (1) the load balancing objective in serving the Longest Queue
(LQ), and (2) the greedy cost minimization emphasis of the cµ rule. Our proposed
control policy, termed as “LEWC,” defines a simple and intuitive measure of workload
costs and assigns each server to the queue with the Largest Expected Workload Cost
(LEWC) among its skill set. Our extensive numerical tests show that the proposed
policy performs well in comparison with four key policies: optimal, LQ, cµ, and
generalized cµ (Gcµ). We also provide a proof of stability of the LEWC, LQ, and
Gcµ policies.
Another important application where design and control plays a major role is in
supply chains. Consider the 2007 disruption in Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner’s supply
chain. Advanced Integration Technology (AIT) fell months behind building parts
needed to assemble the plane, thereby wreaking havoc upon Boeing’s 787 inflexible
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supply chain. Boeing itself expected to take a multi-billion dollar cash hit in 2008
from paying penalties to airline customers and to keep its suppliers afloat in the
wake of the serious cash flow disruption, according to Greising and Johnsson (2007).
Another example is the disruption in the Toyota supply chain on Feb. 01, 1997. A
fire at the Aisin Seiki Co. destroyed most of the capacity to manufacture P-valves.
Because of the Aisin’s ability to produce parts at low cost, Toyota had come to rely
on Aisin for this product (Sheffi, 2007) resulting in a poor supply chain design with
limited control options. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the design and control of supply
chains under disruption risks and provide new insights that can yield resilience in
supply chains.
1.2.1 Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation is presented in a multiple manuscript format. The results in
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have appeared as individual research papers [121], [120],
[124], [122], and [123], respectively. The organization of the dissertation is as follows.
Chapters 2 and 3 consider the application of emergency departments. Chapter 4
considers the application of the call centers, Chapters 5 and 6 consider the design
and control of supply chains under disruption risks.
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CHAPTER 2
Emergency Department: Patient Streaming
2.1 Introduction
Between 1996 and 2006, annual visits to Emergency Departments (ED’s) in the
U.S. increased by 32% (from 90.3 million to 119.2 million), while the number of
hospital ED’s decreased from 4,019 to 3,833 ([114]). This trend has elevated ED
overcrowding to crisis levels in many U.S. hospitals. Similar trends have intensified
pressure on ED’s around the world.
The consequences of ED overcrowding can be tragic. For example, in 2006, 49-
year-old Beatrice Vance arrived at the busy ED of Vista Medical Center East in
Waukegan, IL, complaining of nausea, shortness of breath, and chest pain. Triaged
and sent to the ED waiting room, Mrs. Vance waited there for two hours without
further attention. When she was finally called, she failed to respond and was found
dead of an acute myocardial infarction ([134]).
Other, less tragic but still important, consequences of ED overcrowding include
patient “elopement” (i.e., leaving without being seen), ambulance diversions, and
treatment delays ([69]). The ED overcrowding situation has become so dire that the
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) in its 2006 report gave a failing
mark to emergency care in 41 of 50 states in the U.S, and a D- nationally for access
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to care (see [4]). Some experts believe that the recent healthcare bill will exacerbate
the already serious overcrowding problem in U.S. ED’s ([135]).
This situation has prompted researchers to investigate a variety of methods for
alleviating ED overcrowding, including: (1) personnel staffing, (2) hospital bed access
control, (3) non-urgent and low acuity patient referrals, (4) ambulance diversion, (5)
destination control, and (6) improved resource utilization ([69]).
The most direct way to alleviate crowding and improve responsiveness is by adding
resources. But, since this is also the most expensive approach, it is generally not the
preferred option. Recognizing this, [116] concluded, “the debate is no longer about the
level of resources our EDs deserve, but rather about how to ensure that ED resources
are directed to those who need them - the patients in the waiting room. To achieve
this, some practitioners have recently suggested streaming patients based on their
likelihood of being admitted to the hospital. In one pioneering effort, Flinders Medi-
cal Center in Australia implemented a system in which ED patients and resources are
divided into two streams: one for those likely to be discharged (hereafter “Discharge”
or “D” patients) and one for those likely to be admitted to the hospital (hereafter
“Admit” or “A” patients) ([90], [18]). They reported a 48 minute reduction in aver-
age time spent by the patients in the ED. While Flinders is an Australian hospital,
the fundamental operational principles governing ED flow design are very similar in
developed countries. However, since Flinders represented a single uncontrolled exper-
iment in a specific environment in which other changes (e.g., lean initiatives) were
implemented along with the streaming system, it is impossible to infer that their
results are purely due to streaming and/or that they will translate to other ED’s.
Nevertheless, motivated by positive reports from Flinders, other hospitals such as
Bendigo Health ED ([91]) have begun implementing similar strategies.
While streaming patients based on the likelihood of being admitted to the hospital
is new, patient streaming is not. By the 1980s most ED’s (although not Flinders)
had adopted separate “fast tracks” for patients with minor injuries ([159]). In the
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1990s, many ED’s also established “observation units” for patients requiring lengthy
diagnosis. But, as [159] noted, “these innovations were the tip of the iceberg, and
performance-driven emergency departments have been experimenting with models that
segment patients into streams for more efficient health care delivery.”
For clarity, we will use the term “streaming” to refer specifically to the newly pro-
posed policy that separates patients (and resources) into different streams according
to anticipated disposition (A or D). We label the conventional policy that treats both
types of patients together (with pooled resources) as “pooling”. It is well known from
the Operations Management literature that pooling offers efficiency benefits resulting
from improved resource utilization. This means that in order for streaming to be ef-
fective, it must offer advantages that offset its inherent “anti-pooling” disadvantage.
The Flinders results suggest that this may be possible. But since their results could
be due to (a) specific conditions (e.g., high percentage of admits, the fact that they
did not yet have a separate stream (fast track) for low acuity patients, etc.), (b) other
changes (e.g., lean), or (c) a Hawthorne effect halo, we cannot say without a careful
analysis.
In this chapter, we use a combination of analytical and simulation models to
perform a systematic study of the attractiveness of streaming. Specifically, we address
the following questions:
1. Whether streaming (or a variation on it) can improve ED perfor-
mance?
2. Where (i.e., in what hospital environments) is streaming (or an ef-
fective variation on it) most attractive?
3. How should Admit/Discharge information be implemented for maxi-
mum effectiveness?
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes
previous research relevant to the above questions. Section 6.3 describes ED flows and
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performance metrics in order to construct models with which to understand them.
Section 2.4 considers a simple clearing model with a single stage service process, in
which patients can be classified (A or D) without error. This analysis provides insight
into the relative effectiveness of streaming and pooling with respect to sequencing
patients into the examination rooms. While this suggests that sequencing alone is
not enough to overcome the anti-pooling disadvantage of streaming, it also indicates
that streaming is more robust to patient mix variation and classification errors than
is pooling, which can lead to streaming outperforming pooling in real-world settings.
In Section 2.5, we consider another analytic clearing model, with perfect patient
classification but with multi-stage service processes, in order to understand the impact
of patient sequencing within the exam rooms (i.e., the order in which physicians
visit the patients assigned to them) on the streaming versus pooling comparison.
We find that prioritizing downstream (i.e., near service completion) D patients and
upstream (i.e., recent arrivals) A type patients enhances the advantage of streaming
over pooling. In Section 2.6, we use a simulation model of a realistic ED environment
that includes dynamic patient arrivals, multi-stage service processes, and patient
misclassification error to test the conjectures made from our analytic models. Taken
together, our results suggest that, implemented properly in the right environment,
streaming can significantly improve overall ED performance by substantially reducing
wait times for D patients at the expense of only a modest increase in wait times
for A patients. We conclude in Section 6.5 with a summary of our overall insights
about whether, where, and how streaming can be a potentially attractive strategy for
improving ED responsiveness.
2.2 Literature Survey
There are two main streams of research related to the work of this chapter: (1)
Empirical studies of the ED overcrowding problem (published in medical journals),
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and (2) General queueing systems research (published in operations research journals)
that deal with pooling and/or customer sequencing. We highlight key contributions
from each of these below.
For an excellent survey of empirical studies of ED overcrowding see [69]. Some
of these studies have examined the nature and extent of the problem. For example,
[98] showed that there is a strong correlation between ED length of stay and inpa-
tient length of stay and concluded that “strategies to reduce the length of stay in
the ED may significantly reduce healthcare expenditures and patient morbidity”. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that 379,000 deaths
occurred in U.S. ED’s in 2000 ([103]). Other studies have found that long waiting
times are linked to patient mortality as well as elevated risks of errors and adverse
events (e.g., [143], [51], and [148]). One such study estimated that long waiting times
and high occupancies cause 13 deaths per year in one Australian ED ([117]). Thus,
reducing waiting times is a means for promoting higher levels of patient safety. Be-
cause admit patients typically include the most critical cases that need more rapid
attention, some researchers have focused specifically on studying mortality among
admit patients. For instance, [136] associated a combined measure of hospital and
ED crowding (which causes long waiting times) with an increased risk of mortality
among admitted patients.
Other studies have evaluated the factors that influence overcrowding. [106] eval-
uated different internal factors that affect patient flow and concluded that ED over-
crowding is driven by both external pressure and internal factors such as how flow
across the ED is measured. [125] studied the effect of low complexity ED patients on
the waiting times of other patients and concluded that the impact is negligible. Still
other papers have examined the impact of various reorganizations. The papers on
the Flinders experiment with streaming ([90], [18]) fall into this category. Another
example is [74], which considered a new ED admission process in which ED physicians
admit patients directly to the general medical unit after a telephone consultation with
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a hospitalist.
A subcategory of empirical research on the ED deals with developing metrics
with which to address the issues of ED crowding. [132] provided an overview of the
various metrics that have been proposed. We focus on two important measures in
our study: Length of Stay (LOS), which measures total time in the ED from arrival
to discharge/admit, and Time to First Treatment (TTFT), which measures the time
from arrival to the first meaningful interaction with the physician.
Finally, a stream of empirical ED research involves time studies that characterize
how caregivers spend their time in the ED, as well as the nature and duration of
treatments. Examples of this type of research include [68] and [52]. We will make use
of these results to calibrate our models.
A number of researchers have used queueing models to study various aspects
of the ED (see, for instance, [30], [54], and [3]). Within the large literature on
queueing, studies that consider resource pooling, customer partitioning, or customer
sequencing/prioritizing are most relevant to our work. The standard insight from
studies of pooling in queueing systems is that when two classes of customers in a
queueing system become sufficiently different, pooling becomes ineffective and may
even be harmful (see [101], [142], [150]). This suggests that a significant difference
in treatment times between A and D type patients may be one way for streaming to
overcome the anti-pooling disadvantage. But verifying this requires an extension of
known results because in the ED patient misclassification is inevitable, service is a
complex process involving several physician-patient interactions, different streams of
patients have different performance metrics, and the system has limited buffers (i.e.,
examination rooms/beds).
A related stream of queueing systems research considers effective ways of parti-
tioning resources (see e.g., [118], [161], [75]). An important observation from these
studies is that separating fast and slow customers can protect customers with short
processing times from waiting behind customers with long processing times. Note,
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however, that the same effect can be achieved by assigning priorities to customers
with shorter processing times ([75]). However, for either partitioning or prioritizing
to work effectively, we must be able to classify customers with a high level of accu-
racy. Analyses of priority queueing systems under misclassification errors (which are
inevitable in ED’s) suggest that these insights may not hold when classification is
imperfect (see, e.g., [11]).
One last line of queueing research relevant to our work is the one that studies
sequencing. In queueing systems where multiple customers are in the system at the
same time (e.g., serial production lines with jobs at different stages of competition
or an ED with multiple patients in the exam rooms awaiting physician attention),
the server (physician) faces a customer sequencing problem. Related studies of serial
systems can be found in [40], [70], and [152], while related studies of parallel queue-
ing systems can be found, for instance, in [9], [124], and the references therein. In
particular, [152] proposed a “pick-and-run” policy for servers in a serial system which
favors working on the most downstream (old) jobs. We find that a similar policy can
help physicians assigned to the D stream to choose their next patient in a manner
that reduces average LOS.
2.3 Modeling Flows and Performance in the ED
To develop a modeling framework with which to address the whether, where, and
how questions stated above, we must first describe the key characteristics of ED op-
erations. We start by representing the general flow of patients in Figure 2.1. Patients
arrive to the ED in a non-stationary, stochastic manner. Upon arrival, patients first
go to the triage stage where each patient is assigned an Emergency Severity Index
(ESI), usually by a nurse but sometimes by a doctor. ESI is an integer between 1 to 5,
where clinical urgency decreases in ESI level. ESI 1 patients (who constitute a small












Figure 2.1: The general flow of patients in an ED.
immediately. Hence, they are always given high priority. As such, they are generally
tracked separately from the rest of the patients through an “acute care” or “resus-
citation” track. In American hospitals, ESI 4 and 5 patients are also often tracked
separately through a “fast track” because their treatment needs are relatively simple
and straightforward. Hence, in this chapter, we focus on the ESI 2 and 3 patients
who make up the bulk (about 80% at the University of Michigan) of the patients in
the main ED.
In addition to assigning ESI levels, Flinders Medical Center has reported that,
at the time of triage, nurses can predict whether a patient is A or D with roughly
80% accuracy ([90]). Empirical studies in other medical centers have reported similar
results (e.g., [66], [94]).
After a patient has been triaged, he/she waits in a waiting area, and is eventually
called to an examination room. There he/she goes through one or more phases of
interaction (treatment) with the same physician, as shown in Figure 2.1. (While care-
givers may be non-physicians (e.g., physician assistants), we use the term “physician”
for simplicity.) Each physician-patient interaction (treatment stage) lasts a stochas-
tic amount of time and is followed by testing (MRI, CT scan, etc.) or processing
activities (e.g., wound cleaning) by a nurse that do not involve the physician. Dur-
ing testing or processing stages, which are also stochastic in duration, the patient
is unavailable to the physician. The final processing stage after the last physician
interaction is “disposition,” in which the patient is either discharged or admitted to
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the hospital by staff based on the physician’s final instructions.
Note that a patient is usually assigned to a single physician and so must wait for
his/her physician to return for each treatment phase. Also, in most ED’s, a patient
is assigned to an exam room and holds that room, even when he/she is sent to a test
facility, until he/she is disposed (discharged or admitted). Since physicians and exam
rooms are limited, both of these resources can be bottlenecks.
The flow of patients in the ED is impacted by two phases of sequencing decisions.
Phase 1 sequencing decisions determine the order/priority in which patients are ini-
tially taken from the waiting area to an examination room. Phase 1 decisions are
usually made by a nurse in consideration of ESI levels and patient arrival orders. In
theory, it could also make use of A/D predictions. Once patients are in examination
rooms, Phase 2 sequencing is done to determine the order in which patients are seen.
Individual physicians make the Phase 2 sequencing decisions by choosing the patients
assigned to them in consideration of ESI levels, patient comfort, time in system, ex-
perience, etc. We have observed wide variance in the Phase 2 sequencing logic of
individual physicians working within the same ED. Furthermore, physicians tend to
limit the number of patients they have at any given time – seven seems to be a typical
upper limit.
It is impossible to capture all of the above-mentioned complexities of the ED in a
single tractable analytic model. Of course, we can use simulation, but it is difficult to
draw clear insights from purely numerical studies. Therefore, to probe the whether,
where, and how questions, we will first examine a series of analytic models that
represent simplified versions of the ED flow and then test the resulting conclusions
under realistic conditions with a high fidelity simulation calibrated with hospital data.
To compare streaming and pooling strategies, we must model the flows under each
protocol. In a typical ED, which uses a pooling protocol, patients are not classified
into A/D categories and all (ESI 2 and 3) patients are served by a set of pooled/shared
resources (exam rooms, physicians, etc.), with priority given to ESI 2 patients. Under
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the streaming protocol, resources are divided into two groups: one for the A stream
and one for the D stream, and A/D predictions are used to direct patients to the
appropriate stream.
To compare the pooling and streaming protocols, we also need a performance
criterion. Two commonly used metrics in the ED are Length of Stay (LOS) and
Time to First Treatment (TTFT). For D patients, LOS is the key metric because it
correlates with both convenience and safety (since a low LOS also guarantees a low
TTFT). But for A patients, LOS in the ED is usually a small fraction of their total
LOS in the hospital, which on average extends for days beyond their time in the ED.
For these patients, safety is of much greater importance than amount of time they
spend in the ED rather than in a hospital bed. Since safety is enhanced by starting
treatment as soon as possible, TTFT is the most important metric for A patients.
We let α denote the percentage of A patients and define T πA(α) and L
π
D(α) to
be the (average) TTFT of A patients and (average) LOS of D patients under policy
π ∈ Π, respectively, where Π = {PA(Pooling with priority to A’s),
PD(Pooling with priority to D’s), S(Streaming)} represents the set of admissible poli-
cies. More specifically, letting N denote the total number of patients who visit the ED
during a sufficiently long period (e.g., a year), we define T πA(α) = Eπ[ 1αN
∑αN
i=1 TA,i]
and LπD(α) = Eπ[ 1(1−α)N
∑(1−α)N
i=1 LD,i], where αN ((1 − α)N) is the number of A’s
(D’s) during the period, Eπ denotes expectation with respect to the probability mea-
sure defined by policy π ∈ Π, and TA,i and LD,i are random variables denoting the
TTFT and LOS of the ith A and the ith D patient, respectively. Note that we
are restricting attention only to pooling and streaming policies, in keeping with the
“whether” question raised in the Introduction. We acknowledge that a more complex
state-dependent policy might outperform the policies in set Π. But how much im-
provement is possible and whether such policies can be made practical in actual ED
settings are open questions. In this chapter, we restrict our attention to the potential
for improvement through demonstrably implementable streaming policies.
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To construct a single objective function, we let β represent the relative weight
placed on the TTFT of A patients and define fπ(α, β) = β T πA(α) + (1− β)LπD(α) as
the performance metric under policy π ∈ Π. We note that this performance metric
can also be derived from a cost perspective. To see this, suppose cA and cD represent
the per patient cost of increasing the TTTF of A patients and LOS of D patients
by one unit of time, respectively. If β = (cA α)/
(
cA α + cD (1 − α)
)
, then fπ(α, β)
represents the average cost per patient under policy π. For instance, setting β = α
implies an objective in which increasing TTTF of A patients and LOS of D patients
by one minute is equally costly. We also note that while other metrics are used to
evaluate the performance of an ED, most of these are highly correlated with our
objective function. For example, the percentage of patients who leave without being
seen (LWBS) is commonly tracked in ED’s, but studies such as [44] have indicated
that the majority of such patients leave the ED because of prolonged waiting times.
Hence, improvements in our objective function can be expected to result in reduced
LWBS as well. We will examine the impact of streaming on LWBS in Section 2.6.
A closer look at the empirical results reported by Flinders ([90]) indicates that
streaming reduced the LOS of D patients but increased TTFT of A patients. Hence,
if streaming is attractive, it is because it strikes a better balance between these
potentially conflicting objectives. Our combined objective enables us to examine this
tradeoff.
2.4 Phase 1 Implications of Streaming and Pooling
Realistic models of ED flow described in the previous section would be too complex
for anything other than simulation. So, to get some clear insights into whether, where,
and how streaming can outperform pooling, we start with a stylized patient flow
model in which (1) all patients are available at the beginning of each day (i.e., static
arrivals), (2) there are only two physicians, who work in parallel under the pooling
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protocol and are assigned to the A and D streams in the streaming protocol, (3)
patient diagnosis/treatment occurs in a merged single service stage, where XA (XD)
is a random variable with mean µA (µD) representing the service time of an A (D)
patient, (4) A/D classification is perfect (i.e., error free), and (5) to avoid inefficient
underutilization, the A(D) physician switches to serve D(A) patients when there is
no other A(D) patient is available. Because we model service as a single stage, we
eliminate the Phase 2 sequencing decisions. Hence, this model only offers insights into
the performance of pooling and streaming via their impact on Phase 1 sequencing.
The above assumptions (most of which will be relaxed in subsequent sections) al-
low us to represent the ED with a clearing queueing model, in which a fixed number
(n) of patients is available at the beginning of the day. Because the overall perfor-
mance of the ED is heavily influenced by performance during periods of overload
(which occur during predictably in the mid afternoon), the clearing model approxi-
mates ED behavior better than the more conventionally used steady state queueing
model.
We start by examining the relative effectiveness of the three policies in the admis-
sible space Π for extreme cases where β = 1 or 0 (i.e., when the objective function is
either merely TTFT for A’s or LOS for D’s).
Proposition 1 (Extreme Cases) With Π = {PA, PD, S}, the following hold for
the clearing model (with arbitrary distributions of XA and XD) :
(i) For every α ∈ [0, 1] and every sample path ω, argminπ∈Π T πA(α, ω) = PA. That
is, if only TTFT of A’s matters (i.e., when β = 1), then pooling with priority
to A’s is the best policy in Π (in the almost sure sense).
(ii) For every α ∈ [0, 1] and every sample path ω, argminπ∈Π LπD(α, ω) = PD. That
is, if only LOS of D’s matters (i.e., when β = 0), then pooling with priority to
D’s is the best policy in Π (in the almost sure sense).
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This intuitive proposition suggests that streaming is not attractive unless we care
about both TTFT for A’s and LOS for D’s. Therefore, we now analyze the optimal
strategy when the objective function is a convex combination of these two metrics.
To do this, we first formally define a strategy for our problem.
Definition 1 (Strategy) A strategy is a map π : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ Π that defines the
policy π(α, β) for each α, β. An optimal strategy is the one that defines an optimal
policy π∗(α, β) for every (α, β).
A useful property that allows us to establish the structure of the optimal strategy
is β-convexity which we define in two steps as follows.
Definition 2 (π Region) For policy π ∈ Π, the π region, denoted by Aπ, is the
collection of (α, β) for which policy π is optimal. That is, the π region is Aπ =
{(α, β) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : π∗(α, β) = π}.
Definition 3 (β-Convexity) The optimal strategy π∗ : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ Π is said to
be β-convex if all the π regions (i.e, sets Aπ (∀π ∈ Π)) are convex in β for every
α ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 1 (β-Convexity) The optimal strategy π∗(α, β) is β-convex.
Using the above lemma, we can establish the structure of the optimal strategy.
Proposition 2 (Double Threshold Policy) For every fixed α ∈ [0, 1], there exist
double thresholds β(α), β̄(α) such that streaming is the best policy in Π if, and only
if, β ∈ [β(α), β̄(α)]. If β < β(α) then pooling with priority to D’s is the best policy in
Π. If β > β̄(α) then pooling with priority to A’s is the best policy in Π.
Since ED’s vary in their percentage of A’s (α) and relative weight of TTFT of
D’s (β), the appeal of streaming depends on the width of the gap between β and
β̄. Unfortunately, our numerical experiments suggest that this gap is very narrow
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Figure 2.2: An example of the optimal strategy with three admissible policies (PA,
PD, S) and deterministic service times for which streaming is almost never optimal.
for the stylized model of this section. Indeed, Figure 2.2 illustrates an example with
deterministic service times in which there is no region of optimality for streaming (it
can, however, appear with stochastic service times). While the optimality region for
streaming can appear when service times are stochastic, it is generally small when α
is constant and known. Knowing the exact proportion of A’s enables a fixed priority
policy to strike an effective balance between the waiting costs of A’s and D’s.
This is no longer the case under the (highly realistic) assumption that α is uncer-
tain. If the percentage of A patients varies from day to day, then a pooling policy
that prioritizes either A or D patients can be quite ineffective. The reason is that
we must pick which patient type to prioritize before the mix of A and D patients is
known for the day. If we choose the wrong policy for the mix that actually occurs,
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performance could be very poor. We illustrate this in Figure 2.3, which plots the
optimality gap (i.e., difference between the objective function of a given policy and
that of the optimal policy) for the S, PA and PD policies. These results show that
while PA is optimal for small α, it is very poor for large α. Conversely, PD is optimal
for large α and very poor for small α. In contrast, the streaming policy, S, is almost
never optimal but is also never poor. Hence, we can make the following observation.
Observation 1 Streaming is much more robust to changes in patient mix (α) than
is pooling.
The reason is that streaming mimics a dynamic policy with the simplicity of a
static rule. By allocating some capacity to both patient types, it never results in a
few patients of one type waiting for many patients of the other type.
To examine the impact of uncertainty in α, we assume α is chosen from a family




, where f(x) = (2 − 9x)/(27x), x ∈
(0, 2/9). This results in µα = 1/3, which approximates the fraction of A’s in the
University of Michigan Emergency Department (UMED), and σ2α = x, so we can
generate a range of uncertainty of α by varying x. We choose the Beta distribution
because (1) it is the most common distribution for a random variable that takes values
between zero and one, and it includes the other well-known distribution, the uniform,
as a special case, and (2) it seems to well represent our data from UMED. Figure 2.4
uses our analytical model of the ED along with the Beta distribution to illustrate the
impact of varying σ2α on the optimal strategy. This figure offers two insights: (1) As
noted before, when there is no uncertainty (σ2α=0), streaming is not optimal for any
value of β. (2) As the level of uncertainty (measured by σ2α) increases, streaming
becomes optimal for an increasingly broad range of β values.
From Figures 2.3 and 2.4, we can make an important conjecture (which we will
test in Section 2.6): streaming is more robust than pooling to variation in patient mix.
The intuition behind this robustness result is that a pooling system that completely
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Β = 0.4, ΜA = 80, ΜD = 45, n = 1000
Figure 2.3: Sensitivity of policies to changes in α. Streaming is more robust to changes
in patient mix than are the pooling policies.
prioritizes one type of patients can sequence them far from the optimal order (e.g.,
putting D patients at the end of the line on a day in which they should have been
at the beginning of the line). In contrast, a streaming system always gives some
priority to both types of patients by “reserving” some capacity for each type. While
the proportion of capacity assigned to A and D patients may not be optimal on any
given day (depending on the mix of patients), the fact that the two streams “back
each other up” makes such suboptimalities much less disruptive than the “reverse
prioritization” that can occur under pooling. Hence, altering the mix of patient types
has a much more modest impact on performance in the streaming system. We relegate
discussion of the model behind Figure 2.4 to Appendix B for the sake of brevity. We
will test another important conjecture that streaming is more robust than pooling to




Figure 2.4: When the level of uncertainty in the percentage of A patients (measured
by σ2α) increases, streaming becomes the optimal policy for an increasingly wide range
of β values.
2.5 Phase 2 Implications of Streaming and Pooling
By modeling patient care as a single stage service process, the above model fo-
cused attention exclusively on Phase 1 sequencing. However, as we noted earlier, ED
patients typically receive multiple visits from physician (designated as “treatment”
states), interspersed with tests, waiting for test results and intermediate processing
(designated as “wait” states), during which the patient is not available for interaction
with the physician. To examine the Phase 2 sequencing decisions of which patient to
see next whenever a physician completes a treatment stage, we now relax the single-
stage service assumption and consider a multi-stage treatment process. Note that we
still face the Phase 1 sequencing decision concerning the order in which to bring the
patients back into the examination rooms. In both Phase 1 and Phase 2 sequencing,
we can make use of ESI information, and, if available, A/D information. In Phase 2
sequencing, a physician can also potentially consider the number of past interactions
with the patient. For instance, he/she could prioritize patients that have completed
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more treatment stages because they may be closer to competition.
To explore the Phase 2 sequencing problem and its impact on the streaming vs.
pooling comparison, we consider a static arrival (clearing) model with two physicians,
where one physician is assigned to each stream under the streaming protocol. How-
ever, we represent the service process by the multi-stage model in Figure 2.5. In
this model, after an initial wait state labeled as W1, patients go through an initial
treatment (direct or indirect interaction with the physician) labeled as state T1 (so
TTFT is the time between the start of T1 and the arrival of the patient). After
T1, the patient oscillates between a stochastic number of “wait” (labeled as W) and
“treatment” (labeled as T) states. We note that the treatment states start only if
both the physician and the patient are available and the physician elects to work on
that patient. After the final treatment by the physician, the patient experiences a
final wait state (labeled as FW), which involves final processing by a nurse and a
delay specific to admission (e.g., assignment to a bed) or discharge (e.g., final paper
work and follow-up instructions), and then the patient exits the ED (to state E). To
allow the distribution of physician interactions per patient to match observed data,
we let the probability of a transition to the final stage (FW) depend on the number
of previous interactions.
Because our focus here is on Phase 2 sequencing, we simplify some other aspects
of the system to construct a tractable model. First, without loss of generality, we
consider a single ESI level for patients. We do this, because in a clearing system, all
ESI 2 patients will be served before ESI 3 patients (due to their Phase 1 sequencing
priority). Hence, distinguishing between these patient classes will have little effect
on system performance. Second, to permit maximum opportunity for Phase 2 se-
quencing, we assume there are enough examination rooms to hold all of the patients.
Third, we assume that times in “wait” states (i.e., times spent for tests, waiting for
test results and intermediate processing) are i.i.d. and exponentially distributed. For
convenience, we also assume that times in the treatment states are i.i.d. and expo-
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nentially distributed and are independent of the duration of wait states. The i.i.d.
assumption glosses over any queueing for test equipment or nurses that could serve
to correlate the times in the wait states. But since these states account for many dif-
ferent activities, we would not expect such correlation to be large. The exponential
assumption reflects the unpredictability of the activities between physician interac-
tions. Finally, to avoid the minor complications injected if preemption is disallowed,
we allow preemption. For instance, when a patient returns from a test, the physi-
cian has the option of preempting the current patient and switching to the returning
patient. We will relax these assumptions in the next section.
Because A and D patients have different performance metrics, it makes sense to
treat them differently in Phase 2 sequencing. For D patients, LOS matters most.
The work of [152] (which considers a manufacturing system with multiple phases of
worker/product interaction) suggests that a “Pick-and-Run” policy can be effective
when the performance criterion is average time spent in the system. Under this policy,
the goal is to serve the most downstream job. In the ED, the equivalent policy would
be for physicians to work on the patient closest to completion and try to complete
this “old” patient’s service (to the extent possible) before initiating a service for a
“new” patient. We refer to this policy as Prioritize Old (PO). In contrast, for A
patients, TTFT is the key performance metric. Hence, for them, physicians should
give preference to patients that have not yet been seen, unless constrained by the
availability of exam rooms or the patient per physician limit. (Thus, in our simulation
framework of the next section, where such additional constraints are also considered,
a physician at his/her capacity should be directed to clear out in-process patients as
quickly as possible by following the PO policy.) We refer to the policy that favors
unseen patients as the Prioritize New (PN) policy.
We can show that these policies are optimal in the context of our simplified model
(see Appendix A for a proof, where a Markov Decision Process is developed to analyze















Figure 2.5: Multi-stage ED service: (W(1): (initial) wait, T(1):(initial) treatment,
FW: final wait, E: exit).
Proposition 3 (Who to See Next?) In the clearing model of a streaming ED flow
with one physician assigned to each stream and multi-stage exponential treatment and
wait stages modeled as in Figure 2.5:
(i) If the probability of completion increases in the number of previous physician-
patient interactions, the Prioritize Old (PO) rule is optimal (in the expected sense)
for the D stream.
(ii) The Prioritize New (PN) rule is optimal (in the almost sure sense) for the A
stream.
The implication of the above result is that instructing D physicians to work on the
most downstream (old) patient and A physicians to work on the most upstream
(new) patient should further improve the effectiveness of streaming. This addresses
the how question we posed in Section 2.1 by suggesting a policy simple enough to
be implemented in ED’s. It also partially corresponds to what was done at Flinders
(see [90]), where physicians assigned to the D stream were instructed that, in the
absence of a threat to life/limb, need for time critical intervention or severe pain,
they were to see patients in the order of arrival (i.e., a FCFS (First-Come-First-
Served) mechanism). Moreover, “the staff were further encouraged to attempt as far
as possible to complete one patient’s journey before bringing the next patient out
of the waiting room into a cubicle.” However, physicians assigned to the A stream
were instructed to continue to prioritize patients according to ESI categories and to
use FCFS within each category. Our results suggest that Flinders sequencing policies
within the ED are reasonable but not optimal.
25
We will confirm the conjecture that implementing the PO and PN rules for Phase
2 sequencing in the ED can enhance the effectiveness of streaming in the next section.
2.6 A Simulation-Based Comparison of Streaming
and Pooling
We now test the conjectures suggested by our simple analytic models by means
of a detailed simulation model of the ED. This simulation incorporates many realis-
tic features discussed earlier, including dynamic non-stationary arrivals, multi-stage
service, multiple physicians and exam rooms, inaccuracy in disposition prediction,
bed-block by the hospital, among others. Our base case model was calibrated using
a year of data from UMED plus time study data from the literature. Below, we
highlight key features of the model. A more detailed description of our modeling
assumptions is presented in Appendix C.
Patient Classes. As discussed earlier, patients are classified according to both ESI
level (2 or 3) and ultimate disposition (A or D). This is done at the triage stage and
results in patient classes 2A, 2D, 3A, and 3D. However, A/D prediction at triage
is imperfect, resulting in misclassification errors. The true type of a patient is not
revealed until the admit/discharge decision is made. Misclassification errors may vary
from hospital to hospital but achievable levels seem to be in the range of 20 − 25%
([90], [66], [94]).
Arrival Process. Arrivals for patient classes are modeled using non-stationary Pois-
son processes (which closely approximate the data) with arrival rates by class (ob-
tained from a year of UMED data) depicted in Figure 3.5. The general pattern is
similar to those reported in other studies (e.g., [54]).
Service Process. The ED service process is depicted in Figure 2.5. Each patient
goes through several phases of patient-physician interactions/treatment followed by
























Figure 2.6: Class dependent arrival rates to the ED for an average day (obtained
from a year of data in UMED).
may depend on the class of the patient and the number of previous interactions. For
instance, the first and last interactions are usually longer than intermediate ones.
The number of interactions with a physician ranges from 1 to 7 and depends on
the class of the patient, as well as several other factors. Based on the class of the
patient, we draw the number of such interactions from a distribution constructed
from a detailed time study (see Table 3 of [52]) after modifying the data to represent
our four patient classes (see Appendix C for details). The simulated service process
is non-collaborative (an ED physician rarely transfers his/her patients to another
physician) and non-preemptive (an ED physician rarely moves to another patient in
the middle of his/her current interaction). The non-preemptive framework rules out
impractical policies that for instance instruct physicians to visit each patient for a
short time and then move to the other patient before finishing the interaction with the
current patient. Such preemptive policies are generally avoided by physicians because
they are inefficient for the physician (who will need to re-review patient history and
condition upon the next return), as well as irritating to patients.
Physician-Patient Assignments. As noted earlier, the process of connecting pa-
tients with physicians involves two phases. In Phase 1, patients are assigned to
available exam rooms, usually by the charge nurse, based on a Phase 1 sequencing
rule. In Phase 2, whenever a physician becomes available, he/she chooses the next
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patient (among those available/ready in the exam rooms) to see based on a Phase
2 sequencing rule. Under all patient flow designs, prioritizing ESI 2 patients over
ESI 3 patients in Phase 1 is a constraint for safety reasons. For Phase 1 sequencing
under streaming, patients are first streamed according to A/D information and then
prioritized within streams with ESI 2 patients before ESI 3 patients (ties are broken
with a FCFS rule). Under pooling, Phase 1 sequencing may or may not make use of
A/D information, depending on the scenario under consideration. If A/D information
is not available, then Phase 1 sequencing only considers ESI levels by prioritizing ESI
2 over ESI 3 with a FCFS rule to break ties. If A/D information is available under
pooling, then Phase 1 sequencing prioritizes patients in the following order: 2A, 2D,
3A, 3D, with FCFS to break ties within a class.
In keeping with practice in UMED and elsewhere, we assume physicians do not
take on more than seven patients at any time. We consider the following Phase 2
sequencing rules: (1) Service-In-Random-Order (SIRO), in which when a physician
becomes available, s/he selects a patient at random from the pool of available (i.e.,
those not under a preparation or test) patients assigned to him and the new patients
in the examination rooms waiting for a physician, provided that his/her total patient
load does not exceed seven. This SIRO policy approximates current practice in many
ED’s in which physicians are not specifically encouraged to follow any specific rule,
and hence, exogenous factors (changes in patient urgency level, patient discomfort,
physician preference and experience, anticipation of interactions with testing facilities,
access to newly available information, etc.) override systematic sequencing of patients.
(We note, however, that while exogenous factors may make it appear that patients are
sequenced according to SIRO, the decisions of physicians are not actually random.
They are just based on criteria other than flow efficiency.) (2) First-Come-First-
Served (FCFS), in which a physician selects his/her next patient in order of their
arrival to the ED. This is an implementable policy to which many ED’s aspire. (3)
Prioritize-New-Prioritize-Old (PNPO), in which the Prioritize New (PN) policy is
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used by physicians assigned to the A stream, and the Prioritize Old (PO) policy is
used by physicians assigned to the D stream. That is, physicians in the A stream
take an unassigned new patient whenever one is available in an exam room and the
physician’s patient load does not exceed seven. In contrast, physicians assigned to
the D stream are instructed to prioritize the most down-stream patient assigned to
them, in order to free up rooms and minimize LOS by completing patient journeys as
quickly as possible. If a physician is handing seven patients s/he is asked to serve the
most down-stream patient assigned to him regardless of the stream s/he is working in
(in an effort to free up a room and lower his/her workload). Ties are always broken
using a FCFS rule. While new to ED’s, PNPO is also an implementable policy that
our previous analytic results suggest should be effective.
Naming Convention. To distinguish between patient flow designs, we adopt a
naming convention that labels each design as: Protocol/Phase 1/Phase 2. “Protocol”
designates the type of system: pooling (P), streaming (S), and virtual streaming
(VS). The difference between between the S and VS protocols is that S represents an
implementation of streaming in which resources (rooms and physicians) are physically
segregated and hence, idle resources assigned to one stream cannot be used by the
patients of the other stream. In contrast, in VS, resources are only logically segregated
and thus can be shared across streams. The “Phase 1” and “Phase 2” parts in the
naming convention designate the Phase 1 and 2 sequencing rules described earlier.
Phase 1 sequencing under streaming is done by separating patients based on their
ultimate disposition (A or D) and prioritizing each stream by ESI level (2 before 3).
Hence, we label all S and VS cases with “AD+ESI” to indicate the Phase 1 rule.
Similarly, for “Phase 1” under pooling, we use “ESI” to denote the case where Phase
1 sequencing is based only on ESI information, and we use “AD+EDI” to denote the
case where, in addition to ESI levels, A/D information is used to sequence patients
in the order: 2A, 2D, 3A, 3D. For phase 2 sequencing rules, we use SIRO, FCFS, and
PNPO. SIRO and FCFS can be used under either pooling or streaming, but PNPO
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Table 2.1: Different patient flow designs under consideration and the notation imple-
mented.
Protocol Phase 1 Phase 2 Notation
Str. (S)
ESI only (ESI)
Service In Random Order (SIRO) S/ESI/SIRO
First Come First Served (FCFS) S/ESI/FCFS
Prioritize New Prioritize Old (PNPO) S/ESI/PNPO
A/D Info + ESI (AD+ESI)
Service In Random Order (SIRO) S/AD+ESI/SIRO
First Come First Served (FCFS) S/AD+ESI/FCFS
Prioritize New Prioritize Old (PNPO) S/AD+ESI/PNPO
Pooling (P)
ESI only (ESI)
Service In Random Order (SIRO) P/ESI/SIRO
First Come First Served (FCFS) P/ESI/FCFS
A/D Info + ESI (AD+ESI)
Service In Random Order (SIRO) P/AD+ESI/SIRO
First Come First Served (FCFS) P/AD+ESI/FCFS
Vir. Str. (VS)
ESI only (ESI)
Service In Random Order (SIRO) VS/ESI/SIRO
First Come First Served (FCFS) VS/ESI/FCFS
Prioritize New Prioritize Old (PNPO) VS/ESI/PNPO
A/D Info + ESI (AD+ESI)
Service In Random Order (SIRO) VS/AD+ESI/SIRO
First Come First Served (FCFS) VS/AD+ESI/FCFS
Prioritize New Prioritize Old (PNPO) VS/AD+ESI/PNPO
can only be implemented in S and VS systems where physicians and patient classes
are segregated into A and D streams. Table 2.1 summarizes this notation and the
possible patient flow designs.
By comparing the pooling and streaming policies (S and VS) under the basic
SIRO Phase 2 sequencing rules, we can address the question of whether streaming
can improve ED performance. By performing sensitivity analysis on the model param-
eters, we address the question of where streaming is most effective. And by matching
streaming and pooling with various Phase 1 and Phase 2 sequencing rules, we gain
insight into the question of how to implement streaming for maximum effectiveness.
In the following subsections, we present our main findings from the simulation
experiments. For each patient flow design described above, the objective function
(βTTFT (A) + (1− β)LOS(D)) is computed as an average over 5000 replications of
a week of operation, where the result for each replication is obtained after a warmup
period of one week. Further details about our simulation framework can be found in
Appendix C.
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2.6.1 ED Flow Design: Pooling, Physical Streaming, or Vir-
tual Streaming?
We start with a comparison between the current practice of pooling in the ED’s
and physical streaming (where, unlike virtual streaming and our analytical clearing
model, capacity sharing is not possible).
Observation 2 Comparing simulations of the S/AD+ESI/SIRO and P/ESI/SIRO
systems shows that pooling is more effective than physical streaming, with a 77% lower
objective value.
The inefficiency of physical streaming results from the imbalanced and low utiliza-
tion of resources (which leads to intervals in which physicians are starved for lack of a
patient or bed, even though a patient and/or bed is available in the opposite stream).
In other words, physical streaming exhibits an “anti-pooling effect,” which occurs be-
cause physical separation in either physicians or beds prevents capacity sharing. To
place the observed magnitude of the anti-pooling effect of physical streaming (77%)
in context, we make use of Kingman’s formula for a G/G/s queueing system with
s = 8 physicians and two parallel G/G/s queueing systems with s = 4 physicians
each, with a server utilization close to our base case. The pooling benefit of having
a G/G/8 queue versus two parallel G/G/4 queues on the average waiting time and
the average system time is 79% and 7%, respectively. Since our objective function is
a weighted average of TTFT (queue time) and LOS (system time), we would expect
the anti-pooling penalty to fall between these values, as it does. This simple example
illustrates that, even when capacity is perfectly balanced, the inability to share ca-
pacity between streams can be very damaging to performance. In the ED, this effect
is particularly pronounced (i.e., toward the higher end of the range indicated by the
G/G/s model) because (1) it is not possible to balance utilization in the two streams
exactly due to the discreteness of physicians and beds, and the fact that the average
mix of A and D patients fluctuates according to the time of day (see Figure 7), and (2)
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the limited number of beds in the ED means that patients can be held in the waiting
room even when physicians are idle, an effect that becomes more pronounced when
beds are separated into two smaller systems under physical streaming. (The magni-
tude of this effect becomes apparent when we observe that the anti-pooling penalty
falls to 17% in the simulation model when the number of beds is made infinite.) As a
result, physical streaming is decidedly worse for performance than is a conventional
pooling protocol. This leads us to suspect that Flinders does not rigidly adhere to a




Policy TTFT (2A) TTFT (3A) LOS (2D) LOS (3D)
P/AD+ESI/SIRO 0.05 0.79 ‐0.09 ‐0.26


































































Figure 2.7: Virtual streaming significantly outperforms pooling and improved pooling.
The reason is that VS dramatically decreases LOS for 3D patients with only a minor
increase in TTFT of 2A patients. (Results for an ED with 8 physicians and 60 beds,
a 20% misclassification error rate, and a weight for TTFT of A patients of β = 0.50).
Since physical streaming is so unattractive, we do not consider it further and in-
stead we investigate whether virtual streaming (VS) can improve ED performance.
We start by considering the SIRO Phase 2 sequencing rule (as an approximation of
the status quo in most ED’s) and compare VS/AD+ESI/SIRO (basic virtual stream-
ing) and P/AD+ESI/SIRO (improved pooling) with P/ESI/SIRO (current pooling
practice in most ED’s). Figure 2.7 depicts the simulation results. The graph on the
left depicts the percentage improvement in the combined objective function (with
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β = 0.5). The graph on the right illustrates the improvement (in hours) achieved for
each class of patients separately. The significant improvement shown in Figure 2.7
(left) is achieved because VS dramatically decreases LOS of 3D’s while only slightly
increasing TTFT of 2A’s (see Figure 2.7 (right)).
Observation 3 Virtual streaming significantly outperforms both pooling and improved
pooling by striking a better balance between TTFT of A’s and LOS of D’s.
Since VS does not require any physical reconfiguration of the ED, this finding
provides strong evidence that virtual streaming can be an attractive and practical
option for improving ED responsiveness. As can be easily observed from Figure 2.7
(right), this attractiveness is also very robust to the weights assigned to our two main
metrics, TTFT for A’s and LOS for D’s.
To further confirm this insight, we also compare the performance of the proposed
virtual streaming (VS/AD+ESI/PNPO) with the current practice (P/ESI/SIRO)
using all four metrics (i.e., TTFT and LOS for both A’s and D’s). Table 2.2 presents
these four metrics in hours for our base case scenario under pooling and streaming.
To examine the robustness of streaming, we consider a weighted average of all these
four metrics defined as TTFT (A)+β1TTFT (D)+β2LOS(A)+β3LOS(D), where the
weight for TTFT (A) is assumed to be one and other weights represent the relative
priorities of the remaining metrics to that of TTFT (A). Our analysis reveals that
pooling is only preferred in unrealistic cases where (a) almost no weight is placed on
LOS(D) (i.e., β3 is small), (b) LOS(A) is weighted more heavily than TTFT (A) (i.e.,
β2 > 1), and (c) LOS(A) is more heavily weighted than TTFT (D) (i.e., β2 > β1).
Condition (a) is problematic, since (as we discussed previously) LOS(D) is of great
concern for ED’s. Conditions (b) and (c) are particularly unrealistic because A’s
remain in the hospital well beyond their stay in the ED, and hence, LOS in the ED is
not that important for them. These provide further evidence that (1) the benefit of
the proposed streaming policy (over the current pooling policy) is robust with respect
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to weights assigned, and (2) considering an objective function made up of the two most
important metrics, TTFT (A) and LOS(D), is a reasonable approximation of the full
multi-objective optimization problem. Hence, for the reminder of of our analyses, we
will make use of the two dimensional objective function involving only TTFT (A) and
LOS(D). However, it is worth noting that, based on the results presented in Table
2.2, we also expect the percentage of left without being seen (LWBS) metric to be
improved by the proposed streaming design, as it improves the TTFT of both A’s
and D’s.
Since patients who abandon the ED are not tracked in detail, we do not have
enough data (e.g., how long they waited before leaving) to characterize the exact effect
of streaming on LWBS. However, we can get an estimate using the following method.
First, we assume patients may leave after an exponentially distributed amount of
time if they are not yet seen. This is a reasonable approximation of reality if there
are multiple factors leading to a patient abandonment, each occurring according to
a Poisson process. Under these conditions, the patient abandonment process is a
superposition of Poisson processes which is itself Poisson. To estimate the rate of this
process, we note that the current LWBS percentage in the UMED is 3%. Moreover,
based on Table 2.2, the TTFT for an average patient (A or D) is about 1 hour. Thus,
we need to find the exponential distribution that has a cdf equal to 0.03 at TTFT = 1.
This leads to an exponential distribution with rate 0.031. Next, augmenting the
arrival rates in the simulation by the current percentage of LWBS, 3%, and having
patients leave after this exponential time, we observe that the LWBS (when made
endogenous) under the streaming scenario is 1.04% compared to that of 3% in the
current pooling system. Because the LWBS is reduced, the arrival rate to the ED
is increased which in turn slightly increases the TTFT relative to what it would be
without the LWBS improvement. Nevertheless, streaming still significantly improves
TTFT compared to current pooling practice in addition to achieving a significant
reduction in the percentage LWBS. The bottom line is that streaming can reduce
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Table 2.2: Performance (in hrs) of the proposed streaming design
(VS/AD+ESI/PNPO) and current pooling practice (P/ESI/SIRO) under four
metrics as well as the associated LWBS (%). For the streaming design the physician
and bed split have been optimized at phys. =(3, 5) and beds=(22,38) for the A and
D sides, respectively.
Policy TTFT (A) TTFT (D) LOS (A) LOS (D) LWBS
P/ESI/SIRO 0.88532 1.07893 7.4458 3.51401 3%
VS/AD+ESI/PNPO (exogenous LWBS) 0.67253 0.95437 7.7389 2.60942 3%
VS/AD+ESI/PNPO (endogenous LWBS) 0.74601 1.01349 7.8134 2.67707 1.4%
overall TTFT, LOS and LWBS relative to pooling. However, as illustrated in Table
2.2, it does this by allowing a slight increase in LOS for A patients in order to achieve
substantial improvements in all other metrics.
Having answered the whether question, we now seek to answer how VS should
be implemented for maximum benefit. Proposition 3 suggests that following the
PNPO rule for Phase 2 sequencing may further improve performance. Using our
simulation test bed we observe that this conjecture is true. However, we also observe
that improved Phase 2 sequencing does not make as large an improvement as that
achieved by virtual streaming.
Observation 4 Using the PNPO rule for Phase 2 sequencing improves the perfor-
mance, but performance of VS is relatively insensitive to the Phase 2 sequencing rule,
indicating that most of the benefit of streaming is attributable to Phase 1.
The insensitivity of performance to Phase 2 sequencing is due to the fact that ED
physicians frequently do not have many patients to choose among, because patients
are often unavailable while waiting for test results. In ED’s with shorter test times,
higher physician utilization, and larger case loads (patients per physician), there
would be more choice among in-process patients, and hence more benefit from an
improved Phase 2 sequencing policy.
To get a sense of the maximum achievable value of the PNPO policy, we considered
an ED with 50% shorter test times than UMED, as well as higher maximum case loads
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(12 vs. 7) and very high dedicated utilization (up to 88% compared to 44% in the base
case). “Dedicated utilization” refers to the fraction of the time that a physician is
involved in activities that will not be interrupted to see another patient. These include
direct care of patients and some indirect activities (e.g., reading patient test results).
But physicians also engage in many indirect activities (e.g., staff management, paper
work, discussions with colleagues) that are preemptible and hence do not contribute
to patient queueing. Studies report that direct care activities occupy 32% of ED
physician time ([68]), so the 44% value for dedicated utilization in our base model
is plausible. Of course, total ED physician utilization, which includes all direct and
indirect activities is much higher; ED physicians are busy. But here we are only
concerned with dedicated utilization, since this is what drives congestion.
The percentage improvement due to implementing the PNPO policy is shown
in Figure 3.4 for a range of dedicated utilization values. This figure confirms that
implementing PNPO becomes more effective when (1) the dedicated utilization of
physicians is high, (2) the number of patients allowed per physician is large, and (3)
patient test times are short. This suggests a practical limit of 4% on the amount
of improvement possible via better Phase 2 sequencing. When combined with the
benefit of virtual streaming, this results in a 29% improvement in the overall objective
function compared to the current pooling practice (P/ESI/SIRO).
2.6.2 Sensitivity Analyses: Where to Implement Virtual
Streaming?
Having addressed the whether and how questions we raised in Section 2.1, we
now turn to the question of where virtual streaming is likely to be most attractive.
We address this by performing sensitivity analyses on environmental characteristics
in order to identify key factors that amplify the advantage of implementing virtual
streaming over pooling.











































Figure 2.8: The benefit of implementing PNPO sequencing rule. ED’s with a higher
physician utilization or with a higher maximum number of patients allowed per physi-
cian benefit more from PNPO.
tual streaming, we select P/AD+ESI/FCFS as a good candidate for pooling because:
(a) it makes use of A/D information in Phase 1 sequencing, and (b) FCFS is an imple-
mentable policy, which was used at Flinders, and showed a small improvement over
SIRO for Phase 2 sequencing in our simulation experiments. However, as we observed
previously, the effect of a Phase 2 sequencing rule is small compared to the benefit
obtained from virtual streaming, so we do not expect the results to be sensitive to
the Phase 2 sequencing rule.
We start by examining the role of misclassification errors and β (the relative weight
given to TTFT of A patients compared to LOS of D patients) on the relative benefit
of virtual streaming over pooling. Based on our earlier clearing model, we conjectured
that a higher β should favor pooling. Common sense suggests that A/D information is
less valuable if it is inaccurate, so we also expect a higher misclassification probability
to also favor pooling. Figure 2.9 confirms these conjectures and shows that unless an
ED gives an extremely very heavy weight to the TTFT of A patients (high β) or has
a very high misclassification error rate, virtual streaming is preferred to pooling.
Next we consider the effect of the percentage of A patients (α). Our analytical












Figure 2.9: Sensitivity of virtual streaming and pooling designs. Lower weight on
TTFT of A patients (β) or misclassification probability favors virtual streaming over
pooling.
day variance in the percentage of A patients increases the attractiveness of virtual
streaming. Figure 2.10 (left) shows simulation results indicating that virtual stream-
ing is indeed more attractive in ED’s with a higher percentage of A patients. Figure
2.10 (right) shows the effect of increasing day-to-day variation in the mix of pa-





f(x) = (2 − 9x)/(27x), x ∈ (0, 2/9). (Recall that doing this holds the mean at
µα = 1/3 (which approximates UMED data), but allows the variance, σ
2
α = x, to
range from 0 to 2/9.) This indicates that higher variability in α also makes virtual
streaming more attractive, as our analytic models predicted.
Observation 5 A higher fraction of A patients and a higher variance in the day-to-
day fraction of A patients both favor (virtual) streaming relative to pooling.
It is worth nothing that the percentage of A patients at Flinders is relatively high
(α = 43%) compared to the average rate of admission in the U.S. ED’s, which was
α = 12.8% in 2006 (NHAMCS by [114]). This may be one reason that streaming was
considered a success at Flinders.
Another environmental factor that affects the (virtual) streaming versus pooling






















Figure 2.10: Sensitivity of virtual streaming (VS) and pooling (P) designs with re-
spect to mean µα (left) and variance σ
2
α (right) of the percentage of A patients. VS
dominates P in the shaded region.
we examine the sensitivity of the VS/AD+ESI/PNPO and P/AD+ESI/FCFS con-
figurations to increases in the test times of A (left) and D (right) patients. In Figure
2.12, we similarly consider the sensitivity of these two configurations to increases in
the treatment times of A (left) and D (right) patients.
Observation 6 Increasing the difference between the test and/or treatment times of
A and D patients increases the attractiveness of virtual streaming relative to pooling.
This observation has potentially important consequences for where virtual stream-
ing is likely to be effective. First, ED’s with congested or slow test facilities (which
are used more frequently by A’s than by D’s) are likely to benefit more from virtual
streaming than ED’s with fast or ample test facilities. Second, ED’s that handle
serious/complex patients among their A’s (e.g., Level 1 trauma centers and teaching
hospitals) are more likely to benefit from virtual streaming than ED’s with less ex-
treme A’s (e.g., community hospitals), because the former is likely to have a larger
gap between treatment times of A’s and D’s.
To further answer the where question, we consider the impact of a common phe-




























































Figure 2.11: The effect of average patient test time (MRI, CT Scan, etc.) on the
relative performance of two virtual streaming and pooling configurations. As test time
for A patients increases (left) or decreases for D patients (right), virtual streaming



























































Figure 2.12: The effect of treatment times on the relative performance of two virtual
streaming and pooling configurations. As treatment time for A patients increases
(left) or decreases for D patients (right), virtual streaming becomes more attractive
compared to pooling.
are boarded in the ED while they wait for a hospital bed. Decreasing bed-block
times has been shown to be one of the most significant factors (even more significant
than increasing the number of beds) in reducing LOS ([88]). However, its impact
on streaming has not been studied. Figure 2.13 compares the performance of the
VS/AD+ESI/PNPO and P/AD+ESI/FCFS configurations for various values of the
average boarding time of an A patient.
Observation 7 The relative attractiveness of virtual streaming over pooling increases
with the average boarding time of A patients.
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The implication is that ED’s with higher frequency of bed-block or longer waits





























Figure 2.13: The effect of the average boarding time on the performance of two virtual
streaming and pooling configurations. ED’s with longer boarding of A’s benefit more
from virtual streaming.
Finally, we consider the effect of the average dedicated utilization of physicians
on the attractiveness of virtual streaming. Figure 2.14 (left) depicts the objec-
tive function for policies VS/AD+ESI/PNPO and P/AD+ESI/FCFS, while Figure
2.14 (right) shows the improvement in the objective function from implementing
VS/AD+ESI/PNPO instead of P/AD+ESI/FCFS.
Observation 8 The relative attractiveness of virtual streaming over pooling increases
with average dedicated utilization of physicians.
The implication is that congested ED’s with high arrival rates or a low number
of physicians can benefit more from virtual streaming. Furthermore, we did not ex-
plicitly account for physician interruptions, such as treating ESI-1 patients or dealing
with other non-patient issues, which would add to physician’s non-preemptible activ-
ities (and hence dedicated utilization). Thus, our estimates of the benefits of virtual




































































































Figure 2.14: The effect of average physician utilization on the attractiveness of virtual
streaming. ED’s with higher average physician utilization benefit more.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter describes our investigation of a new approach to managing patient
flows in ED’s: streaming, which separates patients based on an up-front prediction
on their final disposition (admission or discharge). Streaming has been popularized
by Flinders Medical Center, where it has been credited with dramatically reducing
patient length of stay (LOS). While the empirical results reported by Flinders have
stimulated substantial interest among ED professional, they are not conclusive be-
cause (1) the Flinders experiment was not a controlled study, so a Hawthorne effect
cannot be ruled out, (2) other changes (e.g., lean) were implemented along with
streaming, and (3) the environment at Flinders may not reflect other ED’s (e.g., the
fraction of A patients at Flinders is substantially above the norm). Indeed, our re-
sults suggest that the physical streaming approach as described by the Flinders may
actually degrade ED performance because of an “anti-pooling” effect caused by sepa-
rating resources into segments. Hence, we suspect that the Flinders success is partly
due to informal capacity sharing to overcome the anti-pooling effect and partly due
to other process improvements.
To avoid the anti-pooling effect of physical streaming, we proposed virtual stream-
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Figure 2.15: ED patient flow design strategy based on key environmental character-
istics of the ED.
capacities can be shared. Using simple analytical models, we found that virtual
streaming can strike a better balance between the TTFT of A patients and the LOS
of D patients by devoting some capacity to each patient type, rather than giving
full priority to one. These analytic models also led to several conjectures about the
environmental factors that should make virtual streaming more attractive.
We tested these conjectures with a realistic simulation and found that virtual
streaming can indeed significantly improve ED performance (by 25% in a case de-
signed to represent the ED of a busy academic hospital). Since implementing virtual
streaming does not require a physical layout redesign in the ED, it provides a practical
option to improve ED responsiveness.
We also found that the information used to stream patients (i.e., A or D clas-
sification) can be used by physicians to sequence patients within exam rooms and
achieve additional performance improvements (up to 4% beyond the improvement
due to virtual streaming alone). To achieve this, physicians assigned to the A stream
should use (to the extent possible) a “Prioritize New” rule that favors seeing new
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patients before finishing patients already in progress, while physicians assigned to
the D stream should use (to the extent possible) a “Prioritize Old” rule that favors
completing patient journeys before initializing new ones.
Our results also indicate that while virtual streaming can be effective, it is not
uniformly attractive to all ED’s. Figure 2.15 summarizes the results of our sensitivity
analyses, which suggest that virtual streaming is best suited for ED’s with (1) a high
percentage of A patients, (2) longer service times for A’s than D’s, (3) long patient
boarding times due to bed-block, (4) high day-to-day variations in patient mix, and
(5) high average physician utilization. Using a PNPO Phase 2 sequencing rule is
more effective in ED’s with (1) high average physician utilization, (2) large patient
case load, and (3) short waits for test results.
In broad terms, our results indicate that better triage information about patients
(e.g., A/D classification) can be leveraged to improve ED performance. One question
to be answered in future research is whether other types of pre-treatment information
(e.g., case complexity, type of testing required, etc.) are possible to obtain and yield
additional benefit. Given the crisis levels of ED congestion, it is critical to find out.
2.8 Appendix A: Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. We use a sample path argument. Consider the probability
space (Ω,F ,P). Let CAπk(ω) and CDπk (ω) denote the completion time of kth Admit
and kth Discharge type patient (under policy π and along sample path ω ∈ Ω),
respectively. Also, assume T πA(α, ω) and LD(α, ω) denote the (average) TTFT of
Admits and the (average) LOS of Discharges for a given α ∈ [0, 1] and sample path
ω ∈ Ω, respectively.
Proof of Part (i). To prove part (i), it is sufficient to show that for every α and
every sample path ω: (a) T PAA (α, ω) ≤ T SA (α, ω), and (b) T PAA (α, ω) ≤ T PDA (α, ω).
To prove (a), fix α and let t(ω) = min{CASnA(ω), CD
S
nD
(ω)} denote the time that
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system moves to a pooling scenario under Streaming policy and over sample path
ω. If t(ω) = CASnA(ω) (i.e., if Streaming becomes Pooling when Admits are all
served) then notice that under π = S, the kth Admit patient starts its treatment
at CASk−1(ω) but under π = PA, the kth Admit patient starts its treatment at
min{CAPAk−1(ω), CAPAk−2(ω)} ≤ min{CASk−1(ω), CASk−2(ω)} ≤ CASk−1(ω), where the
first inequality can be easily shown using induction on k, and the second inequality
trivially holds. Hence, under π = PA each patient is seen no later than when s/he is
seen under π = S, and therefore (a) holds. Now if t(ω) = CDSnD(ω) (i.e., if Streaming
becomes Pooling when some Admits still have not been seen), assume the last Admit
type patient that has been seen before or at time t(ω) under π = S is the nt(ω)th
patients of this type. Using the previous argument, none of first nt(ω) patients under
π = S are seen before the time they would have been seen under π = PA. Moreover,
under π = S every remaining Admit patient is seen with a constant delay of at least
t(ω) − CAPAnt(ω)−1(ω) ≥ 0 compared to what it would have been seen under π = PA.
Therefore, for every ω and every α, every Admit type patient is seen under π = S
no sooner than what it would have been seen under π = PA. Thus (a) holds. To
show (b), fix α and notice that under π = PD every Admit patient is seen with
a constant delay of at least CDPDnD−1(ω) compared to what it would have been seen
under π = PA. Thus, (b) holds and the proof of (i) is complete.
Proof of Part (ii). To prove part (ii), it is sufficient to show that for every α and
every sample path ω: (1) LPDD (α, ω) ≤ LSD(α, ω), and (2) LPDD (α, ω) ≤ LPAD (α, ω).
To show (1), fixing α, we show that CDPDk (ω) ≤ CDSk (ω) (∀k ∈ 1, 2, · · · , nD). To
show this notice that using the same argument as part (i) (and after swapping labels
D and A) it is easy to show that TTFT of each Discharge patient under π = PD
is no more than its TTFT under π = S. That is, if TDπk (ω) denotes the TTFT of
the kth Discharge patient under sample path ω, then TDPDk (ω) ≤ TDSk (ω) (∀k ∈
1, 2, · · · , nD). Next, if SDk(ω) is the service time of kth Discharge patient under
sample path ω, CDπk (ω) = TD
π
k (ω) + SDk(ω). Thus, since TD
PD
k (ω) ≤ TDSk (ω), we
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have CDPDk (ω) ≤ CDSk (ω) (∀k ∈ 1, 2, · · · , nD), and hence (1) holds. To show (2),
fix α and notice that the completion time of every Discharge patient under PA is
delayed at least for CDPAnA−1 units of time compared to PD, and hence, the proof is
complete. 
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove this lemma, using the definition of β-convexity, we
need to show that sets Aπ (∀π ∈ Π) are convex in β for every α. Fix α and consider
β1 and β2 such that (α, β1) ∈ Aπ and (α, β2) ∈ Aπ. We then need to show that
(α, γβ1 + (1− γ)β2) ∈ Aπ for every γ ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that as (α, β1) ∈ Aπ, for every
other policy π′ ∈ Π we have:
β1 T
π
A(α) + (1− β1)LπD(α) ≤ β1 T π
′
A (α) + (1− β1)Lπ
′
D (α). (2.1)
Similarly, as (α, β2) ∈ Aπ, for every other policy π′ ∈ Π we have:
β2 T
π
A(α) + (1− β2)LπD(α) ≤ β2 T π
′
A (α) + (1− β2)Lπ
′
D (α). (2.2)
Now multiplying both sides of (2.1) by γ and both sides of (2.2) by (1−γ) and adding
up the resulting inequalities we get:
(γβ1 + (1− γ)β2)T πA(α) + (1− [γβ1 + (1− γ)β2])LπD(α)
≤ (γβ1 + (1− γ)β2)T π
′
A (α) + (1− [γβ1 + (1− γ)β2])Lπ
′
D (α).
Hence, since the above inequality holds for every π′ ∈ Π and every γ ∈ [0, 1], (α, γβ1+
(1− γ)β2) ∈ Aπ for every γ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the optimal strategy π∗(α, β) is convex in
β. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Define functions β1(α) and β2(α) as follows:
β1(α) = inf{β : fS(α, β) ≤ fPD(α, β)},
β2(α) = sup{β : fS(α, β) ≤ fPA(α, β)}.
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We show that by setting β(α) = min{β1(α), β2(α)} and β̄(α) = max{β1(α), β2(α)},
Streaming is optimal for a given α if, and only if, β(α) ∈ [β(α), β̄(α)]. To see the
“if” part, fix α, suppose β(α) ∈ [β(α), β̄(α)], and write β(α) as a convex combination
of extreme points β(α) and β̄(α). Then notice that by definition of β(α) and β̄(α),
Streaming is optimal at both extreme points β(α) and β̄(α). Hence, by Lemma 1
Streaming is also optimal at β(α). To see the “only if” part, fix α and suppose
β(α) /∈ [β(α), β̄(α)]. That is, suppose for some ε > 0 either (a) 0 ≤ β(α) ≤ β(α)− ε,
or (b) β̄(α) + ε ≤ β(α) ≤ 1 . If (a) holds, write β(α) as a convex combination of
β̃(α) = 0 and β(α) − ε. Then notice that, from Proposition 1, π = PD is optimal
at β̃(α) = 0. Also, β(α) − ε < β(α) ≤ β1(α). Therefore, from the definition of
β1(α), π = PD is better than π = S at β(α) − ε. Moreover, π = PA cannot be
optimal at β(α) − ε, since otherwise, choosing a β in [β(α), β̄(α)] and writing that
as a convex combination of ˜̃β(α) = 1 (for which π = PA is optimal by Proposition
1) and β(α) − ε will result in a contradiction. Thus, π = PD is optimal at both
extreme points β̃(α) = 0 and β(α) − ε. Hence, π = PD is also optimal at their
convex combination, β(α), by Lemma 1. If, on the other hand, (b) holds, write β(α)
as a convex combination of β(α) + ε and ˜̃β(α) = 1. Then, similar to the discussion of
part (a), notice that by definition of β2(α), π = PA is optimal at β(α) + ε. Moreover,
by Proposition 1, π = PA is also optimal at ˜̃β(α) = 1. Thus, from Lemma 1 we see
that π = PA should be also optimal at β(α). This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3 - Part (i). We develop a Markov Decision Process (MDP)
model to show the optimality in the expected sense. It should be noted that the un-
derlying problem is in the class of multi-armed restless bandit problems, which are
usually hard to analyze. Since beds are not limited (e.g., larger than the number of
patients in the clearing model), suppose, without loss of generality, that at the begin-
ning all patients are in state W1, i.e., in the initial waiting state depicted in Figure
2.5. The ith waiting stage, Wi, is followed by a treatment stage, Ti. The duration of
waiting stages and treatment stages are independent of each other and exponentially
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distributed with rates denoted by γ and µ, respectively. Suppose the maximum num-
ber of interactions with the physician is denoted by k̄, and Wk̄+1 denotes the final
nurse visit before disposition (i.e., stage FW in Figure 2.5). For the ease of notation,
we also assume stage Tk̄+1 represents the disposition stage. That is, we assume every
patients who leaves the ED goes to (absorbing) stage Tk̄+1. The LOS of a patient in
our clearing model is then equal to the time that s/he leaves stage Wk̄+1 to enter Tk̄+1.
Let pk denote the probability that a patient who is in treatment stage k, Tk, is having
its final treatment by the physician and will go to the final treatment by nurse, Wk̄+1,
afterwards. Assume pk is increasing in k (that is being in a higher treatment stage is
associated with a higher chance of being in the final treatment stage) and pk̄ = 1. The
state of the system then can be represented by (X,Y) with X = (x1, x2, · · · , xk̄+1)
and Y = (y1, y2, · · · , yk̄+1), where xi and yi denote the number of patients in ith stage
of treatment and wait (Ti and Wi), respectively. Let N denote the total number of
patients at time 0. The goal is to dynamically control the location of the physician,
denoted by l, to go from state (N, 0, · · · , 0) to state (0, 0, · · · , N) with the minimum
expected average LOS or equivalently with the minimum sum of patient completion
times. Now, using uniformization with rate ψ = Nγ + µ < ∞, we can consider the
discrete time version of the problem (where the times between consecutive events are
i.i.d and exponentially distributed with rate ψ). Doing so and denoting the opti-
mal remaining cost when the system is at state (X,Y) with J(X,Y), we have the
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pk J(X− ek,Y + ek̄+1)



















where ek is a row vector of size k̄ + 1 with a one in kth element and zero everywhere
else, and L(X) = {i ≤ k̄ : xi ≥ 1} is the set of possible locations to allocate the
physician when X is the first part of the state. The first line in the above optimality
equation represents the current cost (every patient’s completion time who is still in
the ED is delayed for one unit of uniformized time). The second line is the event
related to treating a patient by the physician. The third line represents the event
that a patient moves from a waiting stage to a treatment stage, and the fourth
line represents the self-loop event. (Notice that since preemption is allowed, using
a sample path argument, it can be easily shown that forced idling is suboptimal.
Therefore, without loss of generality the term in the self-loop with coefficient µ is
independent of the control action, l.) Also, a finite horizon version of the above MDP
can be considered using the following optimality equation with terminal condition
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pk Jn(X− ek,Y + ek̄+1)



















where Jn(X,Y) denotes the optimal remaining cost when the state is (X,Y) and
there are n periods to go. (Notice that Jn(X,Y)→ J(X,Y) as n→∞ since there is
an absorbing state.) To show that the PO policy which prescribes serving the “old”
patient in the most downstream stage is optimal, we use induction on n. First notice
that for n = 1 all policies are the same considering the minimization in (2.4), since
J0(X,Y) = 0 for every state (X,Y). Now, suppose it is optimal to follow PO policy
at any state when in period n. We show that it is optimal to follow PO at any state in
period n+1 as well. To this end, consider period n+1 and an arbitrary state (X,Y).
Suppose in state (X,Y) treatment stage k∗ is the the most downstream stage with
an available patient. To show that allocating the physician to stage 1 ≤ k∗ ≤ k̄ is
optimal in n+ 1, suppose there is also another stage k < k∗ with an available patient
at state (X,Y) (i.e., with xk ≥ 1 and xk∗ ≥ 1). Then considering the minimization
in (2.4), to show that serving stage k∗ in period n + 1 is optimal, it is sufficient to
50
show that for any such k, we have:
Property i: pk∗ Jn(X− ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1) + (1− pk∗) Jn(X− ek∗ ,Y + ek∗+1)
≤ pk Jn(X− ek,Y + ek̄+1) + (1− pk) Jn(X− ek,Y + ek+1).
(2.5)
We show the above property of the optimal cost function along with the following
property:
Property ii: p∗k Jn(X + ek̄+1 − ek∗ ,Y) + (1− p∗k) Jn(X + ek∗+1 − ek∗,Y)
pk Jn(X + ek̄+1 − ek,Y) + (1− pk) Jn(X + ek+1 − ek,Y).
(2.6)
In other words, we assume Properties i and ii hold for n−1, and show that they both
hold for n as well. First, we show Property i. To do so, we build an upper bound
for the LHS of (2.5) using suboptimal actions and show that this upper bound is
less than the RHS of this inequality. The upper bound for the LHS can be obtained
by suboptimally allocating the physician to treatment stage k in period n and then
following the optimal policy (i.e., PO) in the remaining periods. To this end, consider
state (X−ek∗ ,Y+ek̄+1) in period n and use the suboptimal but feasible (since xk ≥ 1)
action l = k to obtain an upper bound for Jn(X− ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1). Doing so we have:
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pk Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1 + ek̄+1)





yi Jn−1(X + ei − ek∗ ,Y − ei + ek̄+1)
















Similarly, using the suboptimal but feasible action l = k at state (X−ek∗ ,Y +ek∗+1),
we obtain an upper bound for Jn(X− ek∗ ,Y + ek∗+1):
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pk Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1 + ek∗+1)





yi Jn−1(X + ei − ek∗ ,Y − ei + ek∗+1)
















Now multiplying both sides of (2.7) by pk∗ , both sides of (2.8) by (1 − pk∗), and
summing up the results we have:
53














pk∗ pk Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1 + ek̄+1)
+ pk∗ (1− pk) Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek+1 + ek̄+1)
+ (1− pk∗) pk Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek∗+1 + ek̄+1)







pk∗ Jn−1(X + ei − ek∗ ,Y − ei + ek̄+1)+
(1− pk∗)Jn−1(X + ei − ek∗ ,Y − ei + ek∗+1)
]
+ γ [pk∗ Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek∗ ,Y) + (1− pk∗) Jn−1(X + ek∗+1 − ek∗ ,Y)]
+ ψ̄
(
pk∗ Jn−1(X− ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1) + (1− pk∗) Jn−1(X− ek∗ ,Y + ek∗+1)
)]
, (2.9)





i=1 yi + 1) − µ1
{∑k̄
i=1 xi ≥ 1
})
. Now in the above upper bound, using the
induction hypothesis, we can replace the terms with coefficient γ to obtain another
upper bound. Using Property i and ii for the first and second terms with coefficient
γ, we have:
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pk∗ pk Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1 + ek̄+1)
+ pk∗ (1− pk) Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek+1 + ek̄+1)
+ (1− pk∗) pk Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek∗+1 + ek̄+1)







pk Jn−1(X + ei − ek,Y − ei + ek̄+1)
+ (1− pk) Jn−1(X + ei − ek,Y − ei + ek+1)
]
+ γ [pk Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek,Y) + (1− pk) Jn−1(X + ek+1 − ek,Y)]
+ ψ̄
(
pk Jn−1(X− ek,Y + ek̄+1) + (1− pk) Jn−1(X− ek,Y + ek+1)
)]
. (2.10)
Thus, we have obtained an upper bound for the LHS of (2.5). Now consider
the RHS of (2.5) and first for state (X − ek,Y + ek̄+1) use (2.4) to obtain Jn(X −
ek,Y + ek̄+1). Note that, by the induction hypothesis, PO is optimal in period n.
Hence, it is optimal to assign the physician to treatment stage k∗ in period n at state
(X−ek,Y+ek̄+1), since k∗ is the most down-stream treatment stage with an available
patient when state is (X,Y) (and hence when state is (X − ek,Y + ek̄+1)). Thus,
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using (2.4) we have:














pk∗ Jn−1(X− ek∗ − ek,Y + ek̄+1 + ek̄+1)





yi Jn−1(X + ei − ek,Y − ei + ek̄+1)
















Similarly, using (2.4) to obtain Jn(X− ek,Y + ek+1) we have:














pk∗ Jn−1(X− ek∗ − ek,Y + ek+1 + ek̄+1)





yi Jn−1(X + ei − ek,Y − ei + ek+1)

















Now multiplying both sides of (2.11) by pk, both sides of (2.12) by (1 − pk), and
summing up the results we have:














pk∗ pk Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1 + ek̄+1)
+ pk∗ (1− pk) Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek+1 + ek̄+1)
+ (1− pk∗) pk Jn−1(X− ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek∗+1 + ek̄+1)







pk Jn−1(X + ei − ek,Y − ei + ek̄+1)
+ (1− pk) Jn−1(X + ei − ek,Y − ei + ek+1)
]
+ γ [pk Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek,Y) + (1− pk) Jn−1(X + ek+1 − ek,Y)]
+ ψ̄
(
pk Jn−1(X− ek,Y + ek̄+1) + (1− pk) Jn−1(X− ek,Y + ek+1)
)]
, (2.13)









. Notice that RHS of (2.13) is equal to the upper bound of the LHS of (2.5)
derived in (2.10). Thus, Property i holds for every n by induction, and hence the PO
is optimal in every period.
To complete the proof, it remains to show Property ii. To do so, we use the
same technique used to show Property i. First, notice that for n = 0 (or n = 1)
this property is trivial. Next suppose it holds for n − 1. To show that it would
also hold for n, we use suboptimal actions to obtain an upper bound for the LHS of
(2.6) and show that this upper bound is equal to its RHS. To do so, consider states
(X + ek̄+1 − ek,Y) and (X + ek∗+1 − ek,Y), and for each one, to obtain an upper
bound, use the optimality equation (2.4) but with suboptimal actions l = k. Then
multiply the upper bound obtained for J(X+ek̄+1−ek∗,Y) and J(X+ek∗+1−e∗k,Y)
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by pk∗ and 1−pk∗ , respectively. Summing up the results, we gain the following upper
bound for the LHS of (2.5):
















pk∗ pk Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1)
+ pk∗ (1− pk) Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek+1)
+ (1− pk∗) pk Jn−1(X + ek∗+1 − ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1)







pk∗ Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 + ei − ek∗ ,Y − ei)




pk Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek∗ ,Y) + (1− pk) Jn−1(X + ek∗+1 − ek∗,Y)
)]
. (2.14)
Now, using the optimality equation (2.4) to derive Jn(X + ek̄+1− ek,Y) and Jn(X +
ek+1 − ek,Y), and then multiplying them by pk and 1− pk, respectively, and finally
summing up the results we get the following equality for the RHS of (2.5). (Notice that
by the induction hypothesis assigning the physician to k∗ is optimal when computing
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Jn(X + ek̄+1 − ek,Y) and Jn(X + ek+1 − ek,Y).)
















pk∗ pk Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1)
+ pk∗ (1− pk) Jn−1(X + ek+1 − ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek̄+1)
+ (1− pk∗) pk Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek − ek∗ ,Y + ek∗+1)







pk Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 + ei − ek,Y − ei)




pk Jn−1(X + ek̄+1 − ek,Y) + (1− pk) Jn−1(X + ek+1 − ek,Y)
)]
. (2.15)
Now, notice that since k∗ > k, by assumption we have pk∗ ≥ pk. Next, using the
induction hypothesis and since pk∗ ≥ pk, it is easy to show that the upper bound
obtained in (2.14) is less than or equal to (2.15), which establishes Property ii for n
and completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3 - Part (ii). We use a sample path argument to show the
result in the almost sure sense. Consider the probability space (Ω,F ,P), and similar
to the proof of part (i), without loss of generality, suppose at time 0, all of the
N patients in the clearing model are in state W1, i.e., in the initial waiting state
depicted in Figure 2.5. Let wn1 (ω) be the realized duration of the initial waiting
stage, W1, for patient n ∈ {1, · · · , N} under sample path ω ∈ Ω. Let G be the
set of all admissible (Markovovian or non-Markovian) policies and TTFT g,n(ω) be
the Time To First Treatment of patient n under policy g ∈ G and sample path
ω ∈ Ω. Notice that TTFT g,n(ω) ≥ wn1 (ω) for every g ∈ G, every ω ∈ Ω, and
every n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, since a patient cannot been seen before s/he finishes stage W1.
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Therefore, infg∈G TTFT
g,n(ω) ≥ wn1 (ω). Now notice that for the underlying Prioritize
New (PN) policy, which instructs the physician to initialize a new patient journey
whenever possible (perhaps by preempting other tasks), TTFT PN,n(ω) = wn1 (ω) (for
every ω ∈ Ω, and every n ∈ {1, · · · , N}). Thus, the PN obtains the minimum TTFT
of every patient along every sample path. Therefore, PN also minimizes the average
TTFT of patients with probability one (i.e., in the almost sure sense). 
2.9 Appendix B: Computations Under Imperfect
Classification
Assume I ∈ {A,D} represents the true identity of the patient (Admit or Dis-
charge) and ω ∈ {A,D} is the signaled/identified class. Let γA = Pr(ω = D|I = A)
and γD = Pr(ω = A|I = D). Next, if γ̃A = Pr(I = A|ω = D) and γ̃D = Pr(I =
D|ω = A) represent the misclassification probabilities, with α = Pr(I = A), using
Bayes rule we have:
γ̃A = Pr(I = A|ω = D) =
α γA
αγA + (1− α)(1− γD)
,
γ̃D = Pr(I = D|ω = A) =
(1− α) γD
α(1− γA) + (1− α)γD
.
To isolate the effect of misclassification errors, we eliminate variability in the treat-
ment times, XA and XD so that Pr(XA = µA) = 1 and Pr(XD = µD) = 1. Moreover,
for the ease of computations, we consider a collaborative service environment when-
ever the system is working in the pooling mode (i.e., under pooling or under streaming
after one stream runs out of patients). Collaborative assumption means that the two
servers work together on one patient at a time with service times of µA/2 for admits
and µD/2 for discharges.
Let n be the total number of patients in the clearing system. Suppose NA and
ND = n − NA denote the random variable representing the number of patients that
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are identified as A and D, respectively. Let ÑA and ÑD be the random variables
representing last patients of type A and D that are seen before the system moves to
a pooling scenario, reactively. Next notice that given NA (and hence ND = n−NA),
ÑA and ÑD, expected TTFT of Admits under Streaming can be computed by:
E
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The first line in the above equation is the reciprocal of the number of A patients
(either classified as A or D). The second line considers the jth patient in the stream
of the patients classified as A and seen before the system moves to a pooling scenario
(i.e., up to ñA) and computes its TTFT by conditioning on the number of D patients
in front him. Similarly, the third and fourth line consider the jth patient in the
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stream of the patients classified/signaled as A and seen after the system moves to a
pooling scenario (i.e., after ñA). The second, third, and fourth lines are multiplied by
(1 − γ̃D) (i.e., the probability that a patient classified as A is truly A type) to give
the total sum of TTFT of A patients who are also classified as A. Similarly, the fifth,
sixth, and seventh lines compute the sum of TTFT of A patients who are classified
as D.
















E[TTFT SA |NA, ÑA, ÑD]g(nA, ñA, ñD), (2.18)
where E[TTFT SA |NA, ÑA, ÑD] is computed in (2.16). To compute TTFT
S
A using the
above equation, it remains to derive g(nA, ñA, ñD). To derive g(nA, ñA, ñD) notice
that:
g(nA, ñA, ñD) =
Pr(NA = nA, ÑA = ñA, ÑD = ñD) =
Pr(ÑA = ñA, ÑD = ñD|NA = nA)× Pr(NA = nA) =
Pr(NA = nA)
[
Pr(ÑA = ñA = NA = nA, ÑD = ñD)1{ñD < n− nA = nD} (2.19)
+Pr(ÑA = ñA, ÑD = ñD = n−NA = n− nA)1{ñA < nA} (2.20)
+Pr(ÑA = ñA = NA = nA, ÑD = ñD = n−NA = n− nA = nD)
×1{ñA = nA, ñD = n− nA}
]
(2.21)
In above, Eq’s (2.19), (2.20), and (2.21) correspond to the cases where the D
stream is finished first, the A stream is finished first, and the case where one stream is
done when the system is working on the last patient of the other stream, respectively.
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Next notice that with p = (1 − γA)α + γD(1 − α) denoting the probability that a
patient is identified as A:





pnA(1− p)n−nA . (2.22)
Let KAj and K
D
j be the random variables denoting the number of D type patients up
to (and including) the jth patient in A and D streams, respectively. Then to compute
(2.19), we need to compute the probability that the time required to see nA patients
in the A stream is between the time required to see ñD and ñD + 1 patients in the D
stream (so that ñD is the last patient seen in the D stream before the system moves
to the pooling scenario). we have:



























































−KDñD+1, respectively. Similarly, to compute (2.20), we have:
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Next, to compute (2.21), we need to compute the probability that one stream
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finishes when the system is working on the last patient of the other stream:
Pr(ÑA = ñA = NA = nA, ÑD = ñD = n−NA = n− nA = nD)
= Pr(TAnA−1 < T
D
nD






= Pr(((nA − 1)−KAnA−1)µA +K
A











+ Pr(((nD − 1)−KDnD−1)µA +K
D
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− Pr((nD −KDnD)µA +K
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− Pr((nD −KDnD)µA +K
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nD − (nA − 1)
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) + F6(µA












nA − (nD − 1)
µA − µD
)
where T in (2.25) is used to show the finish times of corresponding jobs, and F5(·) and
F5(·) are CDFs of random variables Z5 = KDnD −K
A




notice that random variables Z1,...,Z6 are each the difference between two indepen-
dent binomial random variables with known parameters. Thus, CDFs F1,...,F6 are




Next, in a similar way, we compute the metric LOS
S
D (i.e., Expected Length of
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Next we need to compute same metrics but under π = PA and π = PD:
E
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Figure 2.16: Expected performance of policies for a clearing system with n = 20,
µA = 80(mins), µD = 45(mins), and symmetric misclassification error between A


































































TTFT PAA |NA = nA
]
× Pr(NA = nA),
where Pr(NA = nA) is given in (2.22).













































































LOSPAD |NA = nA
]
× Pr(NA = nA).
It remains to compute the metrics under π = PD:
E
[


































































TTFT PDA |NA = nA
]







































































LOSPDD |NA = nA
]
× Pr(NA = nA).
Therefore, we have computed expected values of all metrics under different possible
policies. Using these computation, Figure 2.16 depicts the performances for a typical
numerical example. An important observation is that streaming is much more robust
to misclassification errors than the pooling policies.
2.10 Appendix C: Further Descriptions of the Sim-
ulation Framework and Assumptions.
In this section we describe the patient flow and assumptions of our simulation
framework in more details. Many assumptions are made to be as close as possible to
the practice observed in University of Michigan Emergency Department (UMED). A
year of data from UMED is gathered to calibrate the simulation. The simulation was
developed in a C++ framework. Our model can be described as a cycle-stationary
model with a period of one week. Each data point is obtained for 5000 replications
of simulating a week, where each replication is preceded by a warm up period of one
week (which was observed to be a sufficient warm up period because correlations in
the ED flow are small for spans of two or more days). The number of replications

































Figure 2.17: Cumulative number of class based physician-patient interactions
averages are reliable, and (2) our data presentation need not to visualize these very
tight intervals.
Arrival Process. Arrivals for patient classes are modeled using non-stationary Pois-
son processes. The arrival rates for different classes (obtained from a year of UMED
data) are depicted in Figure 3.5. The general pattern is similar to those found in
other studies (e.g., Green et al. (2006)). A “thinning” mechanism (see Lewis and
Shedler (1979a) and Lewis and Shedler (1979b)) is used to simulate the non-stationary
Poisson process arrivals for each class of patients (with rates depicted in Figure 3.5).
Service Process. The service process in the ED is depicted in Figure 2.5. Each pa-
tient goes through several phases of patient-physician interactions/treatment followed
by tests and preparations. The duration of each interaction is stochastic and depends
on the class of the patient and the number of previous interactions. For instance,
the first and last interactions are usually longer than intermediate ones. Also, the
duration of “wait” states is stochastic and depend on the class of the patient, based
on the information at the UMED. For instance, the last “wait” state, i.e., where
the patient is given final directions and is waiting to be disposed is much longer for
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admits since they have to be boarded until a bed becomes available in the hospital
(the so-called hospital bed-block effect). The number of interactions with a physician
per patient ranges from 1 to 7 and depends on the class of the patient, as well as
several other factors. Based on the class of the patient, we draw the number of such
interactions from a distribution constructed from a detailed time study published in
[52] (see Table 3 there) after modifying the data to represent our four patient classes.
These class based distributions are depicted in Figure 3.6. The simulated service pro-
cess is non-collaborative (an ED physician rarely transfers his/her patients to another
physician) and non-preemptive (an ED physician rarely moves to another patient in
the middle of his/her current interaction).
Phase 1: Assigning Patients to Rooms and Physicians. Whenever a room/bed
becomes available, the nurse who is in charge of bed assignment transfers a triaged
patient from the waiting area to that room. S/he uses a Phase 1 sequencing rule to
decide which patient to bring in to an exam room from the main waiting area (see
the body of the paper for different Phase 1 rules implemented). In the VS designs,
if an A(D) bed becomes available, the nurse in charge brings an A(D) patient (with
priority to patients of ESI 2) from the waiting area in to one of the rooms. If however,
an A(D) patient is not waiting in the waiting area, the nurse brings in a D(A) patient
(with priority to patients of ESI 2). Also, after an A(D) patient is triaged, s/he
is directly guided to one of the A(D) beds if one such bed is available, and if not,
to one of the D(A) beds (i.e., bed sharing is allowed, since beds are only virtually
separated). If, however, no bed is available, the patient has to wait in the waiting
area. Once a room/bed is assigned to a patient, the bed cannot be occupied by
another patient until s/he leaves the ED; the bed assigned to a patient cannot be
assigned to any other one, even if the patient is sent to another facility for a test.
After the patient is brought into the room, s/he goes through the first “waiting”
state (i.e., initial preparation by a nurses) which takes some stochastic amount of
time. The average duration of this stage depends on the class of the patient. After
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this stage the patient is assigned to a physician (if a physician is available) where
his/her first treatment starts. The rule to choose a physician is generally to assign
the patient to the physician who is handling the lowest number of patients (among
those available at that time). However, the rules to choose a physician is different
between the virtual streaming (VS) and the pooling patient flow designs, since in a
VS design the physicians are divided to two groups one for A patients and one for
D patients. Under a VS design, if the patient is assessed to be of A(D) type, the
priority is given to physicians devoted to A(D). In other words, an available A(D)
type physician is allowed to cross to the other stream only if a physician of D(A) type
is needed but is not available (due to being busy with a patient or being currently
assigned to the maximum number of patients that a physician is willing to handle).
Under pooling designs, physicians do not have labels and therefore a physician who is
handling the lowest number of patients (among those available at that time) becomes
responsible for the newly arrived patient. Once a physician is assigned to a patient
s/he is the only physician who can work on that patient. If no physician is available
at the time the patient is ready for his/her first interaction with the physician, the
patient has to wait in the exam room.
Phase 2: Which patient to choose next? Whenever a physician finishes a
treatment stage (including direct and indirect interactions), s/he is available to visit
another patient. The physician chooses the next patient based on the instructions
s/he is given according to the Phase 2 sequencing rule. If the physician has less than
the upper bound on the number of patients that a physician is willing to handle (7
was used based on the UMED data), s/he can also choose to initialize a new journey
by taking a new patient: visiting a patient who has been taken to a room but has
been waiting for a physician to become available. Under the VS designs, physicians
with A(D) label first use the Phase 2 priority rule on the patients of A(D) type and
are allowed to handle D(A) patients only to avoid starvation.
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CHAPTER 3
Emergency Department: Complexity-Based Triage
3.1 Introduction
Overcrowding and lapses in patient safety are prevalent problems in Emergency
Departments (ED’s) in the U.S. and around the world. In one study, 91% of U.S. ED’s
responding to a national survey reported that overcrowding was a problem, and almost
40% of them reported overcrowding as a daily occurrence ([5]). In addition to causing
long wait times, many research studies have linked delays due to overcrowding to
elevated risks of errors and adverse events (see, e.g., [143], [51], [148], and [100]). This
situation prompted the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Future of Emergency
Care in the United States Health System to recommend that “hospital chief executive
officers adopt enterprisewide operations management and related strategies to improve
the quality and efficiency of emergency care” ([77]). The triage process is a natural
place to introduce operations management (OM) into the ED.
Triage (a word derived from the French verb “trier,” meaning “to sort”) refers
to the process of sorting and prioritizing patients for care. [47] argue that there are
two main purposes for triage: “[1] to ensure that the patient receives the level and
quality of care appropriate to clinical need (clinical justice) and [2] that departmental
resources are most usefully applied (efficiency) to this end.” (see [109] for further
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discussion of the underlying principles and goals of triage).
While current triage systems used around the world address the clinical justice
purpose of triage, the efficiency purpose has been largely overlooked. For instance,
most ED’s in Australia use the Australasian Triage Scale (ATS), the Manchester
Triage Scale (MTS) is prevalent in the U.K., and ED’s in Canada generally use the
Canadian Triage Acuity Scale (CTAS). While they differ in their details, all of these
triage systems classify patients strictly in terms of urgency and so address only the
first (clinical justice) purpose of triage.
In the U.S., many ED’s continue to use a traditional urgency-based 3-level triage
scale, which categorizes patients into emergent, urgent, and non-urgent classes. But
other U.S. hospitals have adopted the 5-level Emergency Severity Index (ESI) system
(see [45]), which combines urgency with an estimate of resources (e.g., tests) required.
In the ESI system (a typical version of which is illustrated in Figure 3.1 (left)), urgent
patients who cannot wait are classified as ESI-1 and 2, while non-urgent patients who
can wait are classified as ESI-3, 4, and 5. ESI-4 and 5 patients are usually directed to
a fast track (FT) area, while ESI-1 patients are immediately moved to a resuscitation
unit (RU). ESI-2 and 3 patients, who represent the majority of patients at large
academic hospitals (e.g., about 80% at the University of Michigan ED (UMED)), are
served in the main area of the ED with priority given to ESI-2 patients. Since the ESI
system does not differentiate between patients in the ESI-2 and ESI-3 categories in
terms of complexity, patients in the main ED are still sorted and prioritized purely on
the basis of urgency. Hence, the ESI system does not respond to the second purpose of
triage for the majority of the patients. As [160] state, “Many clinicians have already
realized that triage as it is widely practiced today no longer meets the requirement of
timely patient care.” Our goal in this chapter is to propose a new triage system, which
we call complexity-based triage, that can significantly improve ED performance with
respect to both clinical justice and efficiency.
Doing this poses two challenges: (a) deciding what information should be collected
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at the time of triage, and (b) determining how this information should be used to
assign patients to tracks and prioritize them within tracks (see, e.g., [90]). [121] pro-
posed that one way ED’s can improve performance is to have triage nurses predict the
final disposition (admit or discharge) of patients in addition to assigning an ESI level.
Assigning patients to separate admit and discharge streams can reduce average time
to first treatment for admit patients and average length of stay for discharge patients.
But this study also indicated that the performance of the streaming policy improves
as the difference between the average treatment times of admit and discharge patients
becomes larger. This suggests that classifying patients according to complexity may
be even more useful than classifying them according to ultimate disposition.
There is ample evidence from the OM literature that classifying patients based on
their service requirements and giving priority to those with shorter service times (e.g.,
by following a Shortest Processing Time (SPT) priority rule) can improve resource
usage efficiency, and thereby reduce the average waiting time among all patients.
Furthermore, empirical studies from the emergency medicine literature suggest that
patients can be effectively classified by complexity at the time of triage. Specifically,
[153] defined complex patients as those requiring at least two procedures, investiga-
tions, or consultations and concluded that “Triage nurses are able to make valid and
reliable estimates of patient complexity. This information might be used to guide ED
work flow and ED casemix system analysis.”
Using the number of (treatment related) interactions with the physician (which
correlates directly with expected treatment duration) as an indicator of patient com-
plexity, we propose and investigate the benefit of the new complexity-based triage
process depicted in Figure 3.1 (right). Note that, unlike the ESI system, our proposed
system classifies all patients (except those at risk of death) in terms of complexity.
In this chapter, we compare our proposed triage system with current urgency-based
systems and show that incorporating patient complexity into the triage process can
yield substantial performance benefits. To do this, we consider ED performance in
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terms of both risk of adverse events (clinical justice) and average length of stay (effi-
ciency). Specifically, we make use of a combination of analytic and simulation models
calibrated with hospital data to examine the following:
1. Prioritization: How should ED’s use complexity-based triage infor-
mation to prioritize patients?
2. Magnitude: How much benefit does complexity-based triage (which
adds complexity information to conventional urgency evaluations) offer
relative to urgency-based triage?
3. Sensitivity: How sensitive are the benefits of complexity-based triage
to misclassification errors and other characteristics that may vary across
ED’s?
4. Design: Should complexity-based information be used to create sepa-
rate service streams for simple and complex patients, or is it better to use
it to prioritize patients in a traditional pooled flow design?
In addition to collecting detailed ED data (from UMED), addressing these practi-
cal questions required us to make some technical innovations: (1) In the ED, upfront
triage misclassifications are inevitable. However, the literature on priority queueing
systems under misclassification is very limited. We contribute to this literature by ex-
plicitly considering misclassifications and deriving optimal control policies under dif-
ferent settings that effectively approximate the ED environment. We do this through
a linear transformation of control indices so that they represent “error-impacted”
rates, which use only information from historical data. This leads to modified ver-
sions of the well-known cµ rule, which we show to be very effective as the basis for
prioritizing patients into ED examination rooms. (2) To provide guidance for ED
physicians on how to prioritize patients within the examination rooms (when they
have a choice of what patient to see next), we develop a Markov Decision Process
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Figure 3.1: Left: Current practice of triage (Emergency Severity Index (ESI) algo-
rithm version 4); Right: Proposed complexity-based triage system (RU: Resuscitation
Unit, FT: Fast Track, NS: Non-urgent Simple, NC: Non-urgent Complex, US: Urgent
Simple, UC: Urgent Complex).
heath delivery settings, is that patients are occasionally sent for tests (e.g., MRI,
CT Scan, X-Ray, etc.), and are unavailable to the physician during testing. In such
a setting, the physician (controller) may need to consider both the current and the
future availability of the patients when making decisions. This type of problems usu-
ally result in complex state-dependent optimal control policies. However, we show
how a simple-to-implement rule that relies only on historical data defines the opti-
mal policy for ED physicians. (3) Because of unbounded transition rates, the MDP
model of patient prioritization within examination rooms cannot use the conven-
tional method of uniformization (proposed by [99]) for working with continuous-time
MDP’s. The available technical results for continuous-time MDP’s with unbounded
transition rates is very limited (see, e.g., [56]). We contribute to this literature by
showing how one can use a sequence of MDP’s, each with bounded transition rates,
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to derive an optimal policy for the original MDP. Using this innovative technique, we
derive a simple-to-implement rule for ED physicians that prescribes which patient to
visit next.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes
previous OM and medical research relevant to our research questions. Section 6.3
describes our performance metrics and analytical modeling approach. For modeling
purposes, we divide the ED experience of the patient into Phase 1 (from arrival until
assignment to an examination room) and Phase 2 (from assignment to an examina-
tion room until discharge/admission to the hospital). Section 3.4 focuses on Phase
1 and uses analytical queueing models to compare performance under urgency-based
and complexity-based triage systems. Section 3.5 considers Phase 2 by developing
and analyzing a Markov Decision Process model. Section 3.6 uses a high-fidelity sim-
ulation model of the full ED to validate the insights obtained through our analytical
models and to refine our estimates of the magnitude of performance improvement
possible with complexity-based triage. We conclude in Section 4.5.
3.2 Literature Review
In this section, we review studies related to our work from both the operations
research/management literature and the medical literature.
3.2.1 Operations Research/Management Studies
The effect of assigning priorities in queueing systems has been studied in the
operations research literature for a long time. One of the first works to rigorously
analyze such systems under perfect classification was [28]. Assuming perfect cus-
tomer classification, [28] and [29] showed that the expected waiting time among all
customers can be reduced by assigning priorities. [149] extended Cobham’s results to
the case with imperfect classification for a two-priority single-channel system. They
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recommended creating a “mixed” group for customers who cannot be classified with
certainty into either group 1 or 2, and assigning priorities probabilistically within this
group. Further analysis of priority queueing systems can be found in [31], [83], and
[162].
Under perfect classification, average holding cost objective, Poisson arrivals, and a
non-preemptive non-idling single server model, [31] used an interchange argument to
show that the cµ rule is optimal among priority rules. That is, product of the holding
cost rate times the service rate is the index that quantifies the attractiveness/priority
of that job or job class. [86] extended this result and used a semi-Markov decision
process to show that the cµ rule remains optimal even among the larger class of
state-dependent policies with or without the option of idling the server. The cµ rule
has since been shown to be optimal in many other queueing frameworks; see, e.g.,
[22], [151], [155], [124], and references therein. In this chapter, we contribute to
this literature by proving the optimality of modified versions of the cµ rule that use
“error-impacted” indices, which are well-suited to the ED triage environment where
misclassification is inevitable.
Research related to our work that analyzes the performance of ED’s from an op-
erations perspective is also very limited. [121] considered streaming of ED patients
based on triage estimations of the final disposition (admit or discharge) and found
that an appropriate “virtual streaming” policy can improve performance with respect
to the operational characteristics of average Length of Stay (LOS) and Time To First
Treatment (TTFT). [130] considered the impact of non-emergency patients on ED
delays using urgency-based triage, and proposed a simple priority queueing model
to reduce average waiting times. [157] considered a queue of heterogenous high risk
patients, for which treatment times are exponential, and patient classification is per-
fect, and concluded that patients should be prioritized into as many urgency classes
as possible in order to maximize survival. [11] used the average waiting time as the
performance metric in a service system with two classes of customers, in which cus-
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tomer classification is imperfect, and showed that prioritizing customers according
to the probability of being from the class that should have a higher priority when
classification is perfect outperforms any finite-class priority policy.
The above studies suggest that separating patients according to a measure of ser-
vice duration can reduce waiting times through a better resource allocation. However,
we note that they (a) lack insights into clinical justice/safety issues that are vital in
ED’s, and (b) are limited to simple/stylized queueing models with features (e.g., one-
stage service, fixed number of customers all available at time zero, availability of the
customers at any time during service, no bound on the number of customers that
can be assigned to a server, no change in the condition/holding cost of customers
after they begin service, perfect customer classification, etc.) that do not capture
the reality of ED’s. In this chapter, we seek to address both safety and efficiency,
and to account for the key features that define the ED environment. To this end, in
addition to using stylized models that approximate ED flow, we develop a complex
simulation model of the ED and use hospital data to investigate whether the insights
from stylized models carry over to the actual ED environment.
3.2.2 Medical Studies
Our research was informed by empirical studies of ED’s and triage processes.
[50], [47], and [76] provide excellent reviews of the history of the triage process and
its development over time. Most studies attribute the first formal battlefield triage
system to the distinguished French military surgeon Baron Dominique-Jean Larrey
who recognized a need to evaluate and categorize wounded soldiers. He recommended
treating and evacuating those requiring the most urgent medical attention, rather
than waiting hours or days for the battle to end before treating patients, as had been
done in previous wars ([76]). Since that time, triage in medicine has been mainly
based on urgency. However, the idea of considering the complexity of patients goes
back to World War I triage recommendations: “A single case, even if it urgently
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requires attention, –if this will absorb a long time,– may have to wait, for in that
same time a dozen others, almost equally exigent, but requiring less time, might be
cared for. The greatest good of the greatest number must be the rule.” ([87]). The
ESI triage system shown in Figure 3.1 (left) is the most serious effort to date at
introducing complexity into the triage process. However, because (a) the number of
resources required does not necessarily correlate with the physician time required by
the patient, (b) The complexity of patients varies greatly within ESI categories, and
(c) ED’s do not use ESI information in a consistent manner to prioritize patients, the
ESI system falls well short of the potential for complexity-based triage.
Anticipating the potential of complexity-based triage, [153] empirically tested the
ability of nurses to estimate patient complexity at the time of triage and found that
they are able to this reliably. [153] suggested that this type of information could
be used to improve patient flow in ED’s, although they did not specify how. Other
researchers have suggested using physicians at triage as a way to generate more and
better patient information. However, [60] and [119] studied physician triage and found
that it is not an effective method for reducing total length of stay, although it may
reduce the average time spent in an ED bed.
Finally, several studies have been published in medical journals that aim at in-
vestigating and/or validating the ESI triage system. For this stream of research, we
refer interested readers to [45], which summarized the findings and recommendations
of a task force from the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) and the
Emergency Nurses Association (ENA) appointed in 2003 to analyze the literature and
make recommendations regarding use of 5-level triage systems in the United States.
While this committee found the 5-level ESI system to be a good option compared to
other available methods, they encouraged further in-depth research for improving the
triage system.
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3.3 Modeling the ED
To answer the four questions (prioritization, magnitude, sensitivity, and design)
we posed in Section 1, we need to model patient flow through the ED. A high level
schematic of this flow is presented in Figure 3.2. A patient’s path through the ED
begins with arrival, which occurs in a non-stationary stochastic manner. Upon ar-
rival, the patient goes to triage, where s/he is classified according to a predefined
process (based on urgency and/or complexity), which inevitably involves some mis-
classification errors. If an examination room is not immediately available, s/he goes
to the ED waiting area until s/he is called by the charge nurse and brought to an
examination room. There s/he goes through a stochastic number of treatment stages
with a physician, which are also stochastic in duration. These treatment stages are
punctuated by test stages which involve testing (MRI, CT Scan, X-Ray etc.) or
preparation/processing activities that do not involve the physician and during which
the patient is unavailable to the physician. The final processing stage after the last
physician interaction is disposition, in which the patient is either discharged to go
home or admitted to the hospital.
We refer to the time a patient spends after s/he is triaged and before s/he is
brought an examination room as “Phase 1,” and label the remainder of time in the
ED until disposition as “Phase 2.” Because they are under observation and care,
patients have a lower risk of adverse events during Phase 2 than during Phase 1.
Patients are taken from Phase 1 to Phase 2 by the charge nurse based on a Phase 1
sequencing rule that can make use of the patient classification performed at triage.
Similarly, in Phase 2, physicians use some kind of a sequencing rule to choose which
patient to see next.
To gain insights into appropriate triage and priority rules, we first focus on the risk
of adverse events and average waiting times in Phase 1 by considering the dashed area
in Figure 3.2 (i.e., Phase 2) as a single-stage service node with a single, aggregated
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Figure 3.2: General flow of patients in the main ED.
s/he has begun service, we assume a non-preemptive service protocol. We also ap-
proximate the non-stationary arrival process by a stationary Poisson process. These
simplifications allow us to gain insights into suitable Phase 1 priority rules using a
multi-class non-preemptive priority M/G/1 queueing model. We refer to this model
as the simplified single-stage ED model. An important and challenging aspect of this
model is the existence of triage misclassifications that can affect the way patients
should be prioritized.
After analyzing this model, we focus on the risk of adverse events and average
waiting times in Phase 2. To do this, we note that physicians can preempt their
current interaction with a patient to visit another patient with a higher priority (e.g.,
a severely acute patient), and hence, we allow for preemption in Phase 2. Again
approximating arrivals with a stationary Poisson process arrival stream, we can rep-
resent the multi-stage service process in Phase 2 as a Markov decision process model,
which we label as the simplified multi-stage ED model. We use this model to get
insights into appropriate Phase 2 priority rules that physicians can implement when
choosing their next patient.
Finally, we test the insights from both analytic models under realistic conditions
with a high fidelity simulation model of the full ED calibrated with a year of data from
University of Michigan Hospital ED as well as time study data from the literature.
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3.4 Phase 1: A Simplified Single-Stage ED Model
To formalize the Phase 1 sequencing problem, we define a patient to be of type
ij if his/her urgency level is i ∈ U and his/her complexity type is j ∈ C, where
U = {U(Urgent), N(Non-urgent)} and C = {C(Complex), S(Simple)}. We suppose
patients of type ij ∈ U×C arrive according to a Poison process with rate λij and have
service times (i.e., the total time spent in Phase 2) that follow a distribution, Fij(s)
with first moment 1/µij (where µiC ≤ µiS for all i ∈ U) and a finite second moment.
We assume patients of type ij are subject to adverse events which occur according
to a Poisson process with rate θij, where θUj ≥ θNj for all j ∈ C. Notice that adverse
events only rarely result in death, i.e., the average reported number of adverse events
per patient is much higher than the average number of death per patient (see, e.g.,
[100] where the authors report that 28% of patients boarded in the ED had some
adverse event or error in the course of boarding only). Thus, we assume that the
service process continues, so that it is possible for a patient to experience more than
one adverse event. This allows us to compare the performance of the ED under
different triage systems in a systematic way. Similarly, changes in patient priority
after the occurrence of an adverse event can be neglected, since (a) such changes are
rare, and (b) the effect of such rare changes are not systematically different under
different triage systems.
Assuming RΩπ (t) represents the counting process that, under patient classification
(i.e., triage) policy Ω and sequencing rule π, counts the total number of adverse events
(for all patients) until time t, we consider RΩπ = limt→∞R
Ω
π (t)/t (when the limit exists)
as our metric and refer to it as the rate of adverse events (ROAE). However, if θij = 1




j∈C λij represents the
average length of stay (LOS). (Notice that the sample path costs of LOS and adverse
events with unit risk rates divided by total arrival rate will be different, but they are
equal in expectation.) Hence, we can use our metric to characterize performance with
respect to both safety and efficiency in a systematic and coherent way.
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3.4.1 Urgency-Based Triage - Phase 1
We first consider current practice in most ED’s, in which patients are classified
solely based on urgency, and use our simplified single-stage model to focus on Phase 1
sequencing decisions. We start with the case of perfect classification and then consider
the case of stochastic misclassification.
When patients can be perfectly classified as either urgent (U) or non-urgent (N),
the arrival rates for U’s and N’s are λU =
∑
j∈C λUj and λN =
∑
j∈C λNj, respectively.





j∈C(λNj/λN)(1/µNj), respectively. Furthermore, from known results
for non-preemptive priority queues (see, [28], [149], Section 3.3 of [31], or Section 10.2









where ρl = λl/µl for class l. Hence, if U’s are prioritized over N’s, then the average
waiting time is WU = λE(s2)/2(1−ρU) for U’s and WN = λE(s2)/2(1−ρU)(1−ρ) for
N’s. Furthermore, the average rate of adverse events for U’s is θU = (λUS/λU)θUS +
(λUC/λU)θUC and for N’s is θN = (λNS/λN)θNS + (λNC/λN)θNC . With these, the
ROAE under an urgency-based triage policy (i.e., patient classification with respect
to set U) that gives priority to U’s is
RUU = θUλU(λE(s2)/2(1− ρU)) + θNλN(λE(s2)/2(1− ρU)(1− ρ)). (3.2)
Similarly, we can obtain the ROAE under an urgency-based triage policy that gives
priority to N’s:
RUN = θNλN(λE(s2)/2(1− ρN)) + θUλU(λE(s2)/2(1− ρN)(1− ρ)). (3.3)
Comparing these reveals that, without misclassification errors, the best priority rule
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is to prioritize U’s (N’s) if, and only if, θUµU ≥ (≤)θNµN . Given the criteria used
to classify a patient as urgent, we expect θU and θN be such that θUµU > θNµN ,
meaning that U’s will be given priority. However, this simple result may or may not
hold if one carefully considers the effect of stochastic triage misclassifications.
Therefore, we now formally incorporate stochastic misclassification errors into our
decision model of urgency-based triage and prioritization. Let γU and γN denote
the misclassification probabilities for urgent and non-urgent patients, respectively.
The arrival rates for patients classified (correctly or erroneously) as U and N are
λ′U = λU(1− γU) + λNγN and λ′N = λN(1− γN) + λUγU , respectively. Similarly, the





N = [λN(1 − γN)(1/µN) + λUγU(1/µU)]/λ′N , respectively.
Finally, the ROAE for patients classified as U and N are θ′U = [λU(1 − γU) θU +




N = [λN(1− γN) θN + λUγU θU ]/λ′N , respectively.
Using (3.2) with these new “error impacted” rates shows that when priority is







U(λE(s2)/2(1− ρ′U)) + θ′Nλ′N(λE(s2)/2(1− ρ′U)(1− ρ)), (3.4)











N(λE(s2)/2(1− ρ′N)) + θ′Uλ′U(λE(s2)/2(1− ρ′N)(1− ρ)), (3.5)





The above results enable us to state:
Proposition 4 (Phase 1 Prioritization - Urgency-Based Triage) In the sim-
plified single-stage ED model with imperfect urgency-based classification:
(i) The best priority rule is to prioritize U patients if θ′U µ
′
U ≥ θ′Nµ′N ; otherwise, pri-
oritize N patients.
(ii) The best priority rule is the same as that for the case without misclassification
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error if γN + γU ≤ 1; otherwise, the best priority ordering is reversed.
Empirical studies have observed misclassification levels γN and γU to be in the
range 9-15% depending on the level of triage nurse experience ([63]). Thus, if, as we
expect, prioritizing urgent patients is optimal when there is no misclassification error,
the above proposition implies that doing so remains optimal even under realistic levels
of misclassification errors. Hence, prioritizing ESI-2 patients over ESI-3 patients in
the main ED seems legitimate in the current urgency-based triage practice in the
U.S. However, we note that there is wide variance of complexity among ESI-2 and
ESI-3 patients. Hence, if complexity is taken into account, simply prioritizing ESI-2
patients over ESI-3 patients as is currently done in practice for these majority of
ED patients may be significantly suboptimal. We investigate this issue in the next
section.
3.4.2 Complexity-Based Triage - Phase 1
We now consider the complexity-based triage policy shown in Figure 3.1 (right),
and compare its performance with respect to that of urgency-based triage currently
in use in practice. By doing this we seek to gain insights into the prioritization,
magnitude, and sensitivity questions posed in the Introduction.
To evaluate the performance of complexity-based triage when classification is im-
perfect, we let γU and γN denote the misclassification error rates with respect to set
U . That is, γU and γN denote the probabilities of classifying a U patient as an N ,
and an N patient as a U , respectively. Similarly, let γC and γS denote the misclassi-
fication error rates with respect to set C; γC denotes the probability that a C patient
is classified as an S, and γS denotes the probability that an S patient is classified as
a C. We assume the misclassification probabilities with respect to sets U and C are
independent. As noted earlier, misclassification error rates in terms of urgency have
been observed to be in the range of 9-15% ([63]). [153] have tested the ability of triage
nurses to evaluate patient complexity (where complexity is defined as requiring two
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or more procedures, investigations, or consultation) and observed a misclassification
rate of 17%.





ij. Let λ = (λUS, λUC , λNS, λNC) and λ







Then λ′ can be obtained through a linear transformation of λ; λ′T = AλT , where A
is a (known) misclassification error matrix, and is defined as
A =

(1− γU)(1− γS) (1− γU)γC γN(1− γS) γNγC
(1− γU)γS (1− γU)(1− γC) γNγS γN(1− γC)
γU(1− γS) γUγC (1− γN)(1− γS) (1− γN)γC
γUγS γU(1− γC) (1− γN)γS (1− γN)(1− γC)
 .
(3.6)
Similarly, if θ′ and µ′ denote the vector of error impacted adverse event and
service rates, we have θ′T = (A (λ × θ)T )/λ′ and (1/µ′)T = (A (λ/µ)T )/λ′, where
1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) and operators “×” and “/” are componentwise multiplier and division,
respectively.
With these, the waiting times for each customer class under an imperfect U ∪ C
classification can be computed using (3.1) with rates replaced with their transformed
error impacted counterparts. This model permits us to show the following.
Proposition 5 (Phase 1 Prioritization - Complexity-Based Triage) In the sim-
plified single-stage ED model with imperfect urgency and complexity classifications:







∗ . That is, even with misclassification errors, implementing the best
priority rule for complexity-based triage is always (weakly) better than the optimal
priority rule for urgency-based triage.
(iii) The best priority rule of part (i) is optimal even among the larger class of all
non-anticipative (state or history dependent, idling or non-idling, etc.) policies.
Proposition 5 (i) addresses the prioritization question by suggesting a simple prior-
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ity rule (analogous to the well-known “cµ” rule) to incorporate complexity information
into Phase 1 sequencing. Proposition 5 (ii) begins to address the magnitude question
by suggesting that complexity-based triage outperforms urgency-based triage, given
that the optimal priority rule is implemented. While priority rules are greedy and
usually suboptimal, part (iii) confirms that they are optimal in this setting. The sur-
prise is that it is never optimal to idle when only low priority patients are available,
even though the model disallows preemption. Furthermore, part (iii) of Proposition
5 states that a dynamic (i.e., state-dependent) priority policy cannot beat the greedy
and simple state-independent policy presented in part (i).
Figure 3.3 provides additional insights into the magnitude question by illustrating
the amount of improvement for a numerical example with µUC = µNC = µC =
1, µUS = µNS = µS varying from 2 to 5, λUS = (1/5)µUS, λUC = 1/4, λNS =
(1/3)µNS, λNC = 1/6,E(s2) = 4, θNS = θNC = θN = 1, θUS = θUC = θU . Note
that (1) the amount of improvement is depicted both in terms of average length of
stay and risk of adverse events (since when θU/θN = 1, the percentage improvement
in risk of adverse events and length of stay are equal), and (2) reduction in the length
of stay results in reduction in congestion (by Little’s Law), which can serve as a po-
tent remedy for the prevalently observed phenomenon of ED overcrowding. Figure
3.3 suggests that, if the average service time of complex patients is 3–4 times larger
than that of simple patients, then complexity-based triage can reduce the risk of
adverse events (ROAE) and average length of stay (LOS) by 12–22% and 27–33%,
respectively. Finally, we can address the sensitivity question by using our model to
determine the environmental factors that favor complexity-based triage.
Proposition 6 (Attractiveness of Complexity-Based Triage) Under the sim-
plified single-stage ED model, complexity-based triage is more beneficial in ED’s with
(i) higher utilization, (ii) higher heterogeneity in the average service time of simple
and complex patients, (iii) a more equal fraction of simple and complex patients, and





















































Imperfect Complexity-Based Triage VS. Imperfect Urgency-Based Triage
ô ΘUΘN = 17
ò ΘUΘN = 13
ì ΘUΘN = 9
à ΘUΘN = 5
æ ΘUΘN = 1
Figure 3.3: Benefit of complexity-based triage over urgency-based triage with prac-
tical misclassification rates (γU = γN = 10%, γS = γC = 17%) reported in the litera-
ture
3.5 Phase 2: A Multi-Stage ED Model
The analysis of the previous section was limited to patient waiting and risk of
adverse events prior to entry into an examination room (i.e., Phase 1). But, as
illustrated in Figure 3.4, a great deal of ED activity takes place after this point,
which contributes to both patient length of stay and risk of adverse events. Since
triage classification can be used to sequence patients within the ED, as well as in the
waiting room, it is important to consider Phase 2 sequencing as part of our evaluation
of complexity-based triage. It seems intuitive that a priority rule similar to that for
Phase 1 should serve as a useful guide to physicians in allocating their time among
their slate of patients. However, investigating this requires a model of Phase 2 that
includes some challenging new features (e.g., patients going off for tests, multiple
patients of different class in different stages of treatment, etc.), which did not exist
in the model of Phase 1.
To formulate a suitable model, consider the multi-stage service process illustrated
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in Figure 3.4 and suppose patients of class ij ∈ U × C arrive according to a Poison
process with rate λij. Further, we suppose the rate of adverse events in Phase 2 is
denoted by the vector θ̂ = (θ̂ij)ij∈U×C (which is usually less than the risk of adverse
events in Phase 1, θ, because patients are monitored and treated in the examination
rooms). As they enter examination rooms, patients are assigned to physicians who
treat them, often with multiple visits, until their discharge or admission to the hospi-
tal. Since an individual physician may be assigned to several patients s/he often has
a choice about who to see next among his/her available patients. We call patients
who have completed tests (e.g., MRI, CT Scan, X-Ray, etc.) and have results and are
ready for a physician visit “available,” and patients being tested, prepared, or waiting
for results “unavailable.” Our model for the congestion for tests is exogenous and can
be estimated from historical data. An important feature in modeling the physician
choice is the uncertain duration of unavailability of patients to the physician due to
the wait for tests and their results.
Suppose each interaction with a patient of class ij takes an exponentially dis-
tributed amount of time with rate µ̂ij and assume (for tractability) that the physician
can preempt an interaction to see a patient of a different class. When a physician
returns to a preempted interaction, we assume s/he must repeat the process (e.g.,
review vital signs, lab results, etc.), and so we assume a preempt-repeat protocol.(In
practice, emergency physicians can, and sometimes do, preempt patients to deal with
emergencies. But for fairness and efficiency reasons, they do this rarely. Hence, we
test our conclusions under the assumption of non-preemption in Phase 2 in Section 6
using a realistic simulation model.)
After each completed interaction, a patient of class ij may be disposed (discharged
home or admitted to the hospital) with probability pij > 0, or with probability 1−pij
requires another round of test and treatment. We note that in practice the probability
of being disposed may not be constant because it depends on various factors (e.g.,
progression of pain, the number of past interactions with the physician, revealed test
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results, etc.). If data on such factors were collected, it could be incorporated into the
patient prioritization decision. Since such data do not currently exist, we approximate
the number of interactions with the physician by fitting a geometric distribution with
constant probability of departure pij for class ij ∈ U×C. Furthermore, we model test
times, which include any preparation and wait times associated with the test, as a
·/M/∞ queueing system with average service time of η−1. Because we aggregate test
times, waiting times for the test results, and preparations for tests into a single “test”
stage, and also aggregate these for all possible types of tests, the long-run average
time spent for a generic “test,” denoted by η−1, can be assumed to be roughly similar
among different patient classes (for more detailed data on test turnaround times see
[138] and [67]).
Because each physician is dedicated to his/her own slate of patients, we focus on
a single physician’s decision of who to see next. To this end, we let x = (xij)ij∈U×C
(respectively y = (yij)ij∈U×C) represent the number of patients of each class available
(not available) for the physician visit. With these, we can define the state of the
system at any point of time, t, by the vector (x(t), y(t)) ∈ Z4+ × Z4+, and model
the process {(x(t), y(t)) : t ≥ 0} as a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC).
We assume the parameters of the system are such that this CTMC is stablizable;
i.e., there exists at least one policy under which the risk of adverse events is finite
(otherwise, the problem does not represent a real ED). However, notice that since
the transition rates are not bounded, we cannot use uniformization in the spirit of
[99] to formulate a discrete time equivalent of the CTMC where the times between
consecutive events are i.i.d. (for all states). However, in what follows, we construct a
sequence of Controlled CTMC’s (CCTMC’s) with an increasing but bounded sequence
of (maximum) transition rates converging to the original CCTMC. We do this by
replacing the ·/M/∞ test stage with four parallel ·/M/k systems (one devoted to each
patient class), index the underlying CCTMC with k, and let k →∞. The advantage

























Figure 3.4: Patient flow after a patient is moved to an examination room/bed (Phase
2 sequencing).
jobs in each queue becomes irrelevant, and hence, does not need to be captured
in the system’s state. Another novel aspect of our approach is that we truncate the
transition rates as opposed to the state space, thereby avoiding the artificial boundary
effects that usually impact the policy. Since the transition rates in the CTMC indexed
by k (for all k) are bounded by ψk = maxij∈U×C µ̂ij + 4 k η +
∑
ij∈U×C λij < ∞, we
can use the standard uniformization technique to derive the optimal policy for each
CCTMC. We then use a convergence argument (taking the limit as k →∞) to derive
the optimal policy for the original problem. It should be noted that we can always
start with a sufficiently large k such that the stability of the underlying system is not
affected (since the original system is stable by assumption).
For the system indexed by k, the optimal rate of adverse events, Rk∗, and the
optimal physician behavior can be derived from the following average cost optimality
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where Jk(x, y) is a relative cost function (defined as the difference between the total
expected cost of starting from state (x, y) and that from an arbitrary state such as
(0, 0)), a ∧ b = min{a, b}, eij is a vector with the same size as x with a 1 in position
ij and zeroes elsewhere, a is an action determining which patient class to serve, and
A(x) = {ij ∈ U × C : xij > 0} ∪ {0} is the set of feasible actions (class 0 represents
the idling action) when the number of patients of each class in the examination rooms
is x.
The optimal behavior of the physician is an appealing and simple operational rule,
supporting implementation in practice.
Theorem 1 (Phase 2 Prioritization) The physician should not idle when there is
a patient available in an exam room. Furthermore, regardless of the number and class
of available and unavailable patients, the physician should prioritize available patients
in decreasing order of pij θ̂ij µ̂ij.
Theorem 1 provides a simple prioritization index for physicians computed as the
probability that the visit will be the final interaction with the patient (pij) times the
estimated risk of adverse events (θ̂ij) divided by the average duration of each visit
(1/µ̂ij). Such a policy is easy to implement, since (a) the physician does not need to
consider the number and class of patients available in the examination rooms or under
tests, and (b) the physician (or a decision support system) can dynamically estimate
the required quantities. The authors have developed a smart phone application that
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can be used by physicians to facilitate collection of required data and computation of
patient priorities.
The above analysis confirms our intuition that a simple priority rule for Phase 2
is optimal. Moreover, the Phase 2 priority rule is consistent with that of Phase 1,
since 1/µij = 1/(pijµ̂ij).
3.6 A Realistic Simulation Analysis of Complexity-
Based Triage
Our analytical models of the previous sections suggest that adding patient com-
plexity to the triage process and using appropriate priority rules can improve the
ED performance in terms of both patient safety (ROAE) and operational efficiency
(LOS). Furthermore, they provide some insights into hospital conditions under which
such improvements are more beneficial. In this section, we test the conjectures sug-
gested by our analytic models by means of a detailed ED simulation model. This
simulation incorporates many realistic features of the University of Michigan ED
(UMED) that are representative of most ED’s in large research hospitals, including
dynamic non-stationary arrivals, multi-stage service, multiple physicians and exam
rooms, inaccuracy in triage classifications (both in terms of urgency and complexity),
and limits on the number of patients physicians handle simultaneously. Our base case
model uses a year of data from UMED plus time study data from the literature. We
first describe the main features of our simulation framework, and then describe the
test cases and our conclusions from them.
Patient Classes. At the time of triage, patients are classified according to both
urgency (urgent or non-urgent) and complexity (simple or complex). For modeling
purposes, we omit the resuscitation unit (RU) and fast track (FT) classifications,
shown in Figure 3.1 (right), since these patients are typically tracked separately from

























Figure 3.5: Class dependent arrival rates to the ED for an average day (obtained
from a year of data in UMED).
as those who only require one treatment related interaction and C patients as those
requiring two or more treatment related interactions.(To clarify, we do not count
social interactions as a treatment related interaction. Furthermore, we would still
classify a case as simple if the physician were first to order a test (without spending
time treating the patient) and after receiving the results, conduct one treatment visit
prior to discharge.) With ESI-4 and 5 patients omitted, we can equate U patients
with ESI-2 patients, and N patients with ESI-3 patients for our purposes. Since
the majority (about 80% in university of Michigan Hospital ED) of ED patients
are composed of ESI-2 and ESI-3 patients, improvements for this subset of patients
will have a major impact on overall ED performance. Both urgency and complexity
classifications at the point of triage are subject to errors with different error rates.
We assume the true type of a patient is not known until the final disposition decision
is made. Consistent with the empirical findings of [63] and [153], we assume urgency
and complexity classifications are subject to 10% and 17% error rates, respectively.
For simplicity, we also assume urgency-based and complexity-based misclassification
rates are independent and symmetric (i.e., triage nurses are equally likely to classify
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U (C) patients as N (S) as they are to classify N (S) patients as U (C), respectively).
But we consider asymmetric errors in our sensitivity analysis.
Arrival Process. Class-based patient arrivals are modeled using non-stationary
Poisson processes that approximate our data. The non-stationary arrival rates for
different classes are depicted in Figure 3.5. These arrival rates were obtained from
a year of UMED data using the ESI levels based on two-hour intervals of the day.
However, since patients are not currently triaged based on complexity, we used the
empirical results of [153] (who found that about 49% of patients are complex) to
obtain these arrival rates using a (stationary) splitting mechanism. The resulting
pattern illustrated in Figure 3.5 is similar to those reported in other studies (e.g., [54]).
A “thinning” mechanism (see [96] and [97]) is used to simulate the non-stationary
Poisson process arrivals for each class of patients (with rates depicted in Figure 3.5)
in our base case.
Service Process. The ED service process has multiple stages as depicted in the
schematic in Figure 3.4. Each patient goes through one or more phases of patient-
physician interactions followed by test/preparation/wait activities during which the
physician cannot have a direct interaction with the patient (all such stages are labeled
as Test in Figure 3.4). We also consider the initial and final preparations by a nurse.
The initial preparation happens when the patient is moved to an exam room for the
first time (before the first interaction with the physician) and the final preparation
happens after the final visit by the physician and before the patient is discharged home
or admitted to the hospital. The duration of each physician interaction is random
and its average may depend on the class of the patient and the number of previous
interactions. Our data suggest that the first and last interactions are typically longer
than the intermediate interactions. As mentioned before and illustrated in Figure 3.1
(right), S patients are defined to be those who have only one (treatment related) in-
teraction. For C patients, we can estimate the distribution of the number of physician































Figure 3.6: Cumulative number of class-based physician-patient interactions for com-
plex patients (those requiring more than one interaction).
(see Table 3 of [52]) (normalized to represent our NC and UC patient classes). The
simulated service process is considered to be non-collaborative, since an ED physician
rarely transfers his/her patients to another physician, and also non-preemptive.
Physician-Patient Assignments and Priorities. As mentioned earlier, the pro-
cess of connecting patients with physicians involves two phases. In Phase 1, patients
are brought back from the waiting area to exam rooms whenever a room becomes
available based on a Phase 1 sequencing priority. Phase 1 is usually performed by a
charge nurse. In Phase 2, whenever a physician becomes available, and if s/he has
fewer than his/her maximum number of patients (7 is typical), s/he chooses the next
patient from those available based on a Phase 2 sequencing rule, which will depend
on the type of triage being used. For urgency-based triage, we assume U patients get
priority over N patients in both Phases 1 and 2. For complexity-based triage, patients
are prioritized in both Phases according to the strict priority ordering US, UC, NS,
NC (ranked from high to low priority) which we found to be optimal in the simplified
ED models discussed previously (see Proposition 5). When a patient is brought back
to an examination room, we assume that s/he is assigned to the physician with the
lowest number of patients. If all physicians are handling more than 7 patients, the
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patient must wait. Phase 1 and Phase 2 priority decisions can only be made based
on the estimated class of the patient, which is subject to misclassification error, but
adverse events are determined by the true class of the patient.
ED Resources. We consider 22 beds and 4 physicians in our base case scenario.
We then perform a sensitivity analysis to understand the effect of number of both
beds and physicians on the benefit of complexity-based triage. For simplicity, we
do not consider end of shift effects and/or variations in the level of staff available.
Furthermore, we consider test facilities (ancillary services) as exogenous resources
(i.e., test times are independent of the volume of ED patients) because these facilities
often handle many other patients besides those from the ED.
Adverse Events. Adverse events are simulated using Poisson processes with rates
that depend on the class of patients, as well as the phase of service. Specifically, we
assume that U patients have a higher rate of adverse events than N patients, and that
after patients enter an exam room (Phase 2 of service), their rate of adverse events
decreases by 60% (in our base case) relative to their rates in the waiting area (Phase
1 of service). As in our previous models, we do not consider fatal events that would
terminate the adverse events counting process, since the impact of these rare events
on our objective function is extremely small.
Runs. The simulation was written in a C++ framework and makes use of a cyclo-
stationary model with a period of a week. Each data point was obtained for 5000
replications of one week, where each replication was preceded by a warm-up period
of one week (which was observed to be sufficient because correlations in the ED flow
are very small for spans of two or more days). The number of replications (5000)
was chosen so that the confidence intervals are tight enough that (1) the sample
averages are reliable, and (2) we can omit these very tight intervals from our data
presentations.
In the following sections, we describe how we used our simulation model to analyze
the benefit of complexity-based triage over urgency-based triage.
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3.6.1 Performance of Complexity-Based Triage
We start by comparing complexity-based triage to urgency-based triage in our
base case model, under the assumption that both types of triage make use of their
respective priority rules for sequencing patients in both Phase 1 and Phases 2. This
leads to the following:
Observation 1. In the base case, implementing complexity-based triage improves
ROAE and LOS by 9.41% (0.16 events/hr) and 7.68% (36 mins/patient), respectively.
To consider the case where Phase 2 sequencing cannot follow the optimal rule due
to a lack of data, patient discomfort, or other factors, we also compare complexity-
based triage with urgency-based triage when Phase 2 sequencing in both systems
uses a service-in-random-order (SIRO) rule. This leads to improvements of 7.95%
and 7.01% in ROAE and LOS, respectively. Hence, it appears that the benefits of
complexity-based triage are robust to the policy used in Phase 2. At least in our
base case, it is the refined sequencing in Phase 1 that drives the majority of the
improvement.
The smaller effect of Phase 2 sequencing compared to that of Phase 1 prioritization
is mainly due to the fact that, under the conditions of our base case, physicians in
Phase 2 often do not have many available patients from which to choose. This is
because (a) patients are unavailable for a considerable amounts of time while being
tested and waiting for test results, and (b) each physicians is handling a limited
number of patients at a time (with a constrained upper bound of seven). However,
in ED’s with shorter test times (e.g., more test facilities dedicated to the ED, or
more responsive central test facilities), larger case loads (patients per physician), and
enough examination rooms/beds to accommodate patients, there will be more choices
among in-process patients, and hence more improvement from an effective Phase 2
sequencing policy. To test this, we consider an ED with test rates 70% faster than the
base case values, 40 beds, 3 physicians, and a maximum number of 10 patients per
physician. Under these conditions, if Phase 2 sequencing is done according to SIRO for
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both the urgency-based and complexity-based triage systems, then complexity-based
triage achieves improvements of 8.58% and 6.15% in ROAE and LOS, respectively,
relative to urgency-based triage. In contrast, if the urgency-based triage system
prioritizes patients in Phase 2 by urgency (U > N) and the complexity-based triage
system prioritizes patients in Phase 2 by complexity and urgency (US > UC > NS >
NC), then complexity-based triage achieves improvements of 13.09% and 9.11% in
ROAE and LOS, respectively, relative to urgency-based triage. This leads us to the
following:
Observation 2. In ED’s where physicians have more choice about what patient
to see next, using complexity information to prioritize patients in Phase 2 becomes
more valuable.
3.6.2 How to Define Complex Patients?
In the previous section, we investigated the benefit of complexity-based triage us-
ing the approach of [153] to define complex patients as those requiring at least two
(treatment related) interactions with a physician. This results in a nearly even split
between complex and simple patients (49% C vs. 51% S), as well as substantial het-
erogeneity between their treatment time (both of which were predicted in Proposition
6 to be factors that improve the performance of complexity-based triage). But we
could use other standards for defining a patient to be complex. In Figure 3.7, we
illustrate the impact of complexity-based triage on ROAE and LOS when complex
patients are defined to be as those with more than one (resulting in 49% C patients),
more than two (resulting in 39% C patients), and more than three (resulting in 30%
C patients) interactions. From this we conclude:
Observation 3. If the number of (treatment related) interactions is used as the
metric for patient complexity, the benefit of complexity-based triage is greatest when
complex patients are defined to be those requiring at least two interactions.















































Figure 3.7: Performance of complexity-based triage when defining complex patients to
be those having more than one, more than two, and more than three physician-patient
interactions.
patient to be considered complex decreases the fraction of complex patients substan-
tially, but only slightly increases the difference in treatment times between complex
and simple patients. Thus, as predicted by Proposition 6, the benefit of complexity-
based triage declines.
3.6.3 The Effect of ED Resource Levels
Another factor predicted by Proposition 6 to favor complexity-based triage is re-
source utilization. In that proposition, resources refer to physicians and examination
rooms (which are indistinguishable in the single-stage simplified ED model). Hence,
we expect higher utilization of either physicians or examination rooms to increase the
benefit of complexity-based triage. Figure 3.8 illustrates the percentage improvement
(in terms of ROAE and LOS) of complexity-based triage over urgency-based triage
for varying numbers of examination rooms and physicians. In addition to the LOS
for patient classes considered (i.e., ESI 2 and 3) with 4 physicians, this figure also
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TTR (hrs) LOS (hrs) TTR (hrs) LOS (hrs) TTR (hrs) LOS (hrs) TTR (hrs) LOS (hrs) TTR (hrs) LOS (hrs)
Urgency-Based 31.57 35.24 10.66 14.43 3.91 7.81 1.82 5.81 1.16 5.25
Complexity-Based 26.26 29.97 8.95 12.74 3.3 7.21 1.59 5.61 1.04 5.17





































































Figure 3.8: The effect of resources (beds and physicians) on the benefit of complexity-
based triage over the current practice of urgency-based triage [Left: the effect of beds
(4 physicians); Right: the effect of physicians (22 beds)].
presents the average time spent in Phase 1, labeled as Time to Room (TTR), under
each triage system. From this figure we observe the following:
Observation 4. The benefit of complexity-based triage is greater in ED’s with
higher bed and/or physician utilization.
As we observed in the Introduction, most ED’s are overcrowded, so high utiliza-
tion is a common situation. Hence, results from our analytic and simulation models








































































































Figure 3.9: The effect of complexity misclassification error rates on the benefit of
a complexity-based triage (compared to an urgency-based only) [Left: symmetric
misclassification; Right: asymmetric misclassification].)
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3.6.4 The Effect of Misclassification
Finally, we investigate the impact of complexity-based misclassification errors,
which are inevitable in any triage system. Figure 3.9 (left) shows the benefits (in
ROAE and LOS) of complexity-based triage over urgency-based triage for variations
of the base case, in which complexity misclassification error rates range from 5% to
25%. Figure 3.9 (left) assumes these errors to be symmetric; that is, the chance
of classifying an S patient as C is equal to the chance of classifying a C patient
as S. Figure 3.9 (right) considers asymmetric error rates while keeping the average
misclassification rate constant and equal to the base-case value of 17% (reported in
the empirical study of ([153]). From these figures, we observe the following:
Observation 5. The benefit of complexity-based triage is robust to complexity
misclassification errors. However, complex-to-simple misclassifications are slightly
more harmful than simple-to-complex misclassifications.
The intuition behind the second part of this observation is that a complex-to-
simple misclassification error moves a complex patient up in the queue, potentially
delaying many other patients. In contrast, a simple-to-complex misclassification error
moves a simple patient back in the queue, delaying only that patient. So, it is slightly
better to err on the side of classifying ambiguous patients as complex rather than
simple.
3.6.5 Complexity-Based Streaming
In the previous sections, we investigated the benefit of collecting and using complexity-
based information to prioritize patients in the ED. But another way to make use
of this information is to separate patients into different service streams for simple
and complex patients (somewhat analogous to the admit/discharge streaming imple-
mented in Flinders Medical Center ([90]) with complexity information used in place
of admit/discharge predictions). We are interested in whether such streaming is more
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effective than pooling-based prioritization.
To investigate this design question we raised in the Introduction, we examine a
complexity-based streaming patient flow design in which two service streams of patients
are created: one for patients triaged as simple (S) and one for those triaged as complex
(C). The resources (beds and physicians) are labeled with S and C, indicating their
main purpose. However, to overcomes the “anti-pooling” disadvantage of streaming,
we allow the resources to be assigned to the other stream as needed, which is a feature
we found to be useful in [121]. For instance, when a C physician is available but there
is no complex patient available, the physician can be assigned to an S patient who is
waiting. In this design, we assume that patients in each stream and in both Phases
1 and 2 are prioritized according to their ESI level.
Since simple and complex patients are separated, lean process improvement tech-
niques can be implemented to improve and standardize service, particularly on the
simple side for which the repetitive treatment processes can be organized in a clear,
flow-shop like path. In Figure 3.10, we compare the performance of the complexity-
based streaming design, with and without such lean improvements, against that of
urgency-based pooling (current practice) and complexity-based pooling (i.e., a pool-
ing design where Phase 1 and Phase 2 are based on the optimal priority rule using
complexity-based triage information). The system with lean implementation assumes
the service rate for each interaction with the simple patients improves by 10%; how-
ever, no change occurs for complex patients. This is a conservative estimate of the
impact of a lean transformation. Note that the streaming layout facilitates this im-
provement by grouping simple tasks in a single line. Under pooled designs the mix-
ture of simple and complex patients makes a smooth efficient flow extremely difficult.
It should be also noted that some lean improvements may be possible for complex
stream, but we conservatively ignore that here. Figure 3.10 compares performance in
terms of LOS, but we have observed similar results for the ROAE criterion. These





































Figure 3.10: Performance of different patient flow designs compared to the current
practice (Urgency-Based Pooling).
Observation 6. Without lean improvements, complexity-based streaming is still
better than current pooling practice, but worse than complexity-based pooling. With
lean improvements (made only to the simple stream), complexity-based streaming can
achieve a substantial advantage over complexity-based pooling.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a new triage system for ED practice in which patients
are classified on the basis of complexity, as well as urgency. Our results suggest that,
compared to the triage system currently in use in practice, complexity-based triage
can significantly improve ED performance in terms of both patient safety (ROAE)
and operational efficiency (LOS), even if patient classification is subject to error.
We also investigate effective but implementable policies for prioritizing patients
in the ED. We show that the current practice of prioritizing patients purely based
on urgency (e.g., ESI 2 over 3 in the main ED) is suboptimal, and it is essential to
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take into account a measure of patient complexity. This can address many of the
performance limitations of the current triage system in ED’s that are widely reported
by clinicians (see, e.g., [160] and the references therein).
We find that a simple and fast classification scheme, which defines patients to
be simple if they require only a single treatment related interaction (and complex
otherwise) works very well as the basis for complexity-based triage as it results in
(1) a nearly even split between simple and complex patients, and (2) a substantial
difference between average treatment time of complex and simple patients. This
classification scheme has been empirically shown (see [153]) to be feasible for nurses
to implement at triage with reasonable accuracy, and hence, appears to be a promising
enhancement of the triage process.
To accomplish this research, we developed new models, contributed several ana-
lytical contributions, collected hospital data, and developed high-fidelity simulations.
We advanced the analysis of priority queueing systems under misclassification errors
as well as continuous-time MDP analysis with unbounded transition rates, for which
the traditional method of uniformization fails. Using these technical innovations, we
show that new, extended versions of the cµ rule can provide effective guidelines for
prioritizing patients in both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of service in the ED, even when
many practical conditions in the ED are considered.
Our analyses indicate that complexity-based triage can yield substantial safety
and efficiency improvements even if complexity information is only used to prioritize
patients up to the point where they enter examination rooms (Phase 1). Furthermore,
in ED’s where physicians have a significant amount of choice about what patient to
see next within examination rooms (Phase 2), we find that complexity information
gathered at triage can yield additional benefits by facilitating internal sequencing
decisions. For both Phase 1 and Phase 2, the benefit of complexity-based triage is
greatest in ED’s with high physician and/or examination room utilization. Since
ED’s are widely overcrowded, our results suggest that complexity-based triage is
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an effective way for ED’s to improve safety and reduce congestion without adding
expensive human or physical capacity.
We further investigate a new patient flow design, in which complexity-based triage
information is used to separate simple and complex patients into two streams. Our re-
sults show that, when combined with improvements achieved through implementation
of lean methods on the “simple” patient service stream, this complexity-based stream-
ing design can take advantage of complexity-based triage information to achieve even
greater gains.
3.8 Appendix (Proofs)
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof of part (i) follows directly from comparing (3.4)
and (3.5). To show part (ii), notice that, using the result of part (i) for a special case
where there is no misclassification error, prioritizing U (N) patients is optimal if, and












bining these two results completes the proof of part (ii), as the sign of the numerator
changes when the sum of errors exceeds 1. 
Lemma 2 (Perfect Classification - Prioritization) In the simplified single-stage
ED model under perfect urgency and complexity based classification:
(i) The best priority rule is to prioritize patients in decreasing order of θµ values.
Hence, if θUCµUC ≥ θNSµNS, then the best priority rule is to follow the ordering: US,
UC, NS, NC. Otherwise, the ED should follow the priority ordering: US, NS, UC,
NC.
(ii) RU∪C∗ ≤ RU∗ . That is, the risk of adverse events under the optimal priority rule
using both complexity and urgency information is (weakly) smaller than that under
the optimal apriority rule using only urgency information.
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(iii) The best priority rule of part (i) is optimal even among the larger class of all
non-anticipative policies (state or history dependent, idling or non-idling, etc.).
Proof of Lemma 2: Notice that, using (3.1), we can compute the average waiting
time of each class of patients under any (static) priority rule. Furthermore, under









where W πij is the average waiting of class ij under priority rule π. The proof of part
(i) then follows from [31] (see pages 83-84), where an interchange argument is used
(when the number of customer classes is at least 3) to show that the best rule (among
the priority policies) to minimize the holding cost in a non-preemptive M/G/1 is to
follow the cµ rule. Replacing holding cost values (c) with adverse event rates (θ), and
noticing that the patient class US (NC) has the highest (lowest) θµ value complete
the proof of part (i). Next, using the result of part (i) together with (3.1) and (3.8),






2(1− ρUS)(1− ρUS − ρUC)
+
λNSθNS
2(1− ρUS − ρUC)(1− ρUS − ρUC − ρNS)
+
λNCθNC
2(1− ρUS − ρUC − ρNS)(1− ρUS − ρUC − ρNS − ρNC)
]
(3.9)
≤ min{RUU , RUN} = RU∗ ,
where the inequality follows from (3.2) and (3.3) together with the result of part (i)
of Proposition 4 (for the special case where there is no misclassification error).
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2(1− ρUS)(1− ρUS − ρNS)
+
λUCθUC
2(1− ρUS − ρNS)(1− ρUS − ρNS − ρUC)
+
λNCθNC




and similar to the previous case, it can be easily seen that RU∪C∗ ≤ RU∗ . The proof
of part (iii) follows from [86] (after replacing holding cost with adverse event rates)
who (for the average holding cost objective) showed that the cµ policy of [31] remains
optimal even when inserting idleness is allowed and/or when the priority rule is dy-
namic (i.e., state-dependent). 
Lemma 3 (Perfect Classification - Attractiveness) In the simplified single-stage
ED model, perfect complexity-based triage yields a larger improvement over perfect
urgency-based triage when (i) ED utilization is higher, (ii) heterogeneity in the aver-
age service time of simple vs. complex patients is larger, and/or (iii) the fraction of
simple and complex patients are closer to equal.
Proof of Lemma 3: To show the result, first consider the case where under the U∪C
classification it is optimal to follow the priority order US, UC, NS, NC, and under the
U classification, it is optimal to follow the priority order U, N (i.e., prioritizing urgent
patients first). Let f = RU∪C∗ − RU∗ , and notice that with µiC = µC and µiS = µS
(∀i ∈ U), and θUj = θU and θNj = θN (∀j ∈ C) (i.e., when complexity is based only
on set C and urgency is based only on set U), from (3.9) and (3.2) we have:







Then, a careful treatment of utilization (realizing that ρU = λU/µU and ρ = ρU +ρN)
shows that f is non-increasing in utilization, ρ. To prove part (ii), it then can be
seen that f is non-increasing in 1/µC − 1/µS (keeping utilization and other factors
the same). To see part (iii), let α ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of patients that are com-
plex, and (1−α) denote the fraction of patients that are simple, so λUS = (1−α)λU ,
λUC = αλU , λNC = αλN , and λNS = (1− α)λN . Replacing these in (3.11), it follows
that f , as a function of α, can be written as f = −[α(1 − α)]k, for some constant
k ≥ 0. Thus, α = 0.5 yields the maximum benefit. The proof for other cases (i.e.,
when other priority rules are optimal) follows a similar argument after computing
f using either (3.9) or (3.10), and either (3.2) or (3.3), depending on the optimal
priority rule under U ∪ C and U classifications, respectively. 
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof of part (i) follows directly from the proof of part
(i) of Lemma 2, since all rates are replaced with their error impacted counterparts.
That is, the same interchange method of [31] (see pages 83-84) after replacing all
rates with their error impacted counterparts proves that the best priority rule is to
give priority based on a decreasing order of θµ values. The proof of part (ii) follows
from the proof of Lemma 2 (found earlier in this appendix) part (ii) after replacing
parameters with their error impacted counter parts. The proof of part (iii) follows
from the result of [86], after replacing holding cost with the error impacted rate of
adverse events, and all the other rates with their error impacted counterparts. 
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof of parts (i) - (iii) follows mainly from the proof
of Lemma 3 (found earlier in this appendix). First, consider the case where under
the U ′ ∪ C ′ (i.e., imperfect urgency and complexity) classification it is optimal to
follow the priority order US, UC, NS, NC, and under the U ′ (i.e., imperfect urgency)
classification, it is optimal to follow the priority order U, N (i.e., prioritizing urgent




∗ , and after replacing rates
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Next, notice that ρ′ = ρ (i.e., the total utilizations with and without misclassifica-
tions are the same). Hence, similar to the proof of part (i) of Lemma 3, it can bee
seen that f is non-increasing in ρ. Moreover, it can be seen that f is non-increasing
in 1/µ′C − 1/µ′S. Next, notice that (1/µ′)T = (A (λ/µ)T )/λ′, where A is defined in
(3.6). Thus, similar to the proof of part (ii) of Lemma 3, it can be seen that f is
non-increasing in 1/µC − 1/µS, which proves part (ii). Furthermore, similarly to the
proof of part (iii) of Lemma 3, let λUS = (1 − α)λU , λUC = αλU , λNC = αλN , and
λNS = (1− α)λN . It can be seen that f as a function of α is minimized at α = 0.5,
which proves part (iii). It can also be seen that f is non-decreasing in complexity
misclassification error rates, γS and γC , which proves part (iv). The proof for other
cases (i.e., when other priority rules are optimal) follows a similar line of argument
after computing f . 
Proof of Theorem 1: To show the result, we use an interchange argument; we show
that if classes uc ∈ U ×C and sl ∈ U ×C are such that puc θ̂uc µ̂uc ≥ psl θ̂sl µ̂sl, then it
is (weakly) better to serve class uc than class sl when in state (x, y) with xuc, xsl > 0.
This will also prove that the optimal policy will not idle the physician when there are
one or more patients available in the rooms, since idling can be thought of serving
an additional class, class 0, with θ̂0 = µ̂0 = p0 = 0 (see, for instance, [22]). To
show that it is (weakly) better to serve class uc than class sl, we first consider the
problem in an N-period discounted cost setting with four parallel (one for each class
of patients) ·/M/k systems (to guarantee bounded transition rates for the purpose of
uniformization) in place of the ·/M/∞ test stage, and show that the results hold for
any number of periods to go n ∈ 1, 2, ..., N . (Notice that using four parallel ·/M/k
systems removes the need for considering the sequence and the type of patients within
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the common queue.) Using a convergence argument, as n→∞, it then follows that
the result is true for an infinite-horizon (and hence, average cost) scenario with the
four k-server test system. Next, taking limit as k → ∞, it follows that the result is
true even when transition rates are not bounded due to the existence of the ·/M/∞
stage.
Now consider the finite horizon discounted cost version of (3.7). With β denoting
the discount factor, the optimal discounted cost when there are n + 1 (uniformized)
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[λij + (yij ∧ k) η + 1 {a=ij}µ̂ij]
)
V kn (x, y)
}]]
, (3.13)
or equivalently (grouping the terms related to control in the minimization and self-




























[λij + (yij ∧ k) η]
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n (x, y) = V
k




n (x, y) = V
k
n (x + eij, y −
eij) − V kn (x, y). Now let π (π̂) be the policy that prescribes serving patients of class
uc (sl) for every state (x, y) with xuc, xsl > 0 and in every period n. From (3.14),
to show that π is (weakly) better than π̂ in every period, we need to show that the
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n (x− euc, y) + ∆x,yuc V k,πn (x− euc, y + euc)]
≥ µ̂sl [psl∆ysl V
k,π̂




n (x− esl, y + esl)]. (3.15)
To show property (3.15), we use induction on n. First, for n = 0, the property
trivially holds since V π0 (·, ·) = V π̂0 (·, ·) = 0. Next, suppose the property holds for n.
We show that it will then also hold for n+ 1. To do so, we need to consider different
cases based on the state (i.e., partitions of the state space). First, consider the case
where xuc, xsl ≥ 2. Using action a = uc (policy π) in both states (x−euc, y) and (x, y)
to compute V k,πn+1(x − euc, y + euc) and V
k,π
n+1(x − euc, y) using (3.14), and subtracting
the results we have ∆yucV
k,π











n (x, y) + (yij ∧ k) η∆yucV k,πn (x+ eij − euc, y − eij)]
+ 1 {yuc<k} η V
k,π
n (x, y − euc)










n (x− euc, y)
− 1 {yuc<k} η V k,πn (x− euc, y)
]]
. (3.16)
Similarly, we can derive ∆x,yuc V
k,π
n+1(x − euc, y + euc) using (3.14) and action a = uc
(policy π) in both states (x − euc, y + euc) and (x, y) and subtracting the results.
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Doing so we have ∆x,yuc V
k,π











n (x, y + euc) + (y
+
ij ∧ k) η∆x,yuc V k,πn (x+ eij − euc, y − eij + euc)]
− 1 {yuc<k} η V k,πn (x, y)












n (x− euc, y + euc)
+ 1 {yuc<k} η V
k,π
n (x− euc, y + euc)
]]
, (3.17)
where y+ij = yij for all ij 6= uc ∈ U × C, and y+uc = yuc + 1. In a similar way,
and by using action a = sl (policy π̂) in (3.14) quantities ∆ysl V
k,π̂
n+1(x − esl, y) and
∆x,ysl V
k,π̂
n+1(x− esl, y + esl) can be computed. Next, to check property (3.15) for n+ 1,
multiply (3.16) by puc µ̂uc, and (3.17) by µ̂uc and add up the results. Similarly,
multiply ∆ysl V
k,π̂




n+1(x−esl, y+esl) by psl µ̂sl and µ̂sl, respectively,
and add up the results. Next, using the induction hypothesis and that puc θ̂uc µ̂uc ≥





n+1(x− euc, y) + ∆x,yuc V
k,π
n+1(x− euc, y + euc)]
− µ̂sl [psl∆ysl V
k,π̂




n+1(x− esl, y + esl)] ≥ 0, (3.18)
which establishes property (3.15) for n+1 for the case where xuc, xsl ≥ 2. In a similar
way, this property can be established for other cases (i.e., the remaining partition of
the state space). Hence, a non-idling strict priority rule is optimal for all n. Next,
taking the limit as n→∞ it follows that the finite horizon problem converges to the
infinite horizon one both in policy and cost (see [126] Proposition 4.3.1). Furthermore,
the convergence of the policy of the infinite-horizon discounted cost problem to that
of average cost can easily be established (see [126] Corollary 7.5.10). Therefore, the
underlying non-idling strict priority policy is optimal under the average cost setting
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indexed by k (i.e., with ·/M/k’s in place of the ·/M/∞) for any finite k. Since the
result is true for any k, a convergence argument can be used to show that the result
holds for the original problem with k = ∞. Notice that the existence of an optimal




Dynamic Control in the W Service Network and
Beyond
4.1 Introduction
The use of cross-trained workers (or flexible machines) in manufacturing or ser-
vice sectors provides flexibility by dynamically shifting workers (workloads) to re-
spond to volatile demands, machine/worker availabilities, congestion, etc. Typically,
agents/workers are partially flexible, in that they are trained to serve a limited number
of different requests (task types) so as to achieve a cost-effective level of flexibility.
The literature on the modeling and analysis of flexibility includes the following
three themes: (1) System Design of specific paradigms for creating flexibility to max-
imize an objective, (2) Server Scheduling and Control policies to reap the benefits of
flexibility, and (3) Performance Analysis of specific systems and policies. Our work
contributes to all three themes, especially the second theme.
System design, the first theme, motivates the development of methodology to
determine which capabilities a server should be endowed with (see, for instance, [84],
[2], [71], [72], [81], [80], [15], [26], and [7]). We first analyze parallel (Markovian)
queueing systems with general structures (i.e., arbitrary number of queues and servers
in parallel with general skill/capability sets for the servers) to prove properties such
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as stability. Then we focus on the “W” paradigm/structure for parallel operations
that are “make-to-order.”
To motivate the “W” paradigm, consider the small customer support center illus-
trated in Fig. 4.1. In this example, both agents can handle phone calls. However,
only one of them is responsible for supporting customers through the internet using
chat and email. The other agent is provided the resources to handle postal mail and
faxes. We refer to the queueing structure of Fig. 4.1 as a “W” queueing network (since
it forms a “W” with respect to the server skills and workflow). For the manager of
the system illustrated in Fig. 4.1, different request types have different response time
urgencies. For instance, a quick reply to a chat or an email request is often more
important than a fast response to a postal mail or to a fax. Phone calls on hold
(waiting in queue) are also usually more urgent than a mail or a fax request.
Generally, in such systems, a per unit of time cost (or relative weight) of h′i can be
assigned to holding a request of type i. Additionally, the servers are usually heteroge-
nous: they have different skill levels (service rates) in serving different job types. In
general, one can model the service of a request of type i by server j as occurring with
a rate of µ′ji ≥ 0 (where zero indicates that server j lacks skill i). Moreover, servers
might be subject to stochastic disruptions occurring with a rate of θ′j ≥ 0 for server
j, which represents the time lost due to an IT disruption, unplanned absences (e.g.
unexpected meetings), etc. When disrupted, server j returns to a working state after
an expected r′−1j units of time, which represents its average “repair” time. Assuming
a type i request comes to the system at rate λ′i, the manager of such a system needs
to know how to assign the agents to different requests in real-time to obtain good
performance and extract the most benefit from the partial flexibility of the servers.
Conceptually, the “W” structure can be observed in many systems in practice.
One of the situations where a “W” structure may naturally arise is where tasks
performed by the servers have a wide variety and can be classified as tasks that are
server specific and tasks that are shared between servers. Consider, for example, a
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small clinic with a physician and a nurse working together. There is a set of tasks that
would be performed by the nurse (e.g. taking blood pressure and other diagnostic
tests, administering medications, and basic treatments) and there is also a separate
set of tasks that would be performed by the physician (e.g. diagnosis of diseases and
injuries, prescribing medications and treatments, and performing higher skill medical
procedures). Additionally, there is a set of tasks that could be performed by either
the nurse or the physician, depending on the workloads of the nurse and the physician
(e.g., diagnostic tests, bandaging, and giving home self-care or follow-up instructions).
The “W” structure may also arise from considerations of demand workload and
service capacity. For example, the shared demand type may represent the demand
class for which a server cannot provide enough capacity, and thus, capacity can be
shifted via cross-training. Moreover, there are often tasks that are not cost effective
to cross-train. This may be caused by the training/certification expense of the skill,
the difficulty in obtaining workers competent at that skill, or the infrastructure and
layout that makes the cross-functionality ineffective.
We contribute to the first theme of flexibility research, system design, by showing
that the “W” structure achieves most of the potential performance with two servers
and three job types, supporting the notion that a little flexibility goes a long way
(which has been a theme of several papers such as [84] and [15] for some different
structures). Considering the expense of cross-training servers and, more importantly,
application-specific obstacles to cross-train certain task types, the frugality of the
“W” design makes it widely useful in application.
We contribute to the second theme of flexibility research, control, by generating
insights into effective mechanisms for the control of servers in the “W” design as
well as systems with any general structure. Specifically, for the “W” structure, we
rigorously establish a partial characterization of the cµ rule (i.e., the weighted shortest
processing time policy) as an optimal policy under certain operating conditions. We





Servers 1 2 
Buffers 




11μ′  12μ′  22μ′  23μ′  
Chat & Email Mail & Fax Phone Calls Requests 
Figure 4.1: An example of a small customer support center (the “W” structure).
Waiting Cost” (LEWC), and benchmark it relative to the optimal policy for a large
test suite. The proposed LEWC index policy, however, is not specific to the “W”
design and can be implemented in any parallel queueing system.
Even after ignoring possible disruptions, the control problem that we consider
in this chapter is a difficult and still an open area of research. For instance, [16]
considered the “N” structure (with reliable servers), a special case of the “W” with
the third demand stream removed, and noted that even for the “N” “the problem
of finding a control policy that minimizes a cost associated with holding jobs in the
system is notoriously difficult.” The “W” model is a significant departure from the
“N,” because it has two partially flexible servers, whereas the “N” has two extremes:
one inflexible and one fully flexible server. Server disruptions further complicate
the problem. In addition to identifying sufficient conditions under which the well-
known greedy cµ policy is optimal, our numerical analysis provides further insights
for situations where those conditions do not hold. Particularly, the optimal policy is
a state-dependent threshold type policy characterized by four switching surfaces in the
cases studied.
Addressing the system design agenda of the first theme, [81], [78], and [80] have
developed methodologies such as Structural Flexibility and Capability Flexibility for
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estimating the better of alternative cross-training architectures with respect to mean
waiting time. To test these methods, the above papers primarily used the Longest
Queue (LQ) as the control policy. In this chapter, we propose LEWC as a more
effective policy. It should be noted that even for a particular structure such as “W,”
performance analysis (the third theme) under the optimal policy is difficult. Thus, we
provide a careful MDP-based numerical benchmarking study that gives insights into
the optimal policy as well as LEWC, LQ, cµ, and generalized cµ (Gcµ) with quadratic
holding cost (also referred as Max-Weight). We find that not only does the LEWC
heuristic clearly outperforms LQ, cµ, and Gcµ, but it is also a near optimal policy
with a relatively small optimality gap. Moreover, we establish its stability. Since
LEWC can be used for the control of servers in systems with any flexibility structure,
the obtained results introduce LEWC as a promising policy for future research into
the design of flexible structures with arbitrary topologies. This is particularly useful
because the comparison of alternative flexibility/queueing designs under their optimal
control policies is computationally intractable for large systems.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews some
related studies. Section 4.3 formulates the problem using an MDP framework and
identifies some attributes applicable to a parallel queueing system with a general
flexibility structure. Section 4.4 presents the results on the “W” structure, describes
the proposed LEWC heuristic, and extensively tests its performance.
4.2 Literature Survey
When there is a single server in the system that is fully flexible and has memoryless
service times, [22] and [156] show that the well-known cµ policy is optimal. The cµ
rule is a very intuitive and easy control policy to implement; however, it may perform
poorly when partial flexibility is introduced, as is the case with the “W.” It remains,
however, optimal under some conditions. For instance, [39] prove the optimality of
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the cµ rule for an “N” structure under some special conditions. [155] shows the
optimality of cµ for systems without disruptions where servers collaborate on jobs
and special conditions are satisfied.
In parallel systems, which is our focus, the literature mainly considers the control
problem in the heavy-traffic regime (see, for instance, [151], [61], [62], [16], [21], [105],
[102], and [17]). The literature, however, lacks policies that are effective for a wide
range of utilizations. Our target in this chapter is on systems in the utilization range
of 70% to 90%.
The problem of dynamically assigning servers to jobs has also been studied under
the throughput maximization objective (see, for instance, [8], [9], [12], [33], and [6]).
Among these papers, [6] is most related to our work since it also allows for disruptions.
However, throughput maximization is appropriate only for systems in which delay is
not a major concern, and in most cases it is an easier problem to analyze.
Work on the benefit of flexibility to compensate for the risk of disruptions is also
related to our work. For this stream of research, we refer interested readers to [6],
[122], [123], and the references therein.
4.3 General Characteristics
This section addresses general Markovian parallel queueing structures with par-
tially flexible and possibly unreliable servers. That is, we consider Markovian parallel
queueing systems with an arbitrary number of servers, arbitrary number of customer
classes, and arbitrary flexibility structures. We allow even more generality by allow-
ing for a stochastic disruption/repair process unique to each server. We first describe





















Figure 4.2: A general parallel queueing system with server disruptions and arbitrary
flexibility structure.
4.3.1 The Model
Consider a queueing system represented by a bipartite graph G = (N , E) where
N is partitioned to two finite sets: Nc = {1, · · · ,m} for customer/jobs classes,
and Ns = {m + 1, · · · ,m + n} for servers/machines (see Fig. 4.2). (A labeling
{1, · · · , n} might be used for servers when it does not generate a confusion.) Arrivals
of customers of class i ∈ Nc follow a Poisson process with rate λ′i ∈ R+, and server
j ∈ Ns can serve a customer of class i ∈ Nc with an exponentially distributed amount
of time with rate µ′ji ∈ R+. In the graph G, (i, j) ∈ E ⊆ Nc × Ns if, and only if,
µ′ji > 0. We let Sj = {i : (i, j) ∈ E} denote the skill set or “capabilities” of server
j and S−1i = {j : (i, j) ∈ E} denote the servers capable of serving class i. To allow
for server unreliability, disruptions to server j ∈ Ns occur according to a Poisson
process with rate θ′j ≥ 0 (equality holds if server j is completely reliable). Note that
we focus on systems for which disruptions occur at the same rate whether or not
the server is in use. For example, unplanned employee absence, a power outage, or
an economic disruption may happen independently of server idleness. Once a server
is disrupted, it immediately undergoes a repair process that takes an exponentially
distributed amount of time with rate r′j > θ
′
j for server j. All above-mentioned
stochastic processes are considered to be independent of each other.
Let h′ = (h′1, · · · , h′m), where h′i denotes the per unit time (inventory) holding
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cost associated with holding a customer of class i. The objective is to find an optimal
resource allocation (or server assignment) policy to minimize the average holding cost
of the system assuming that the servers cannot collaborate on the same job (unless
otherwise mentioned), but service preemption is permitted. To achieve this goal, let
Xπ(t) = (Xπ1 (t), · · · , Xπm(t)) where Xπi (t) denotes the number of class i customers













where Π is the set of all admissible policies, and Lπi denotes the long-run average
number of class i customers in the system under policy π. This latter measure can
be computed as:






E[Xπi (s)] ds. (4.2)
4.3.2 Formulation of the Markov Decision Process
For j ∈ Ns, let aj(t) = 1 denote that server j is available (i.e., not disrupted)
at time t and let aj(t) = 0 otherwise. The state of the system is then a vector
X̃(t) = (X(t), a(t)) with state space S = Z+m × {0, 1}n, where X̃i(t) = Xi(t) ∈ Z+
for i ∈ Nc and X̃j(t) = aj(t) ∈ {0, 1} for j ∈ Ns. We use uniformization (see
[99]) to formulate the discrete time equivalent of the problem. Since θ′j < r
′
j, we use













0 < ψ < ∞). Let λi = λ′i/ψ, µji = µ′ji/ψ, θj = θ′j/ψ, and rj = r′j/ψ denote the
parameters after uniformization corresponding to the transition probabilities in the
underlying discrete Markov chain. Also, let α be a continuous time discount rate and
ξ be an exponential random variable with rate ψ denoting the length of one unit of
time in the corresponding discrete Markov chain. The equivalent discount factor in
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discrete time is then:







Also, since the state of the system does not change in one period of the discrete













and so h = h′/(ψ+α). The finite-horizon optimal expected discounted cost can then



























1{uj = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns





where Vn,β(X̃) represents the optimal cost of an n-period problem starting at state
X̃, 1{·} is the indicator function, and the initial condition is V0,β(X̃) = 0 for every
X̃ ∈ S. In this optimality equation, the arrival, departure, repair, and breakdown
state transition operators for i ∈ Nc and j ∈ Ns are denoted by AiX̃ = X̃ + ei,
DiX̃ = X̃ − ei, RjX̃ = X̃ + ej, and BjX̃ = X̃ − ej, respectively, where ei (ej) is
a vector with the same dimension as S with a one in ith (jth) position and zeros
elsewhere. Moreover, the control action is the vector u = (uj ∈ Nc ∪ {0} ,∀j ∈ Ns)
where uj = i ∈ Nc if server j is assigned to serve class i, and uj = 0 if it is not
assigned to any class. The set of admissible control actions at state X̃ is denoted by
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a set of vectors U(X̃), where: U(X̃) =
{
u = (uj ∈ Nc∪{0} s.t. ∀i ∈ Nc : 1{uj = i} ≤ aj 1{i ∈ Sj} ,
∑
j∈NS




That is, server j cannot be assigned to class i if it is disrupted, if it lacks skill i, or if
the number of class i jobs is insufficient.
Similar to (4.5), the optimal average inventory holding cost can be computed using
an MDP with the following average-cost optimality equation:



























1{uj = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns





where J(X̃) is a relative cost function, Z∗U denotes the optimal per period average
cost in the uniformized problem, and Z∗ = ψ Z∗U is the optimal per period average
cost of the original problem. The next section first analyzes the stability conditions
of the the general queueing system under consideration. Then it provides another
method to compute the optimal average cost and the relative function J(X̃) using
the finite-horizon version of the problem (i.e., value iteration).
4.3.3 Stability
It is important first to identify the stability region of the system for several rea-
sons. In addition to several interesting theoretical considerations, it provides an
important practical design guideline. We define the general queueing network un-







i < ∞. This is equivalent to the existence of a finite mean
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equilibrium distribution of the underlying stochastic process {X(t), t ≥ 0}. To check
the stability of the underlying system with partially flexible and unreliable servers,
we develop and implement the following Linear Program (LP) (in the spirit of [62]
and [6]). Our LP maximizes the minimum “excess service capacity,” τ , that can be








)µji ≥ λi + τ ∀i ∈ Nc, (4.9)
∑
i∈Sj
yji ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ Ns, (4.10)
yji ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ns,∀i ∈ Sj. (4.11)
In this LP, we introduce the decision variable yji (j ∈ Ns, i ∈ Sj) to denote the
long-run proportion of time that server j is “assigned” to work on class i (including
the times during which server j is disrupted) when the arrival rate of class i is λi + τ .
Notice that (using either Renewal Theory or a two-state Markov chain model of




the time. Thus, yji (
rj
θj+rj
) represents the long-run proportion of the time that server




)µji is the corresponding long-run average capacity offered to class i
by server j given yji. Hence, from constraint (4.9) we see that objective function
(4.8) maximizes the minimum excess capacity among all classes. Constraint (4.10)
(together with (4.11)) sets an upper bound for the total fraction of time that a server
can be assigned to a specific class. The following theorem, based on fluid model
analysis (see, for instance, [34]) and similar to some results presented in the literature
(see for instance, [6]), relates the above LP to the stabilizability of the system. This
theorem provides a tool to ensure that the class of finite cost policies is not empty,
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and hence the optimization in (4.1) is of interest. See Online Appendix A for all of
the proofs.
Theorem 2 (Stability) Let τ ∗ be the optimal objective value of LP 1. Then:
(i) The system is stabilizable (i.e., ∃π ∈ Π s.t. Zπ <∞) if τ ∗ > 0.
(ii) The system is not stabilizable (i.e., ∀π ∈ Π : Zπ =∞ ) if τ ∗ < 0.
Now that we have a tool to check stabilizability, we can take one step further
and (1) guarantee the existence of an optimal stationary policy, and (2) establish the
convergence of the finite-horizon problem to the average-cost case (both in the cost
and in the policy). Indeed, we can establish a convenient alternative approach to find
an optimal average-cost policy by stating that (1) it is sufficient to restrict attention
to the class of stationary policies, and (2) solving the finite-horizon version of the
problem defined in (4.5) can provide both the average-cost optimal value Z∗ and the
average-cost optimal policy π∗.
Theorem 3 (Stationary Policy & Convergence) If τ ∗ > 0, then:
(i) There exists an average-cost optimal stationary policy.
(ii) The optimal average cost can be computed by:






i } = limβ→1− limn→∞ ψ (1− β)Vn,β(X̃).
(iii) The relative cost function J(X̃) defined in (4.7) satisfies:
J(X̃) = limβ→1− limn→∞[Vn,β(X̃)− Vn,β(0)].
(iv) Let πn,β denote an optimal policy for the n-period (discounted cost) problem.
Then any limit point πβ of the sequence {πn,β}n≥1 (as n → ∞) is optimal for
the infinite-horizon discounted cost. Moreover, any limit point of the sequence
{πβ}β∈(0,1) (as β → 1−) is average-cost optimal.
In the search for effective mechanisms to control the servers, we are able to restrict
our attention to the class of policies that do not allow for unforced idling. This is
shown in Appendix A (see Lemma 4 and Proposition 7), where we establish this result
based on a proof of the monotonicity of the value function.
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4.4 The “W” Structure
In the previous section, we presented some characteristics applicable to any Marko-
vian parallel queueing system with an arbitrary server flexibility structure. In this
section, to develop more insights, we consider a special structure forming a “W”
(see Fig. 4.1 or Structure 4 in Fig. 4.3). This structure is an especially effective
paradigm for systems with three demand types and two servers. It should be noted
that the “N” structure, widely studied in the literature, is a special case of a “W”
with µ′23 = λ
′
3 = 0.
The next section shows that the “W” is an efficient design that requires only a
little cross-training to achieve a performance almost as good as any design with two
servers and three job types. Since cross-training the servers is costly (and sometimes
infeasible) in practice, this observation shows that; for systems with three demand
types and two servers, instead of fully cross-training every server, it is sufficient to
make them capable to serve a shared task in addition to their dedicated/fixed one
and form a “W” structure.
4.4.1 The “W” Structure: An Efficient System Design
From a system design perspective, it is crucial to understand the effective ways of
cross-training servers. Please note that in this section we focus on congestion (and
mean wait), so all holding costs are set to one. To understand the design problem,
consider the various possible designs with three customer classes and two servers
illustrated in Fig. 4.3. These six structures progressively add skills, except Structures
2, 3, and 4 (the “W”), which have the same number of skills. Thus, Structures 2, 3,
and 4 also allow us to explore the sensitivity with respect to where the fourth skill is
added. In Structures 3 and 4 the class with the highest arrival rate is the shared one,
but it is not the case in Structure 2. Structure 2 is indeed a “W,” where the shared
task is not the one with the highest arrival rate (i.e., the middle class). The goal is
to find an efficient design among these five structures. In other words, to improve
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the design of Structure 1, we address two questions: (1) where should one implement
flexibility/cross-training?, and (2) how many additional skills are adequate to get a
reasonably good performance?
To answer these questions, we compare the performance of the above-mentioned
structures under their optimal policies in various test suites (parameter settings) as
presented in Table 4.3 (see Online Appendix C). Notice that, considering the built-
in symmetry in our test suites (symmetry between classes 1 and 3 as well as the
symmetry in the speed of a server in serving different classes), the six structures
considered in Fig. 4.3 cover all the possible designs; any other (stabilizable) structure
is homomorphic to one of these six structures. Fig. 4.4 summarizes our computational
results by depicting the optimal long-run average number of customers in each of these
six structure for our test suite and under various congestion factors (ρ in Table 4.3
). The mean (i.e., long-run average) number of customers (or jobs) in the system
under the optimal policy is computed by numerically solving the average-cost MDP
optimality equation (4.7) with h′i = 1 (∀i ∈ Nc).
The results depicted in Fig. 4.4, which is a summary of optimally solving 6
(structures)× 4 (suites) × 9 (congestion factors) = 306 problem instances, confirm
that (a) flexibility usually has a diminishing rate of return, (b) a little flexibility can
go a long way and (c) it usually matters where to add the additional flexibility, which
has been elaborated on in studies such as [84], [71], [81], and [15]. The primary intent
of this section is, however, to reveal the following insight about the “W.”
• Insight. Structure 4, the “W” (or to be precise the “W” with the proper task
being shared) is an efficient design where a little cross-training can achieve most
of the flexibility of a fully flexible network (i.e., Structure 6). In test suites 2,
3, and 4, the “W” is almost as good as Structure 6 and in test suite 1, the
“W” is still an efficient architecture. This observation is especially important
considering the expense of cross training servers in most practical situations
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Figure 4.3: Various possible structures with |Nc| = 3 and |Ns| = 2.
It should be noted that similar characteristics have been shown in the literature
for chaining (see for instance [71] and [84]) and tailored pairing ([15]), but the “W”
is not a special case of those structures. Concurrent research in [7] takes an alternate
approach to analyzing the “W” and other structures with respect to throughput.
4.4.2 Dynamic Control of Servers in the “W” Structure
The previous section examined the benefit of implementing a “W” structure; how-
ever, this benefit cannot be fully achieved without efficiently assigning servers to jobs
in real-time. Hence, the remaining question is: what control policy should be used
in real-time to extract the most benefit from the limited flexibility of servers in this
design? The answer to this question will also provide insight into the control of more
complex queueing structures with partially flexible servers. We first state a corollary
of Theorem 2 to partially characterize the stability region of a “W” design in more
insightful expressions.
Corollary 1 (Stability of “W”) Consider a “W” structure under stochastic dis-
ruptions (or without them as a degenerate case). Let ρ1 = λ1/(µ11
r1
r1+θ1
) and ρ3 =
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). Also, define effective service rates of the shared task as µeff12 = µ12
r1
r1+θ1
and µeff22 = µ22
r2
r2+θ2
. The system is not stabilizable if max{ρ1, ρ3} > 1. On the other
hand, if max{ρ1, ρ3} < 1, the system is stabilizable if (1−ρ1)µeff12 +(1−ρ3)µ
eff
22 > λ2.
Now we characterize the optimal control policy. Hereafter, we assume the system
under consideration is stabilizable. The following theorem shows the optimality of
prioritizing the fixed task before the shared for every server under certain conditions.
This policy is an analogous to the well-known cµ (hµ in our notation) rule as a strict
priority ordering for every server.
Theorem 4 (Optimality of the cµ Strict Priority: Fixed before Shared) For
a “W” structure with stochastic disruptions (or without them as a degenerate case),
if h′1 µ
′
11 ≥ h′2 µ′12, h′3 µ′23 ≥ h′2 µ′22, and either (i) server collaboration is allowed, or
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(ii) server collaboration is disallowed but µ′12 ≥ µ′11 and µ′22 ≥ µ′23 hold, then the cµ
priority rule is optimal for each server. That is, there exists an optimal policy under
which every server, when not disrupted and regardless of the other server’s allocation
or disruption state, prioritizes its fixed task before the shared task whenever its fixed
queue is not empty.
The “Fixed before Shared” policy described in the Theorem 3 can be viewed as
an extension of the cµ rule for systems with partially flexible and unreliable servers.
Indeed, the above theorem shows that this extension of the cµ policy is optimal for
the “W” when the cµ index (hµ in our terminology) gives priority to the fixed task
for each server (even when servers are unreliable). Under the conditions specified
in Theorem 4, using the cµ strict priority rule for a server cannot bring the ill side
effect of underutilizing the other server because of the specific flexibility structure. In
other words, under these conditions, the cµ policy is starvation free; it maximizes the
amount of job available to the other server, and hence, remains optimal. This insights
might also hold for larger systems where cµ priorities are toward the fixed tasks for
all servers. One nice feature of the above policy (i.e., Fixed before Shared) is that it
defines a prescriptive rule for each server regardless of the other server’s allocation or
disruption state. This feature removes the need for servers to communicate in real-
time and provides a static (i.e., state-independent) rule that is easy to implement.
Our extensive MDP-based numerical computations show that the optimal policy
is complex in general when cµ priorities are not toward the fixed tasks. Relaxing
all such assumptions, we observe from our extensive numerical examples that the
optimal policy for a general “W” structure with server disruptions is a state-dependent
threshold type policy which can be defined by four switching surfaces. See Online
Appendix B for a detailed discussion on this observation and for numerical examples
supporting it.
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4.4.3 An Efficient Heuristic Policy: Largest Expected Work-
load Cost (LEWC)
In practice, to be implementable, a policy must be easy enough to use. In the
experience of the authors, managers and researchers working with on-demand service
centers usually believe that a simple policy such as LQ is preferable to the cost/effort
of implementing a complex policy in real-time (see [72] and [81]). However, our
investigation has revealed that the popular LQ policy does not perform well in many
situations. Moreover, as the previous section revealed, the optimal policy is complex
and hard to be implemented in real-time in practice. Therefore, in this section, we
develop a heuristic policy that is both easy-to-implement and highly effective.
This policy balances the expected workload cost of queues. Indeed, this heuristic
prescribes that every server (whenever not disrupted) in every decision epoch should
prioritize serving the queue with the Largest Expected Workload Cost (LEWC), re-
gardless of the allocation or availability (i.e, disruption state) of other servers. Under
this policy, a server does not need to know all the queue lengths. Rather, each server
needs visibility only of her/his duty area (skill set) to decide which queue to serve.
Moreover, this policy eliminates the need for communication between servers, since
each server can perform her/his job without the knowledge about the other servers’
allocations, availabilities, or workloads. As a result, a manager can prescribe a rule
to each server in advance and ensure good overall performance. In large networks
more general than the “W” this is a significant advantage. However, this policy is
still dynamic and requires different actions for each server depending on the real-time
length of the queues within the server’s skill set.
To develop this policy, we first slightly modify LP 1 presented in Section 4.3.3;
we call the new program LP 2. The objective of this LP (applicable to any general
network and not only the “W”) is to find allocations yji that maximize the minimum









)µji ≥ λi (1 + τ̃) ∀i ∈ Nc, (4.12)
∑
i∈Sj
yji ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ Ns, (4.13)
yji ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ns,∀i ∈ Sj. (4.14)
Next, for each queue i (with queue length xi), we develop an index Ii(xi) to approxi-










where y∗ji are the solution to LP 2, and S−1i represents the set of servers able to serve
queue i. In fact, if all servers that can work on queue i are assigned to work there based
on the steady state allocations obtained from LP 2, a single job in the first position







−1 units of time to be served (assuming
work sharing is permitted). Since xi jobs are in queue i, it will take approximately







−1 units of time to serve all the
jobs in queue i. This generates a workload cost of Ii(xi) for queue i. It should be clear
that the LEWC index also accounts for other system parameters, such as arrival rates,
disruption rates, and repair rates through the optimal solutions y∗ji. Therefore, LEWC
incorporates not only the load balancing logic of LQ and the greedy cost minimization
of cµ, but also considers utilizations via solutions y∗ji. The LEWC heuristic policy
follows.
LEWC Algorithm:
• Step 1: Solve LP 2 to obtain the optimal allocations y∗ji.
• Step 2: At the current state, X̃, use (4.15) to compute indexes Ii(xi) for
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all queues (i.e., i ∈ Nc). Then assign each available server j to the queue
i∗j = argmaxi∈Sj Ii(xi), i.e., to the queue with the largest LEWC index among
the queues that it can serve. If two or more queues have the same index, break
the tie by assigning the server to the queue with the smallest label (i.e., the left
most queue in our diagrams).
The following theorem states that our proposed policy stabilizes the system, if the
system is stabilizable (i.e., if there exists a policy under which the average holding
cost is finite). The ability to stabilize the system is another obvious benefit of using
LEWC instead of strict priority policies, such as cµ, which do not belong to the class
of stabilizing policies (i.e., policies that always result in a finite cost if the underlying
system is stabilizable).
Theorem 5 (Stability under LEWC) If the condition of Theorem 2 or Corollary
1 is satisfied (and hence, the system is stabilizable), then implementing the LEWC
policy stabilizes the “W” system. That is, if Z∗ = infπ∈Π Z
π <∞ and Γ denotes the
LEWC policy, then ZΓ <∞.
The following theorem presents the same property for the policy of serving the
Longest Queue (LQ) as well as the policy of implementing the generalized cµ (Gcµ)
rule with quadratic holding cost.
Theorem 6 (Stability under LQ and Gcµ) Suppose the condition of Theorem 2
or Corollary 1 is satisfied (and hence, the system is stabilizable). Then implementing
either the LQ policy or the Gcµ rule with quadratic holding costs stabilizes the “W”
system. That is, if Z∗ = infπ∈Π Z
π <∞, and ν denotes either of these policies policy,
then Zν <∞.
4.4.4 Computational Results
This section compares the performance of our proposed heuristic with (1) the
optimal policy, (2) the widely used policy of serving the Longest Queue (LQ), (3)
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the well-known cµ rule, and (4) the generalized cµ (Gcµ) rule for quadratic holding
costs. Under LQ, each server prioritizes serving the queue (among its skill set) with
the highest queue length. The cµ rule, as mentioned before, prescribes server j to
serve the queue k = argmaxi ci µji, where ci is the holding cost of a customer in class
i. Under the Gcµ, the class to be served by server j is k = argmaxi µjiC
′
i(xi(t)),
where xi(t) is the queue length of class i at time t and C
′
i(·) is the derivative of the
holding cost function with respect to xi. As is prevalent in the literature, we use this
policy for the case of quadratic holding cost (Ci(xi) = ci x
2
i ). Thus, the implemented
version of the Gcµ (also referred as Max-Weight) prescribes server j to serve class
k = argmaxi ci µji xi. When there is only one job in the shared queue and none in
other queues, under all policies we assume the server that is (among available servers)
faster in serving the shared task serves the only job in the system.
To perform the comparisons, we developed an extensive test suite of problem
instances that covers various combinations of holding costs, disruption rates, service
rates, arrival rates, workload distribution among the queues, and system congestions
around 70% and 90% (which are common in small service centers and make-to-order
manufacturing systems). Part II of the Online Appendix C presents this test suite
and the methods used to cover wide ranges of parameter combinations. This test
suite generates 480 problem instances for the “W” network and builds a fairly large
test suite (given the computational effort for these models).
To benchmark the “W,” we employed the Markov Decision Process (MDP) of
Section 4.3.2 to compute the optimal cost for each of our problem instances. A similar
computational framework is used for policy evaluation to benchmark the performance
of the LEWC, LQ, cµ, and Gcµ policies. We used the value-iteration algorithm to
solve MDPs numerically and we truncated the state space so that even for the cases
with high utilization, probability of reaching the truncation limit was insignificant.
Fig. 4.5 summarizes our computational results over the test suite by depicting the
empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the percentage optimality gap
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Policy No. of Cases Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cµ (Stable Cases) 464 28.10% 59.33% 0.00% 379.73%
LQ 480 13.04% 13.43% 0.51% 89.45%
















































Figure 4.5: Performance of cµ, LQ, Gcµ, and LEWC relative to the optimal policy.
(i.e., the CDF of percentage increase over the optimal cost) of each heuristic policy
(i.e., LQ, cµ, Gcµ, and LEWC). Specifically, this figure summarizes the result of our
480× 5 = 2400 MDP-based runs. Fig. 4.5 also presents key statistics of the obtained
optimality gaps: mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum.
Even though the system can be stabilized (by Corollary 1) for each problem in-
stance, we observed that the greedy cµ policy is unstable in 16 out of 480 problem
instances (i.e., 3.33% of cases) within the test suite. Hence, we considered the re-
maining 464 cases as the basis for computing the statistics on the cµ rule. However,
as Theorems 5 and 6 indicate, LEWC, LQ, and Gcµ always stabilize the “W.” Fig.
4.5 illustrates that the proposed heuristic, LEWC, outperforms the other policies.
The mean optimality gap for LEWC is 6.70% in contrast to 13.04% for LQ, 28.10%
for cµ (among stable cases), and 7.24% for Gcµ. That is, the mean optimality gap of
LQ, cµ, and Gcµ are 195%, 420%, and 108% of that of LEWC, respectively. These
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results suggest that LEWC (as the first best) and Gcµ (as the second best) are nearly
optimal policies considering that the problem instances include wide variations on
disruption rates, repair rates, arrival rates, costs, traffics, etc. This observation is
especially important in light of the following:
• The optimal policy is too complex for practical application in many settings.
• Even for small systems with few servers and task types, obtaining the optimal
policy becomes quickly intractable, especially when disruptions are allowed.
Therefore, when the size of the systems increases, the optimality gap of a
heuristic quickly becomes intractable, so comparisons to the performance of
other available heuristics are appropriate.
The standard deviation column in Fig. 4.5 shows that LEWC is considerably
more robust than other policies in the sense that it is more predictably effective over
a wide range of model parameters. For any test case, the heuristics employ the true
parameters. Thus, robustness for us is not associated with model uncertainty; rather
the range of parameters over which a policy is effective. Indeed, as the figure shows,
the standard deviations of LQ, cµ, and Gcµ are 249%, 1100%, and 125% of that of
LEWC, respectively. From Fig 4.5 we also observe that the CDF of the optimality
gap of LEWC is closer to that of Gcµ compared to LQ and cµ. However, LEWC
outperforms all of the policies including Gcµ in all four metrics (mean, standard
deviation, min, and max). Moreover, the obtained CDF for the optimality gap of
LEWC is always above that of LQ, illuminating the clear advantage of using LEWC
over LQ. However, the CDF for the optimality gap of cµ is initially above LEWC,
because for about 40% of the test problems within our test suite the cµ rule obtains
the optimal cost (since its optimality conditions presented in Theorem 4 are met).
Of course, one can revise the LEWC policy so that it implements the cµ rule when
its optimality conditions are met. We did not implement this obvious improvement,
because the LEWC policy as stated can be applied in any general network structure
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for which the optimality conditions of cµ may not be known. This way, we gain more
confidence that LEWC is suitable for a wide range of applications.
Although the CDF for the optimality gap of cµ is initially above LEWC, it should
be noted that the cµ rule is a greedy policy and is very risky to implement unless
the system’s manager can ensure that its optimality conditions are not violated in
advance. For instance, even under a heavy-traffic regime, [102] discusses that although
the Gcµ rule is asymptotically optimal when holding costs are convex, its special case,
cµ, may not be optimal when the holding costs are linear. Our results for systems
with moderate traffic and linear holding costs shows that the cµ rule performs poorly
on average. Moreover, as Fig. 4.5 shows, cµ is unstable in 3.33% of cases, and among
the stable cases, cµ shows a large standard deviation of 59.33% (and a maximum of
379.73%) in its optimality gap. Our proposed algorithm, similar to Gcµ, combines
the cost minimization intuition behind the cµ and the load balancing idea of LQ.
However, unlike Gcµ, LEWC uses an LP (LP 2) to approximate the effort levels (yji).
This use of an LP permits a more accurate estimatation of the workload and allows
LEWC to dynamically balance the workload costs. This fact makes LEWC not only
a more effective policy in terms of the mean optimality gap, but also a considerably
more robust policy with a relatively small standard deviation of 5.39%. This small
standard deviation suggests another advantage of LEWC; using LEWC for comparing
various queueing designs (where the optimal policy is computationally intractable)
can be more reliable than implementing other policies (see, for instance, [81] and [80]
where LQ is used for strategic design comparisons.)
Another observation from Fig. 4.5 is that the widely used LQ and Gcµ policies are
never optimal within our test suite, showing a minimum optimality gap of 0.51% and
0.25%, respectively. However, our proposed LEWC algorithm achieves the optimal
cost in a few cases and, like cµ, has a minimum gap of 0%. Moreover, LEWC, unlike
cµ and LQ, rarely results in an optimality gap of above 15%. Indeed, under LEWC
the chance of obtaining a performance which is 15% worse than optimal is only 6.9%
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(within our test suite), but under LQ and cµ the chances are 29.0% and 27.6%,
respectively.
Another point of interest is to look at the performances of the policies in detail
from the perspectives of disruption, congestion, and cost. Table 4.1 presents the de-
tailed comparisons based on Settings (I)-(IV) (see Table 4.6 in Online Appendix C).
These four settings represent various combinations of disruption and system conges-
tion. Setting (I) represents a system with no disruption and relatively high traffic.
The scope of this research is not the heavy-traffic regime; therefore, here high traffic
means relatively high congestion of around 90% and low represents 70%. In Setting
(II) the servers are reliable, but the system congestion is relatively low. Settings (III)
and (IV) represent scenarios where the system is under relatively lower traffic; in Set-
ting (III), servers are completely reliable, but they are under stochastic disruptions
in Setting (IV). The results in Table 4.1 suggest the following observations.
• Interestingly, cµ outperforms LQ on average under relatively low traffic (see
the mean optimality gaps under Settings (II) and (IV)). Under relatively higher
traffic, however, LQ is better than cµ. This observation may suggest that the
load balancing of LQ becomes more important than the greedy cost minimiza-
tion of cµ when traffic is moderate to relatively high.
• LQ is always worse than cµ with respect to the minimum optimality gap cri-
terion and always better with respect to the maximum optimality gap. This
result is intuitive since cµ, unlike LQ, is an extreme (and a greedy) policy. Ad-
ditionally, LEWC is almost as good as cµ (which itself outperforms LQ) under
the minimum optimality gap criterion and always better than LQ (which itself
outperforms cµ) under the maximum optimality gap criterion. Moreover, in
all of these four settings, LEWC outperforms LQ, cµ, and Gcµ with respect to
the mean optimality gap and, therefore, presents the best policy under various
settings. This strength of LEWC derives from the way it accounts for different
parameters of the system through the proposed LP 2 incorporated in the LEWC
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Table 4.1: Comparison of policies based on the combinations of disruption and the
system congestion using the percentage optimality gaps.
Setting Disruption Traffic Policy No. of Cases Mean Min Max
(I) No High
cµ (Stable Cases) 112 69.52% 0.00% 379.73%
LQ 120 22.12% 1.25% 89.45%
Gcµ 120 12.47% 0.87% 44.31%
LEWC 120 11.92% 0.31% 31.48%
(II) No Low
cµ(Stable Cases) 120 7.01% 0.00% 36.75%
LQ 120 10.45% 0.56% 43.56%
Gcµ 120 4.86% 0.25% 16.51%
LEWC 120 4.57% 0.00% 12.06%
(III) Yes High
cµ (Stable Cases) 112 32.75% 0.00% 352.13%
LQ 120 12.47% 1.23% 62.44%
Gcµ 120 7.77% 0.71% 29.12%
LEWC 120 7.06% 0.01% 16.19%
(IV) Yes Low
cµ (Stable Cases) 120 6.36% 0.00% 36.95%
LQ 120 7.11% 0.51% 34.53%
Gcµ 120 3.84% 0.33% 12.67%
LEWC 120 3.25% 0.00% 8.03%
Table 4.2: Comparison of policies based on the holding cost settings (Level of cost
asymmetry among different classes: (A) Zero, (B) Low, (C) Moderate, (D) High).
Setting
Cmu (Stable Cases) LQ GCmu LEWC
Optimality Gap (%) Optimality Gap (%) Optimality Gap(%) Optimality Gap(%)
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
(A) 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.03 1.08 11.39 4.28 0.64 10.99 4.41 0.00 14.52
(B) 29.51 0.00 207.18 8.34 0.56 31.30 7.63 0.44 33.19 5.67 0.14 23.81
(C) 40.75 0.00 379.73 12.77 0.51 51.10 8.69 0.61 44.31 7.17 0.11 29.10
(D) 23.33 0.00 182.31 20.67 1.24 89.45 6.37 0.25 23.39 8.03 0.04 31.48
Total 28.10 0.00 379.73 13.04 0.51 89.45 7.24 0.25 44.31 6.70 0.00 31.48
index.
• All of the policies show a smaller average optimality gap under lower congestion
(compare Setting (I) with (II), and Setting (III) with (IV)). This observation
may suggest that it is better to implement these policies for systems with low
to moderate congestion rather than systems with relatively high traffic.
Table 4.2 compares the policies based on the various holding cost settings defined
in Table 4.7 in Online Appendix C. In Setting (A), all holding costs equal one, repre-
senting a symmetric situation. Settings (B)-(D) represent situations with asymmetric
holding costs among customer classes where the degree of asymmetry develops from
a low degree in (B) to a high degree in (D). A closer look at Table 4.2 provides the
following observations.
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• All the policies perform their best (based on the mean criterion) when there
is no cost asymmetry. Moreover, the performance of both LQ and LEWC
deteriorates as the level of asymmetry increases. However, this deterioration
does not occur for cµ or Gcµ. In fact, both cµ and Gcµ perform their worst when
the level of asymmetry in holding costs is moderate (Setting (C)). Although
the performance of LEWC, unlike cµ and Gcµ, deteriorates as the level of
asymmetry increases, as Table 4.1 showed, LEWC still outperforms both cµ
and Gcµ.
• The proposed heuristic (LEWC) is much more robust to changes in holding
costs than other policies. For instance, the mean optimality gap of LQ changes
from 5.03% to 20.67% (more than 410% change) by moving from no asymmetry
in costs to high asymmetry in costs whereas the mean optimality gap of LEWC
only changes from 4.41% to 8.43% (less than 183% change). These results show
that the performance of the widely used cµ and LQ policies, unlike LEWC and
Gcµ, is very sensitive to the holding costs. This observation is intuitive, because
LQ does not consider holding costs and cµ depends on them in a relatively
extreme way.
• To complete the previous observation, we should note that LEWC, similar to cµ
and Gcµ, uses holding costs to determine the switching curves, but LEWC, un-
like cµ and Gcµ, uses holding cost together with other system parameters. This
fact makes LEWC less sensitive to changes in the system parameters (including
holding costs and service rates). Therefore, our results recommend the use of
LEWC rather than cµ and Gcµ when the system parameters vary over time. A
similar comparison indicates that LEWC is also preferable to LQ. However, it
should be noted that LQ is the rational choice in the absence of any information
on the system parameters (which is perhaps its best feature).
Finally, to explore the effect of server disruptions on the performance of LEWC,
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Policy No. of Cases Mean Std. Dev.
Cµ 288 3.93% 12.00%
LQ 288 10.29% 7.69%
GCµ  288 3.34% 2.35%


























Figure 4.6: Sensitivity of cµ, LQ, Gcµ, and LEWC to variations in disruption risks.
LQ, cµ, and Gcµ, we consider the test suite presented in Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10
(Online Appendix C), and depict in Fig. 4.6 the average optimality gap (over all
problem instances) of each of these policies for different levels of disruptions. As the
results confirm, LEWC is the least sensitive policy to variations in the disruption risks
as it explicitly incorporates disruption rates. This robustness to disruptions, provides
another benefit of the proposed policy, LEWC. Among other policies, Gcµ and LQ
are more robust to disruptions compared to cµ, since they implicitly incorporate the
effect of disruptions through a consideration of queue lengths.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter considered the problem of assigning servers to various jobs in real-
time to obtain good performance and thereby extract the most benefit from the flexi-
bility of the servers. We first developed a Markov Decision Process (MDP) modeling
framework for parallel queueing systems with arbitrary number of job types, arbitrary
number of servers, arbitrary flexibility structures, and heterogeneous servers subject
to stochastic disruptions. We implemented a Linear Program (LP) to investigate the
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stability of such a queueing system, provided some convergence and monotonicity
results, and showed that it is sufficient to restrict attention to the class of non-idling
stationary policies.
To gain more insights into the characteristics of effective real-time server assign-
ment mechanisms, we then considered the “W” design in which servers are trained to
work on a shared task in addition to their fixed task. As a three-class network with
two partially flexible servers, the “W” generalizes the “N” structure which has re-
ceived considerable attention (mainly due to the intrinsic difficulties of the underlying
control problem). Next, comparing the “W” design with other possible structures, we
showed that the “W” queueing network is an efficient paradigm; with a little invest-
ment in flexibility, it provides performance almost as good as a fully flexible network.
This chapter provided specific observations into how the “W” design is the preferred
structure for many systems with three demand types and two servers. Given the ob-
stacles of fully cross-training servers in practice, our models, analyses, and numerical
studies provide designers with a better understanding of how to effectively introduce
limited flexibility to a system.
We next provided insights for a system manager on how to benefit from the limited
flexibility of servers in real-time. We showed that, for the “W,” a version of the greedy
cµ policy that prescribes every server (whenever not disrupted) to work on the fixed
task before the shared task is optimal under some conditions. In general, we observed
that the optimal policy is of a state-dependent threshold type and can be characterized
by four threshold surfaces. However, our findings confirmed that the optimal policy
is complex in general, which makes it less attractive for use in practice.
Therefore, we introduced a new, powerful, and implementable policy to control
the servers. [137] states that “A fundamental understanding of the scheduling tradeoff
[between achieving server load balancing and scheduling jobs where they are processed
most efficiently] is of great theoretical interest.” Our heuristic policy, LEWC, considers
this trade-off and balances the workload cost of queues (using the traditional notion
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of instantaneous workload). This balance is achieved by combining the load balancing
intuition that is effectively captured in the queue length dependence of the LQ policy
and the greedy cost rate minimization concept embodied in the cµ rule. LEWC
dynamically measures the expected workload costs of the queues, and then assigns
each server to the queue with Largest Expected Workload Cost (LEWC) among its
skill set. We first established the stability of LEWC (as well as LQ and Gcµ) and
then performed an extensive MDP-based numerical test to gain insights into the
performance of LEWC as well as three widely used policies: the LQ policy, the cµ,
and the Gcµ rules. Our results particularly suggested the following two conclusions:
(1) LEWC is a near optimal policy outperforming the other policies, (2) LEWC
is more robust than LQ, cµ, and Gcµ over a wide range of operating environments
(holding costs, service rates, disruptions, etc.). This latter observation is an important
property in practice, since system parameters often vary over time.
This robustness may also suggest that the proposed LEWC heuristic is a more
reliable mechanism than the other policies for applications to strategic design, where
a designer needs a fair control policy to compare the performance of alternate de-
signs. However, future work could explore if LEWC is also robust across different
cross-training designs. If so, it would also be a useful policy for the strategic de-
sign of general flexible/queueing systems. This can greatly benefit research targeting
strategic design of queueing systems in the vein of [81] and [80].
4.6 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2 (i) We use the timed round-robin policy of
∮
5.1 of [6] and
show that if τ ∗ > 0, this policy stabilizes the system (although it might not have a
good performance). In other words, we show that, if τ ∗ > 0, this policy results in
a finite steady-state distribution or equivalently a finite performance cost. To show
that, consider a special case of the queueing network in [6] with routing matrix P = 0
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and setups sπj = 0, where the long-run availability of server j is given by āj =
rj
θj+rj
. Let the optimal decision variables obtained from LP 1 be y∗ji. Also, let λ
∗ be the







δji µji ≥ λαi ∀i ∈ Nc, (4.17)
∑
i∈Nc
δji ≤ āj ∀j ∈ Ns, (4.18)




is the splitting probability from the current aggregated arrival rate
to the system (i.e., λ =
∑
i∈Nc λi) to class i. Notice that because y
∗
ji and τ
∗ > 0 are










yield a feasible solution to LP (4.16)-(4.19). Since λ∗ is the optimum solution to
LP (4.16)-(4.19), we have λ∗ ≥ λ̂. Also, since τ ∗ > 0, we have λ̂ > λ =
∑
i∈Nc λi.
Hence, λ∗ > λ. Now consider the capacity λ (the current aggregated arrival rate to
the system) and use the timed round-robin policy of
∮
5.1 of [6]. Following the same
line of proof as part (i) of Theorem 3 of that paper and using Theorem 2.4.9 of Dai
(1999), we see that the corresponding fluid model of this policy is stable. Hence,
using Theorem 4.2 of Dai (1995) and Theorem 4.1 of Dai and Meyn (1995), the
underlying Markov process that represents the dynamics of the queueing system under
the above-mentioned round-robin policy is positive Harris recurrent and converges to
a steady-state distribution with finite moments. This proves part (i).
To prove part (ii), we show that if τ ∗ < 0, the current aggregated arrival rate to
the system (λ =
∑
i∈Nc λi) cannot be achieved through LP (4.16)-(4.19). In other
words, we show that if τ ∗ < 0, then λ > λ∗, i.e., the current arrival to the system
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is larger than λ∗. The rest of the proof then follows Theorem 3 (ii) of [6]. To show
that λ > λ∗ if τ∗ < 0, we prove the result by contradiction. Suppose λ ≤ λ∗ and let
δ∗ji be the optimal decision variables of LP (4.16)-(4.19). Then notice that since the






τ = 0 provides a feasible solution to LP (4.8)-(4.11). However, since τ ∗ is the optimum
solution to this LP, we will have τ ∗ ≥ 0 which contradicts the assumption τ ∗ < 0. 
Proof of Theorem 3. In the proof of Theorem (2) we showed that if τ ∗ > 0, then
there exists a policy under which the stochastic process defining the system is positive
(Harris) recurrent. Moreover, notice that for any c > 0, the set {X̃ : hXT ≤ c} is
finite. Hence, the assumptions of Corollary 7.5.10 of [126] hold, and from Theorem
7.5.6.(i) of this reference, the set of assumptions [SEN] hold. Now, first notice that
the convergence of finite-horizon discounted problem to the infinite-horizon discounted
problem follows from Proposition 4.3.1 of [126]. Then, since the set of assumptions
[SEN] hold, parts (i), (ii), and (iii) follow from Theorem 7.2.3 of the same reference,
if we also notice that Z∗ = ψZ∗U . Part (iv) also follows from Proposition 4.3.1 of [126]
for the infinite-horizon problem and then from Theorem 7.2.3 of the same reference
for the average-cost case. 
Lemma 4 (Monotonicity) For any X̃ ∈ S, n ∈ Z+, β ∈ [0, 1), and k ∈ Nc :
Vn,β (X̃ + ek) ≥ Vn,β (X̃).
Proof of Lemma 4. We prove this lemma by induction on n. For n = 0, we have
V0,β (X̃) = 0 (∀X̃ ∈ S). Hence, V0,β (X̃ + ek) = V0,β (X̃) = 0 (∀X̃ ∈ S , ∀k ∈ Nc).
Now assume for some n ∈ Z+ we have Vn,β (X̃ + ek) ≥ Vn,β (X̃) for any X̃ ∈ S,
β ∈ [0, 1), and k ∈ Nc. We show the same monotonicity result is also true for n+ 1.
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From (4.5) we have:





λiVn,β(AiX̃ + ek) +
∑
j∈Ns
[θj aj Vn,β(BjX̃ + ek)



















1{uj = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns




Now, if the minimization occurs for some control vector u∗ ∈ U(X̃), then after re-
placing U(X̃ + ek) with U(X̃) the proof would be straightforward since by induction
assumption every term in Vn+1,β(X̃ + ek) is greater than or equal to the same term in
Vn+1,β(X̃) defined in (4.5). However, since U(X̃ + ek) is a larger admissible set than
U(X̃), it is not always the case (i.e., u∗ may not belong to U(X̃)). If u∗ /∈ U(X̃),
writing terms related to the control of class k separately and using the optimal action
u∗, we have:





λiVn,β(AiX̃ + ek) +
∑
j∈Ns
[θj aj Vn,β(BjX̃ + ek)





















1{u∗j = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns





Now we show that if one uses the same allocation policy as u∗ for every class i 6= k
but idles one of the servers (say server j′), which is allocated to class k in u∗, and
instead changes X̃ + ek to X̃, obtains a lower value than Vn+1,β(X̃ + ek). We will
then show that this new value is an upper bound for Vn+1,β(X̃) since the new policy
(say u′) is admissible (but not necessarily optimal) at state X̃. Precisely, because we










1{u∗j = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns
[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]− µj′k
)
≥ 0 ,










1{u∗j = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns




Vn,β(X̃ + ek)− Vn,β(X̃)
]
≥ 0.
Now subtracting this positive term from (4.20), we get:
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λiVn,β(AiX̃ + ek) +
∑
j∈Ns
[θj aj Vn,β(BjX̃ + ek)




















1{u∗j = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns































1{u∗j = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns





where the last inequality is obtained by using the induction assumption. Now we show
that (4.21) is an upper bound for Vn+1,β(X̃), and hence Vn+1,β(X̃ + ek) ≥ Vn+1,β(X̃).
To see that (4.21) is an upper bound for Vn+1,β(X̃), let u
′ be a policy that uses the
same allocation as u∗ for every class i 6= k but idles server j′ (i.e., u′j′ = 0 and u′j = u∗j
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for every j 6= j′ ∈ Ns). Using u′ and from (4.21), we have:
























1{u′j = i}µji −
∑
j∈Ns





Finally, notice that since u∗ is admissible at state X̃, the policy u′ constructed above is
admissible (but not necessarily optimal) at state X̃ based on (4.6). Hence, this policy
provides an upper bound for Vn+1,β(X̃) defined in (4.5) and the proof is complete. 
Proposition 7 (Non-idling) There exists an optimal policy (for the finite, infinite,
or the average-cost problems) which does not allow for unforced idling.
Proof of Proposition 7. The following sample path argument shows the result for
the finite horizon case. The result for the other cases then follows from Theorem
3. Consider first a t + n period problem. If every optimal policy does not allow for
unforced idling, the proof is complete. Otherwise, assume a policy π∗ exists that is
optimal and allows for unforced idling of a server j. Let t denote the first decision
epoch at which π∗ allows for unforced idling, i.e., it idles server j although it can
assign a class k job to that server. Construct another policy π′ that follows the
same allocation as π∗ until decision epoch t, but at t it assigns server j to a class
k job. Since preemption is allowed, at t + 1 preempt every server and follow the
optimal policy π∗. Let X̃′ denote the state of the system under policy π′. Notice that
until time t both policies have the same cost. However, from t + 1, the cost of the
policy π′ is Vn+1,β(X̃
′), and the cost of policy π∗ is either Vn,β(X̃
′+ ek) or Vn+1,β(X̃
′).
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Hence, using Lemma 1, total cost of policy π′ cannot be worse than that of policy









Hence, since the above argument holds for every n ∈ Z+ and β ∈ (0, 1), Zπ′ ≤ Zπ∗ .
Therefore, if the policy π∗ is optimal with respect to average cost criterion, then pol-
icy π′ constructed above would be optimal for the average cost problem. 














) + y22 µ22 (
r1
θ1 + r1
) ≥ λ2 + τ (4.26)
y11 + y12 ≤ 1 (4.27)
y22 + y23 ≤ 1 (4.28)
y11, y12, y22, y23 ≥ 0. (4.29)
Let τ ∗ denote the optimal value of the objective function of this LP. Notice that
if max{ρ1, ρ3} > 1, then either constraint (4.24) (together with (4.27) and (4.29)),
or constraint (4.25) (together with (4.28) and (4.29)), forces τ ∗ < 0. Therefore,
by Theorem 2 part (ii) the system is unstable if max{ρ1, ρ3} > 1. Now suppose
max{ρ1, ρ3} < 1 and (1 − ρ1)µeff12 + (1 − ρ3)µ
eff
22 > λ2. Let ε = 1 − max{ρ1, ρ3}
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and δ = (1 − ρ1)µeff12 + (1 − ρ3)µ
eff
22 − λ2. Choose n ∈ N large enough such that
ε/n (µeff12 + µ
eff
22 ) < δ. Then set y11 = ρ1 + ε/n, y12 = 1 − y11 = 1 − ρ1 − ε/n,
y22 = 1−ρ3− ε/n, and y23 = 1− y22 = ρ3 + ε/n. Then notice that, because ε > 0 and
δ > 0, the set of variables yij constructed above yield a feasible (but not necessarily
optimal) solution for the LP with a positive objective value τ . Since τ ∗ is the optimal
objective value, τ ∗ ≥ τ > 0. Hence, the system is stable by Theorem 2 part (i), and
the proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 4 (Non-Collaborative Case). We first prove the case where
collaboration is not allowed. We show the result for the finite horizon discounted
cost problem defined in (4.5). For the infinite horizon and the average cost criterion,
the result would follow from Theorem 3 part (iv). Let V be the set of real-valued
functions on state space S and define functional operators Th, Tλ,a, Tu, T : V → V
as follows:








[θj aj V (BjX̃) + rj (1− aj)V (RjX̃)] (4.31)











































1{uj = i}µji∆iV (DiX̃)
}
(4.33)
TV (X̃) = ThV (X̃) + β
[




From (4.5) and (4.34), and after fixing discount factor β, the N-Period problem sat-
isfies the optimality equation:
Vn(X̃) = TVn−1(X̃) n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, (4.35)
with terminal condition V0(·) = 0.
Define A1,A2 ⊂ S as:
A1 = {X̃ ∈ S : a1 = 1, x1, x2 ≥ 1} and A2 = {X̃ ∈ S : a2 = 1, x2, x3 ≥ 1}. (4.36)
Now suppose the condition of the theorem holds. Hence, after uniformization we
have h1µ11 ≥ h2µ12, h3µ23 ≥ h2µ22, µ12 ≥ µ11, and µ22 ≥ µ23. First notice that if
the shared queue is empty (i.e., if x2 = 0) the result of the theorem is trivial since
unforced idling is suboptimal by Proposition 7. Thus, it remains to show that it is
optimal (1) for server 1 to serve its fixed task for every X̃ ∈ A1, and (2) for server
2 to serve its fixed task for every X̃ ∈ A2. From (4.33), to show that the optimal
allocation in operator Tu follows these rules, it is sufficient to show that the following
properties hold:
(i) µ11∆1V (X̃− e1) ≥ µ12∆2V (X̃− e2) for all X̃ ∈ A1,
(ii) µ23∆3V (X̃− e3) ≥ µ22∆2V (X̃− e2) for all X̃ ∈ A2.
(4.37)
Now, let V ⊂ V be the set of real-valued functions such that if V ∈ V then V satisfies
properties (i) and (ii) given in (4.37). Notice that, since V0(·) = 0, V0 ∈ V . Hence,
from Lemma 2 (see below) and (4.35) we have Vn ∈ V (∀n ∈ Z+). Thus, the proof
is complete for the finite-horizon problem. The proof for infinite-horizon and average
cost scenarios then follow from Theorem 3 part (iv). 
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Lemma 2 [Preservation (Non-Collaborative Case)]. Suppose that conditions
h1µ11 ≥ h2µ12, h3µ23 ≥ h2µ22, µ12 ≥ µ11,
and µ22 ≥ µ23 hold and V ∈ V . Then TV ∈ V . That is, operator T preserves
properties (i) and (ii) in (4.37) when h1µ11 ≥ h2µ12, h3µ23 ≥ h2µ22, µ12 ≥ µ11, and
µ22 ≥ µ23.
Proof. We first show that, under the conditions of this lemma, TV satisfies property
(i) in (4.37). To show that, we divide A1 to five partitions A11,A21, · · · ,A51, where
A11 = {X̃ ∈ A1 : x1 ≥ 2, x2 ≥ 1, x3 ≥ 1},
A21 = {X̃ ∈ A1 : x1 ≥ 2, x2 ≥ 1, x3 = 0},
A31 = {X̃ ∈ A1 : x1 = 1, x2 ≥ 1, x3 ≥ 1},
A41 = {X̃ ∈ A1 : x1 = 1, x2 ≥ 2, x3 = 0},
A51 = {X̃ ∈ A1 : x1 = 1, x2 = 1, x3 = 0}.
Now, for each partition we show that TV satisfies property (i) in (4.37), i.e., we show
that µ11∆1TV (X̃− e1) ≥ µ12∆2TV (X̃− e2) holds for each partition.
Case 1 (X̃ ∈ A11)










[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− a2µ23∆3V (X̃− e3)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e1)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− 2e1)− a2µ23∆3V (X̃− e1 − e3)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e2)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)− a2µ23∆3V (X̃− e2 − e3)
From above:∆1TuV (X̃− e1) =





































∆1V (X̃− e1)−∆1V (X̃− e1 − e3)
)
,
where the last equality is obtained since ∆3V (X̃ − e3) − ∆3V (X̃ − e1 − e3) =
∆3∆1V (X̃− e1 − e3) = ∆1∆3V (X̃− e1 − e3) = ∆1V (X̃− e1)−∆1V (X̃− e1 − e3).
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Similarly, ∆2TuV (X̃− e2) =



































∆2V (X̃− e2)−∆2V (X̃− e2 − e3)
)
.
where the last equality is obtained since ∆3V (X̃ − e3) − ∆3V (X̃ − e2 − e3) =
∆3∆2V (X̃− e2 − e3) = ∆2∆3V (X̃− e2 − e3) = ∆2V (X̃− e2)−∆2V (X̃− e2 − e3).
Therefore, from the above and after simplification we have:



















µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e3)− µ12∆2V (X̃− e2 − e3)
]
≥ 0,
where the inequality holds, since every term is nonnegative as V ∈ V (and hence V
satisfies property (i)). Thus, operator Tu preserves property (i) in this case. (It should
be clear that the coefficient of the first term is nonnegative due to uniformization).
Also, notice that clearly operator Tλ,a preserves this property as well. Moreover,
µ11∆1ThV (X̃ − e1) − µ12∆2ThV (X̃ − e2) = h1µ11 − h2µ12 ≥ 0. Hence, all of the
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operators Th, Tλ,a, and Tu preserve property (i). Thus, operator T = Th+β[Tλ,a+Tu]
preserves property (i) in (4.37).
Case 2 (X̃ ∈ A21)









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e2)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e1)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− 2e1)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e2)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)− a2µ221{x2 ≥ 2}∆3V (X̃− 2e2)
Therefore, ∆1TuV (X̃− e1) =





































∆1V (X̃− e1)−∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)
)
,
where the last equality is obtained since ∆2V (X̃ − e2) − ∆2V (X̃ − e1 − e2) =
∆2∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2) = ∆1∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2) = ∆1V (X̃− e1)−∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2).
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Also,





































∆2V (X̃− e2)− 1{x2 ≥ 2}∆2V (X̃− 2e2)
)
where the last equality is obtained since ∆1∆2V (X̃−e1−e2) = ∆2∆1V (X̃−e1−e2),
as introduced above in this case.
Hence, from above and after simplification we have:



















µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)− µ121{x2 ≥ 2}∆2V (X̃− 2e2)
]
≥ 0,
where the inequality holds, since if 1{x2 ≥ 2} = 1, every term is nonnegative as
V ∈ V (and hence V satisfies property (i)). Also, if 1{x2 ≥ 2} = 0, then the
first and second term are nonnegative as V ∈ V , and the last term is nonnega-
tive since ∆1V (·) ≥ 0 from Lemma 4. Thus, operator Tu preserves property (i) in
this case. Also, notice that clearly operator Tλ,a preserves this property. Moreover,
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µ11∆1ThV (X̃− e1)− µ12∆2ThV (X̃− e2) = h1µ11 − h2µ12 ≥ 0, and thus, operator Th
preserves property (i). Hence, similar to Case 1, all of the operators Th, Tλ,a, and Tu
preserve property (i). Thus, operator T = Th + β[Tλ,a + Tu] preserves property (i) in
(4.37).
Case 3 (X̃ ∈ A31)









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− a2µ23∆3V (X̃− e3)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e1)
− µ12∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)− a2µ23∆3V (X̃− e1 − e3)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e2)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)− a2µ23∆3V (X̃− e2 − e3)
From above: ∆1TuV (X̃− e1) =









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
∆1V (X̃− e1)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1) + µ12∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)
− a2µ23
(










[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
∆1V (X̃− e1)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1) + µ12∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)
− a2µ23
(




where the last equality is obtained since ∆3∆1V (X̃−e1−e3) = ∆1∆3V (X̃−e1−e3),
as introduced in Case 1.
Similarly, ∆2TuV (X̃− e2) =





































∆2V (X̃− e2)−∆2V (X̃− e2 − e3)
)
.
where the last equality is obtained since ∆3∆2V (X̃−e2−e3) = ∆2∆3V (X̃−e2−e3),
as introduced in Case 1.
Therefore, from the above and after simplification we have:















µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e3)− µ12∆2V (X̃− e2 − e3)
]
≥ 0,
where the inequality holds, since every term is nonnegative as V ∈ V (and hence V
satisfies property (i)). Thus, operator Tu preserves property (i) in this case. Also, it
is trivial that operator Tλ,a preserves this property. Moreover, µ11∆1ThV (X̃− e1)−
µ12∆2ThV (X̃−e2) = h1µ11−h2µ12 ≥ 0. Hence, similar to the previous cases, all of the
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operators Th, Tλ,a, and Tu preserve property (i). Thus, operator T = Th+β[Tλ,a+Tu]
preserves property (i) in (4.37).
Case 4 (X̃ ∈ A41)









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e2)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e1)
− µ12∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e2)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− 2e2)
Therefore, ∆1TuV (X̃− e1) =









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
∆1V (X̃− e1)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1) + µ12∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)
− a2µ22
(



















∆1V (X̃− e1)−∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)
)
,
where the last equality is obtained since ∆2∆1V (X̃−e1−e2) = ∆1∆2V (X̃−e1−e2),
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as introduced in Case 2.
Similarly,






































∆2V (X̃− e2)−∆2V (X̃− 2e2)
)
.
where the last equality is obtained since ∆1∆2V (X̃−e1−e2) = ∆2∆1V (X̃−e1−e2),
as introduced in Case 2.
Hence, from above and after simplification we have:



















µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2)− µ12∆2V (X̃− 2e2)
]
≥ 0,
where the inequality holds since every term is nonnegative as V ∈ V (and hence V
satisfies property (i)). Thus, operator Tu preserves property (i) in this case. Also,
notice that clearly operator Tλ,a preserves this property. Moreover, µ11∆1ThV (X̃ −
e1)− µ12∆2ThV (X̃− e2) = h1µ11 − h2µ12 ≥ 0, and thus, operator Th preserves prop-
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erty (i). Hence, similar to the previous cases, all of the operators Th, Tλ,a, and Tu
preserve property (i). Thus, operator T = Th + β[Tλ,a + Tu] preserves property (i) in
(4.37).
Case 5 (X̃ ∈ A51)









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e2)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e1)
−max{µ12, a2µ22}∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e2)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2).
Therefore, ∆1TuV (X̃− e1) =









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
∆1V (X̃− e1)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1) + max{µ12, a2µ22}∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e2),
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and









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
∆2V (X̃− e2)









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
∆2V (X̃− e2)
− µ11(∆2V (X̃− e2)−∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2))− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e2).
where the last equality is obtained since ∆1∆2V (X̃−e1−e2) = ∆2∆1V (X̃−e1−e2),
as introduced in Case 2.
Then, from above and after simplification we obtain:







[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]− µ11
)[
µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− µ12∆2V (X̃− e2)
]
+ a2µ22(µ12 − µ11)∆2V (X̃− e2) + µ11
(
max{µ12, a2µ22} − µ12
)
∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)
≥ 0,
where the inequality holds since all the terms in the last expression is nonnegative.
The first term is nonnegative as (1) its coefficient is nonnegative due to uniformization,
and (2) V ∈ V (and hence V satisfies property (i)). Similarly, the second term is
also nonnegative as (1) µ12 ≥ µ11 is a condition of the lemma, and (2) ∆2V (·) ≥ 0
by Lemma 4. Finally, the third term is nonnegative as (1) max{µ12, a2µ22}−µ12 ≥ 0
always holds (note that this also covers the cases with a2 = 0), and (2) ∆2V (·) ≥ 0
by Lemma 4.
Therefore, operator Tu preserves property (i). Also, notice that clearly operator
Tλ,a preserves this property. Moreover, µ11∆1ThV (X̃ − e1) − µ12∆2ThV (X̃ − e2) =
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h1µ11 − h2µ12 ≥ 0, and thus, operator Th preserves property (i). Hence, similar to
the previous cases, all of the operators Th, Tλ,a, and Tu preserve property (i). Thus,
operator T = Th + β[Tλ,a + Tu] preserves property (i) in (4.37).
From the proofs for Cases 1 to 5 above, operator T preserves property (i) for
X̃ ∈ Aj1 (j = 1, · · · , 5). Hence, T preserves this property for X̃ ∈ ∪5j=1A
j
1 = A1. It
remains to show that T preserves property (ii) in (4.37) for all X̃ ∈ A2. To prove
this, notice that because of the complete symmetry in the “W,” the proof would
follow exactly the same lines as the proof for preservation of property (i), only after
relabeling servers and customer classes. (Notice that properties (i) and (ii), and all
the conditions of the lemma are symmetric). Therefore, T also preserves property
(ii) for all X̃ ∈ A2 and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 4 (Collaborative Case). When servers can collaborate while
serving jobs, majority of the proof of Theorem 4 and Lemma 2 stay the same. The
functional operators Th, Tλ,a, Tu, and T and the optimality equation provided in
(4.30) to (4.35) of the Theorem 4 proof stay the same, but in order to allow for




u = (uj ∈ Nc ∪ {0} s.t. ∀i ∈ Nc : 1{uj = i} ≤ aj 1{i ∈ Sj},∑
j∈Ns
1{uj = i} ≤ |Ns|1{Xi > 0})
}
. (4.38)
Let A1,A2 ⊂ S be as defined in (4.36). Now suppose we have h1µ11 ≥ h2µ12, h3µ23 ≥
h2µ22, and server collaboration while serving jobs is allowed. Due to the skill structure
of the “W,” servers can only collaborate on the shared task jobs. Note that, if the
shared queue is empty (i.e., if x2 = 0) the result of the theorem is trivial since unforced
idling is suboptimal by Proposition 7. Thus, it remains to show that it is optimal
(1) for server 1 to serve its fixed task for every X̃ ∈ A1, and (2) for server 2 to serve
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its fixed task for every X̃ ∈ A2. From (4.33), to show that the optimal allocation in
operator Tu follows these rules, it is sufficient to show that the following properties
hold:
(i) µ11∆1V (X̃− e1) ≥ µ12∆2V (X̃− e2) for all X̃ ∈ A1,
(ii) µ23∆3V (X̃− e3) ≥ µ22∆2V (X̃− e2) for all X̃ ∈ A2.
(4.39)
which are the same properties used in the proofs of Theorem 4 and Lemma 2. Proper-
ties (i) and (ii) ensure that the server collaboration is the unique optimal action only
when (both servers are available and) X = (0, 1, 0) (where both servers are assigned
to fixed task job) and servers follow the cµ rule, as stated in the Theorem 4, in the
rest of the states. To see this, assume V satisfies properties (i) and (ii). As unforced


















1{uj = i}µji∆iV (DiX̃)
}
,



















µ12∆2V (X̃− e2) + µ22∆2V (X̃− e2)
)
,
1{x1, x3 ≥ 1}
(
µ11∆1V (X̃− e1) + µ23∆3V (X̃− e3)
)
,
1{x2, x3 ≥ 1}
(
µ12∆2V (X̃− e2) + µ23∆3V (X̃− e3)
)
,
1{x1, x2 ≥ 1}
(




The first and the second options in the maximum function are collaboration and as-
signing each server to separate shared task jobs (if possible), respectively. Properties
(i) and (ii) ensure that the first two actions in the maximum function are never the
unique optimal action as long as one of the other server assignments is allowable at
that state. Therefore, except for states with X = (0, x2, 0) where x2 ≥ 1, we can
ignore the first two actions and construct an optimal policy. For states X = (0, x2, 0)
where x2 ≥ 2, the first two terms in (4.40) are equal. Therefore, as long as x2 ≥ 2,
we can construct an optimal policy that ignores the collaboration action. As a result,
if V satisfies properties (i) and (ii), then collaboration is only uniquely optimal at
X = {0, 1, 0}. Now, similar to the proof of the non-collaborative case, let V ⊂ V be
the set of real-valued functions such that if V ∈ V then V satisfies properties (i) and
(ii). Notice that, since V0(·) = 0, V0 ∈ V . Hence, from Lemma 3 (see below) and
(4.35) we have Vn ∈ V (∀n ∈ Z+). Thus, the proof is complete for the finite-horizon
problem. The proof for infinite-horizon and average cost scenarios then follow from
Theorem 3 part (iv) (notice that Theorem 3 is proved under a non-collaborations
assumption, but is also true for the collaborative case). 
Lemma 3 [Preservation (Collaborative Case)]. Suppose h1µ11 ≥ h2µ12, h3µ23 ≥
h2µ22, server collaboration is allowed, and V ∈ V . Then TV ∈ V . That is, under
these conditions, operator T preserves properties (i) and (ii) in (4.39).
Proof. Note that we can use the same partitioning used in the proof of Lemma 2, and
in addition, since V ∈ V , collaboration is the unique optimal action only when (both
servers are available and) X = {0, 1, 0}. Hence, the proofs for the first four partitions
A11 to A41 will not change. In partition A51 however, TuV (X̃−e1) = TuV (0, 1, 0, a1, a2)
and therefore collaboration is optimal when a1 = a2 = 1. Below we present the proof
of Case 5 (X̃ ∈ A51) for the collaborative case.
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Case 5 (X̃ ∈ A51)
Under the server collaboration assumption, it is optimal to assign both servers to the
fixed task when X = (0, 1, 0) and a1 = a2 = 1. Therefore, TuV (X̃) and TuV (X̃− e2)
of Case 5 (X̃ ∈ A51) proof for the non-collaborative case stay the same, but (regardless
of whether a2 = 0 or a2 = 1) the max{µ12, a2µ22} term of TuV (X̃ − e1) is replaced









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e2)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e1)
− (µ12 + a2µ22)∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)








[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
V (X̃− e2)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2).
Therefore, ∆1TuV (X̃− e1) =









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
∆1V (X̃− e1)
− µ11∆1V (X̃− e1) + (µ12 + a2µ22)∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2)− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e2),
and









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]
)
∆2V (X̃− e2)
− µ11(∆2V (X̃− e2)−∆2V (X̃− e1 − e2))− a2µ22∆2V (X̃− e2).
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Then, from above and after simplification we obtain:









[θj aj + rj (1− aj)]− µ11
)[
µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− µ12∆2V (X̃− e2)
]













µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− µ12∆2V (X̃− e2)
]
+ a2µ22µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− a2µ22µ12∆2V (X̃− e2) + a2µ22(µ12 − µ11)∆2V (X̃− e2)































µ11∆1V (X̃− e1)− µ12∆2V (X̃− e2)
]
+ a2µ22µ11∆1V (X̃− e1 − e2) ≥ 0, (4.41)
where the last term is obtained from ∆1∆2V (X̃ − e1 − e2) = ∆2∆1V (X̃ − e1 − e2),
as introduced in Case 2 in the proof of the non-collaborative case.
Note that the inequality in (4.41) holds since all the terms in the last expression are
nonnegative. The first term of (4.41) is nonnegative as (1) its coefficient is nonnegative
due to uniformization even when a2 = 1, and (2) V ∈ V (and hence V satisfies
property (i)). Similarly, the second term is also nonnegative as ∆1V (·) ≥ 0 by
Lemma 4 (which is true when collaboration is allowed).
Hence, by following the same steps employed at the end of the proof for the non-
collaborative case, we can conclude that the operator T preserves properties (i) and
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(ii) and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Let τ̃ ∗ and y∗ji denote the optimal objective function and
the corresponding solutions of LP 2, respectively. Suppose τ ∗ > 0 (or equivalently






)µji ≥ λi + τ ∗ ∀i ∈ Nc, (4.42)
∑
i∈Sj
y∗ji ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ Ns, (4.43)
yji ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ns,∀i ∈ Sj. (4.44)







−1 so that Ii(xi) = κi xi, where Ii(·) is the
LEWC index of queue i. Next suppose the system under LEWC, denoted Γ, is
unstable (i.e., ZΓ = ∞) and, therefore, at least one of the queues does not have
finite average queue length. Let M 6= ∅ denote the set of such queues. That is,
M = {i ∈ Nc : LΓi = ∞}. We prove that LEWC stabilizes the system by showing
that M = ∅ (which is a trivial contradiction).
To show this, we use a fluid model analysis (see, for instance, [35] and [34]). The
goal is to show that the analog fluid model of the system drains in a finite time. To this
end, fix the control policy and let Qi(t) and Tj,i(t) denote the length of queue i at time
t > 0 and the time server j spends actively working on class i up to t, respectively.
Next, let (Q̄i(t), T̄j,i(t) : i ∈ Nc; j ∈ Ns) denote the fluid limit of the system (i.e.,
limit point of (q−1Qi(q t), q
−1Tj,i(q t) : i ∈ Nc; j ∈ Ns) when q → ∞). First, assume
M = {1}, i.e., only queue 1 is unstable. We will show that it results in a contradiction
by showing that ifM = {1}, then (under LEWC) queue 1 will indeed drain in a finite
time. An important step is to show that for any time t with Q̄1(t) > 0 the length
of queue 1 is decreasing on average (and as a result this queue will be drained in a
finite time). To show this rigorously, suppose Q̄1(t) > 0 for some t. From page 20
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of [34], every component of the fluid model including Q̄1(t) is Lipschitz continuous,
and thus, (similar to the argument used in the proof of [35] Proposition 4.2 part (vi))
we can choose a subsequence {q−1n Q1(qns), n ≥ 1} with qn → ∞ as n → ∞, such
that q−1n Q1(qns)→ Q̄1(s) > 0 uniformly on a small interval s ∈ [t, t + h]. Therefore,
for any M ∈ R+ there exists N ∈ N such that Q1(qns) > M for all n ≥ N and all
s ∈ [t, t + h]. Since queue 2 is stable, take M = κ2/κ1 supqnsQ2(qns). This choice
of M implies that κ1Q1(qns) > κ2Q2(qns) for all n ≥ N , during interval [t,t+h],
server 1 spends all his (available) time on queue 1 under LEWC (because queue 1’s






. That is in the fluid model the departure rate of queue






. Moreover, since y∗11 satisfies
(4.42)-(4.44), D̄1(t) = µ11
r1
θ1+r1
≥ y∗11 µ11 ( r1θ1+r1 ) ≥ λ1 + τ
∗, where τ ∗ > 0. In other
words, the departure rate is (strictly) greater than the arrival rate (the queue length
is decreasing) at any time t with Q1(t) > 0. Hence, based on Theorem 2.4.9 of
[34] this queue drains in a finite time. Therefore, from Theorem 4.1 of [35] (which
connects the stability of the fluid model with that of the original underlying Markov
process), LΓ1 < ∞. This is a contradiction with M = {1}. Thus, M 6= {1}. A
similar discussion shows thatM 6= {3} (because of the symmetry in the “W”, it only
requires a change in the notation: consider queue 3 as queue 1, and server 2 as server
1).
Next assume M = {2} i.e., queue 2 (the shared queue) is the only unstable
queue. Suppose Q̄2(t) > 0 for some t > 0. Using a similar discussion, we can
choose a subsequence {q−1n Q2(qns), n ≥ 1} with qn → ∞ as n → ∞, such that
q−1n Q2(qns)→ Q̄2(s) > 0 on a small interval s ∈ [t, t+h]. Therefore, for any M ∈ R+
there existsN ∈ N such thatQ2(qns) > M for all n ≥ N and all s ∈ [t, t+h]. Now take
M = max{κ1/κ2 supqnsQ1(qns), κ3/κ2 supqnsQ3(qns)} and notice that under LEWC
both servers 1 and 2 spend their time on queue 2 during a small interval [t,t+h].
Therefore, we have d
du





. That is, in the fluid
174







Moreover, since y∗12 and y
∗




≥ λ2 + τ ∗, where τ ∗ > 0. Hence, based on Theorem 2.4.9 of [34], queue
2 drains in a finite time. Therefore, from [35] Theorem 4.1, LΓ2 < ∞ which is a
contradiction with M = {2}.
Next assume M = {1, 2} and suppose Q̄2(t) > 0 for some t > 0. Similar to the
above, first notice that in the fluid model, server 2 spends all his time on queue 2
during a small interval [t,t+h]. Moreover, we can always choose a sequence {qm,m ≥
1} and L ∈ N such that κ1Q1(qms) < κ2Q2(qms) for all m ≥ L and all s in a small
interval [t, t + δ] (since otherwise after some finite time server 1 would be always
serving queue 1 under LEWC and hence queue 1 cannot be unstable). Next, similar
to the above and since Q2(t) is Lipschitz continuous, we can consider a subsequence of
this sequence, {qn, n ≥ 1}, such that q−1n Q2(qns)→ Q̄2(s) on a small interval [t, t+ ε].
Thus, in the fluid model, server 1 is serving queue 2 during an interval [t, t + ε].
Therefore, on [t, t + min{h, ε}] both servers are serving queue 2 in the fluid model.
Taking limit we have d
du





. Hence, the effective














≥ λ2 + τ ∗,
where τ ∗ > 0. Hence, based on Theorem 2.4.9 of [34] queue 2 drains in a finite
time. Therefore, from [35] Theorem 4.1, LΓ2 < ∞ which is a contradiction. Thus,
M 6= {1, 2}. Moreover, because of the symmetry in “W”, a relabeling of the queues
shows that M 6= {2, 3}.
The analysis for the only remaining case, i.e, M = {1, 2, 3} also follows a sim-
ilar line of proof but by choosing appropriate subsequences such that κ2Q2(qns) >
max{κiQi(qns), i = 1, 3}. This choice will result in the stability of queue 2 which is a
contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 6. For the case of LQ policy, set κ′i = 1 and notice that each
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server serves the queue with highest κ′ixi among its skill set. For the Gcµ rule with
quadratic holding cost define κ′′ji = hi µji and notice that server j serves the queue
with highest κ′′jixi. The proof is then similar to the proof of Theorem 5, after replacing







−1 of LEWC with κ′i for the LQ policy and with κ
′′
ji for
the Gcµ rule. 
4.7 Appendix B: Structure of the Optimal Policy
Our extensive MDP-based numerical computations show that the optimal policy
for a “W” structure with server disruptions is complex in general. The following
conjecture characterizes the optimal policy as a state-dependent threshold type policy
which can be defined by four switching surfaces. We state this result as a conjecture
and support it through some numerical examples.
Conjecture 1 (Optimality of a State-Dependent Threshold Policy) Consider
a stabilizable “W” with stochastic disruptions (or without them as a degenerate case)
and define threshold surfaces from N+2 to the extended positive integers as:
gup1 (x2, x3) =
inf
{
x1 ∈ N : µ11 ∆1J(x1 − 1, x2, x3, 1, 1) ≥ µ12 ∆2J(x1, x2 − 1, x3, 1, 1)
}
gdown1 (x2, x3) =
inf
{
x1 ∈ N : µ11 ∆1J(x1 − 1, x2, x3, 1, 0) ≥ µ12 ∆2J(x1, x2 − 1, x3, 1, 0)
}
gup2 (x1, x2) =
inf
{
x3 ∈ N : µ23 ∆3J(x1, x2, x3 − 1, 1, 1) ≥ µ22 ∆2J(x1, x2 − 1, x3, 1, 1)
}
gdown2 (x1, x2) =
inf
{
x3 ∈ N : µ23 ∆3J(x1, x2, x3 − 1, 0, 1) ≥ µ22 ∆2J(x1, x2 − 1, x3, 0, 1)
}
with the convention that inf ∅ = ∞. Then there exists an optimal state-dependent
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threshold type policy that acts as follows. In each state X̃, the optimal policy assigns
the working server 1 (server 2) to its fixed task if, and only if, x1 ≥ gup1 (x2, x3) (x3 ≥
gup2 (x1, x2)) when the other server is up, and x1 ≥ gdown1 (x2, x3) (x3 ≥ gdown2 (x1, x2))
when the other server is down.
The above conjecture states that the four threshold/switching surfaces gupj (·) and
gdownj (·) (for j = 1, 2) characterize an optimal policy in general. This conjecture is
based on the intuition (observed numerically), that the optimal policy is monotone
in the number of jobs in the fixed queues: if it is optimal to assign server 1 (server 2)
to its fixed task in state X̃, then it is also optimal to do so in state X̃ + e1 (X̃ + e3).
Therefore, for every server, it is sufficient to recognize the minimum number of jobs
in that server’s fixed task such that it is optimal to start serving the fixed task. Such
states are defined by the switching surfaces gupj (·) and gdownj (·) (for j = 1, 2).
Remark. Theorem 4 presented a special case of the above conjecture by setting
all the surface functions to the value 1. Another special case can be seen in [39] for the
so-called “N” structure without disruptions, where the authors show the optimality
of a threshold type policy for the case when all servers have an equal service rate (see
Theorem 5.4 part 4 of [39]).
The following numerical examples support the above conjecture and clarify the
behavior of threshold surfaces by illustrating the optimal policy.
Example 1. Consider a “W” queueing network where servers are reliable (i.e.,
a system without disruptions) with parameters λ′1 = 0.7, λ
′





12 = 1.0, µ
′
22 = 1.2, µ
′
23 = 1.5, h
′
1 = 1.0, h
′
2 = 1.2, and h
′
3 = 1.0. Fig.
4.7(a) illustrates the optimal policy. Since there is no disruption, the optimal policy
can be described by threshold surfaces gup1 (x2, x3) and g
up
2 (x1, x2). As Fig. 4.7(a)
shows, server 2 follows the cµ rule by giving strict priority to its fixed task. Thus,
gup2 (x1, x2) = 1 for every x1, x2 ∈ Z+. However, for server 1, serving the fixed is opti-
mal if, and only if, x1 ≥ gup1 (x2, x3). It should be noted that there are states where
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its fixed.  
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1 to shared, 
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fixed.  
Assign server 1 
to fixed, server 2 
to shared.  
(a) Example 1. (b) Example 2.
Figure 4.7: Illustration of the optimal policy in examples 1 and 2.
the surface gup2 (x1, x2) = 1 in Fig. 4.7. Since one of the servers is following a strict
priority rule, the optimal policy is still simple and intuitive. However, as the next
examples show, the optimal policy can be much more complex.
Example 2. Consider a “W” queueing network where servers are reliable (i.e., a
system without disruptions) with parameters λ′1 = 0.7, λ
′
2 = 0.9, λ
′
3 = 0.4, µ
′
11 = 1.2,
µ′12 = 1.0, µ
′
22 = 1.0, µ
′
23 = 1.2, h
′
1 = 1.0, h
′
2 = 1.5, and h
′
3 = 1.0. Fig. 4.7(b)
illustrates the optimal policy. As can bee seen in Fig. Fig. 4.7(b), the optimal policy
is much more complicated in this case, since both servers use threshold surfaces. These
two threshold surfaces divide the state space into four regions. As is shown in Fig.
4.7(b) (using wide arrows), in each region a specific allocation remains optimal. As
with all other numerical examples we performed, the observed behavior is consistent
with the conjecture made earlier. The next example presents a case where the servers
are subject to stochastic disruptions and again adheres to the earlier conjecture.
Example 3. Consider a “W” structure where servers are not reliable and the
parameters of the system are: λ′1 = 0.3, λ
′
2 = 0.2, λ
′
3 = 0.1, µ
′
11 = 1.0, µ
′
12 = 1.2,
µ′22 = 1.2, µ
′
23 = 1.0, h
′
1 = 1.1, h
′
2 = 1.2, h
′
3 = 1.3, θ
′
1 = 0.4, θ
′
2 = 0.45, r
′
1 = 0.6,
and r′2 = 0.55. Fig. 4.8 illustrates the optimal policy. In Fig. 4.8, the graph on
left depicts gup1 (x2, x3) and g
up












Figure 4.8: Illustration of the optimal policy in example 3.
and gdown2 (x1, x2). Hence, the left graph shows the optimal policy when both servers
are available. The right graph, depicts the optimal behavior of one server when the
other server is disrupted. The four threshold surfaces depicted in Fig. 4.8 completely
define the optimal policy, and the result is consistent with the earlier conjecture.
A first glance at Fig. 4.8 might indicate that the threshold surfaces are the same
regardless of the other server’s availability (i.e., gupj (·) = gdownj (·) ). However, a closer
look reveals that the threshold surfaces gupj (·) and gdownj (·) (for both j = 1, 2) are
different at many points. For instance, near the origin, gdown1 (·) is lower than g
up
1 (·)
(e.g., (2,1,6) is on gup1 (·), but (2,1,1) is on gdown1 (·) ). In this example, to start serving
its fixed task, server 1 requires fewer jobs at queue 3 when server 2 is down than when
it is is working.
4.8 Appendix C: Test Suites for Numerical Com-
parisons
This appendix presents the test suites for our numerical studies. Part I describes
the test suite for comparing the “W” design with other possible designs and is related
to Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Part II presents the test suite for comparing the performance
of our proposed Largest Expected Workload Cost (LEWC) heuristic with other well-
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known control policies (Section 4.4.4).
4.8.1 PART I: Comparisons of Various Structures (Figures
4.3 and 4.4)
The parameter settings used in Fig. 4.4 are presented in Table 4.3. As is the case
throughout the paper, we distinguish between non-uniformized parameters and the
uniformized parameters using prime notation. In this table, ρ denotes the congestion
factor of the system, which varies from 0.1 to 0.9 as is illustrated in Fig. 4.4. In
Table 4.3, as is introduced in the main body, Sj represents the skill set or capability
set of server j. For instance, in Suite 1, server 1 works at a speed of 3 and server 2
works at a speed of 2. To eliminate the homomorphic designs in these test suites, we
assume job type two (the shared task) has an arrival rate greater than or equal to the
fixed types. Moreover, based on Theorem 2, for large values of ρ in some test suites,
some structures with low flexibility can be unstable. This fact is considered in the
illustration presented in Fig. 4.4. For instance, as is clear from Fig. 4.4, Structure 1
is not stabilizable for large values of ρ in Suites 1, 2, and 4.
4.8.2 Part II: Comparisons of LEWC with Other Well-Known
Policies
Assume that every source (worker, server, machine, agent, etc.) is at least as good
as a standard source (which serves in expectation one unit of work content in one
unit of time). We consider different skill levels (heterogeneity in service rates) and
allow some sources to be 20% faster in working on some job types. Table 4.4 presents
various combinations of interest assuming that servers are faster (in a non-strict sense)
in serving their specialized (i.e., fixed) task. (Notice that otherwise, there would be
another design for which the current shared task is fixed for that rapid server, and the
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Table 4.3: Various Suites of Parameter Settings for Comparisons of Alternate Struc-
tures.
Parameters Suite 1 Suite 2 Suite 3 Suite 4
λ′1 4/3 ρ 0.25 ρ 1 ρ 4/3 ρ
λ′2 4/3 ρ 3.50 ρ 2 ρ 4/3 ρ
λ′3 4/3 ρ 0.25 ρ 1 ρ 4/3 ρ
µ′1i (∀i ∈ S1) 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
µ′2i (∀i ∈ S2) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
θ′1 0.1 0 0 0
θ′2 0.1 0 0 0
r′1 0.9 0 0 0
r′2 0.9 0 0 0
current fixed task of that rapid server is shared between both servers.) Moreover, for
every service rate setting, we consider four workload distributions as shown in Table
4.5 . These workload distributions introduce asymmetry in the amount of the time
that each server needs to spend among the queues. Setting (a) in this table represents
a case where both servers need to spend their time equally between their fixed task
and the shared task. This case represents a symmetric workload distribution among
the queues. Settings (b)-(d) consider other extreme workload distributions where a
server may need to spend 80% of its time on either the fixed task or the shared task.
Notice that (1) because of the inherent symmetry in the “W”, these settings cover
all key workload distributions with the above assumption, and (2) these workload
distributions are approximate and the actual workloads of servers depend on the
control policy implemented.
Considering these workload distributions, Table 4.4 also presents the correspond-
ing arrival rates as a function of a congestion factor, ρ. Assuming that both servers
are 100% available, a congestion factor of 1 indicates the maximum possible arrival
rates to each queue (which corresponds to a system with 100% utilization) based on
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the corresponding workload distribution. Hence, by computing the arrival rates in
this way: (1) we can ensure that the problem instances are within the feasible/stable
region, and (2) by changing ρ, we can control the overall utilization (or traffic) of the
system. As shown in Table 4.5 , we choose ρ such that for every setting we can include
a system in both 90% (relatively high) and 70% (relatively low) utilization. Notice
that the actual system utilization also depends on the control policy implemented.
Since there is no analytical method to exactly determine the real utilization of the
system, we have reported the approximate system utilization based on the ratio of
work content over available capacity as is presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 also presents disruption and repair rates corresponding to combina-
tions of 100% (representing no-disruption scenarios), 90% (representing relatively high
availability), and 70% (representing relatively low availability) of servers. Specifically,
Settings (I) and (II) in this table illustrate systems with completely reliable servers
under relatively high and low traffic, respectively. Settings (III) and (IV) represent
systems in which one server is of low reliability and the other server is highly reli-
able. Since disruption and repair dynamics form a two-state Markov chain, we can
precisely compute the steady-state availabilities. In fact, the ratio rj/(rj + θj) is
the steady-state availability of server j and is reported in Table 4.6 . Moreover, we
assume that both servers are repaired through a similar process. Hence, the repair
rates are selected to be close. However, by considering different repair rates, we also
include cases in which servers have asymmetric reliability. Because of the symmetry
in the “W,” it is sufficient to consider server 1 as the server that possesses a lower
reliability. To capture the effect of disruptions (for scenarios that allow disruptions),
repair rates are also selected such that when a server is disrupted, it takes approx-
imately 3 (precisely 1/0.35) standard service durations until the server returns to a
working state.
Finally, Table 4.7 presents different holding cost settings. In Setting (A), all job
types have a similar holding cost, representing a symmetric case. Settings (B)-(D)
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introduce asymmetry in holding costs. More precisely, in Settings (B), (C), and (D)
the asymmetry among the costs is obtained by using multipliers of 0.25, 0.5. and
1, respectively. Hence, the degree of asymmetry in holding costs (i.e., differences in
costs) increases from Setting (A) to (D). Moreover, costs within each of these settings
are chosen such that they cover all the possible cµ order-based permutations (among
the three queues). In fact, since it is sufficient to consider only the highest and the
second highest cµ rankings (as the third one will follow), the last column of Table 4.7
reports the corresponding cµ ranking permutation among the queues. Because of the
symmetry between fixed queues, we can assume the holding cost associated with one
of the fixed queues (h1 or h3) is always greater than the holding cost associated with
the other fixed queue. We assume (h3 ≥ h1) to eliminate the degenerate cases. These
cost settings together with service rate settings (Table 4.4 ) and disruption settings
(Table 4.6 ) generate 10 × 12 × 4 = 480 different problem instances that cover a
fair and extensive range of possibilities regarding arrivals, holding costs, disruptions,
traffic, service rates, etc.


















1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (a) 0.5 ρ 1 ρ 0.5 ρ
2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (b) 0.8 ρ 1 ρ 0.2 ρ
3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (c) 0.8 ρ 0.4 ρ 0.8 ρ
4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (d) 0.2 ρ 1.6 ρ 0.2 ρ
5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 (a) 0.5 ρ 1 ρ 0.6 ρ
6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 (b) 0.8 ρ 1 ρ 0.24 ρ
7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 (c) 0.8 ρ 0.4 ρ 0.96 ρ
8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 (d) 0.2 ρ 1.6 ρ 0.24 ρ
9 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 (a) 0.6 ρ 1 ρ 0.6 ρ
10 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 (b) 0.96 ρ 1 ρ 0.24 ρ
11 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 (c) 0.96 ρ 0.4 ρ 0.96 ρ
12 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 (d) 0.24 ρ 1.6 ρ 0.24 ρ
Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 present the test suite used for investigating the effect of
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S1-C1 S1-C2 S2-C2 S2-C3
(a) 50% 50% 50% 50%
(b) 80% 20% 80% 20%
(c) 80% 20% 20% 80%
(d) 20% 80% 80% 20%
Table 4.6: Settings of disruption rates, repair rates, and system congestion factor (ρ)




r1 r2 θ1 θ2 Server 1 Server 2
(I) 0 0 0 0
100% 100%
0.9 ∼ 90%
(II) 0 0 0 0 0.7 ∼ 70%
(III) 0.35 0.36 0.15 0.04
70% 90%
0.63 < 90%
(IV) 0.35 0.36 0.15 0.04 0.49 < 70%
disruptions (Fig. 4.6). Table 4.8 corresponds to Table 4.4 with a congestion factor of
ρ = 0.5. Table 4.9 presents the various holding cost settings considered, and Table
4.10 presents the settings related to disruptions and repair. Server 1 is considered to
be completely reliable. However, disruption rate of Server 2 changes from 0.0 to 0.5,
while its repair rate is kept constant to generate different steady-state realisability
levels.
184
Table 4.7: Holding cost settings and the corresponding highest and second highest
cµ rankings among the queues (SF: Highest=Shared, Second Highest=Fixed; FS:
Highest=Fixed, Second Highest=Shared, FF: First and Second Highest=Fixed).
Setting Cost Asym.
Holding Cost
cµ Ranking Permut. Cases
h1 h2 h3
(A) Zero 1 1 1 Symmetric 48
(B) Low
1 1.5 1.25 SF 48
1 1.25 1.5 FS 48
1.25 1 1.5 FF 48
(C) Moderate
1 2 1.5 SF 48
1 1.5 2 FS 48
1.5 1 2 FF 48
(D) High
1 3 2 SF 48
1 2 3 FS 48
2 1 3 FF 48
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Table 4.8: Service and arrival rates considered for the results on the effect of server
disruption risk (Fig. 4.6).
Setting
Service Rates Arrival Rates
µ11 µ12 µ22 µ23 λ1 λ2 λ3
1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.25 0.50 0.25
2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.40 0.50 0.10
3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.40 0.20 0.40
4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.10 0.80 0.10
5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.25 0.50 0.30
6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.40 0.50 0.12
7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.40 0.20 0.48
8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.10 0.80 0.12
9 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.30 0.50 0.30
10 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.48 0.50 0.12
11 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.48 0.20 0.48
12 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.12 0.80 0.12
Table 4.9: Holding cost setting considered for the results on the effect of server




1 1 1 1
2 1 3 2
3 1 2 3
4 2 1 3
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Table 4.10: Disruption and repair rate setting considered for the results on the effect
of server disruption risk (Fig. 4.6).
Setting
Disruption/Repair Rates
r1 r2 θ1 θ2
1 0 0.5 0 0
2 0 0.5 0 0.1
3 0 0.5 0 0.2
4 0 0.5 0 0.3
5 0 0.5 0 0.4
6 0 0.5 0 0.5
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CHAPTER 5
Supply Chain Disruption Risk Management:
Newsvendor Analysis with Recourse
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, a variety of events have elevated to a strategic level concerns
over the pernicious effects of supply chain disruptions. Consider the 2007 disruption
in Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner’s supply chain. Advanced Integration Technology (AIT)
fell months behind building parts needed to assemble the plane, thereby wreaking
havoc upon Boeing’s 787 inflexible supply chain. Boeing itself expected to take a
cash hit of $2.5 billion in 2008 from paying penalties to airline customers and to keep
its suppliers afloat in the wake of the serious cash flow disruption, according to [55].
Evidence showed that AIT had been facing serious production problems in 2006 (see,
for instance, [55]). Thus, if Boeing had thoroughly monitored AIT in an effort to
obtain disruption risk information, it might have made better ordering and contract-
ing decisions in advance and thereby protected against such havoc. To enable firms
to monitor their suppliers, some companies including Open Ratings have developed
supply chain monitoring software that provides a firm with supplier visibility and
actionable insights before a disruption occurs.
Consider also the disruption in the Toyota supply chain on Feb. 01, 1997. A fire at
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the Aisin Seiki Co. destroyed most of the capacity to manufacture P-valves. Because
of the Aisin’s ability to produce parts at low cost, Toyota had come to rely on Aisin
for this product ([129]). According to the Wall Street Journal, Toyota officials called
different part makers to obtain P-valves, including Somic ([115]). Somic had the
flexibility to free up machines and shift its production line to make P-valves. On Feb.
06, right on schedule, it delivered its first P-valves to Toyota ([115]). Considering
the enormous financial impact of disruptions, it may be beneficial for many firms
that procure raw materials from low price, high volume primary suppliers to reserve
in advance some capacity from a secondary flexible backup supplier such as Somic to
insure the supply stream against possible disruptions. This chapter gives insights into
the potential benefits and risks.
Although disruptions are rare, their economic consequences can be massive. [64]
investigate over 800 cases of disruptions in supply chains and conclude that firms
suffering from supply chain disruptions experience about 30% lower stock returns
than their matched benchmarks.
[92] have formulated a set of 10 principles derived from the supply chain risk liter-
ature, three of which are: (1) diversification in sourcing, (2) implementing flexibility,
and (3) information sharing. These principles will be considered throughout this
chapter from the perspective of a firm that procures materials from different sources.
We investigate two important strategic remedies to increase supply chain reliability
and responsiveness: (1) contracting with a secondary flexible backup supplier (or
similarly to establish an in-plant flexible resource) which is capable of adjusting its
production mix to respond to the requests of a firm in the case of a disruption, and (2)
to obtain and assess information about the disruption risk of primary suppliers. Point
(1) increases the flexibility and responsiveness of supply chains in facing disruptions.
In point (2), monitoring suppliers allows firms to anticipate potential disruptions and
adopt better operational decisions.
Using a model with two products, we quantify the value of purchasing flexible
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backup capacity through a generalized capacity reservation contract with a flexible
backup supplier. In this contract, also known as an option contract, the buyer pays
a fixed lump-sum payment to the supplier at the beginning of the contract in return
for the delivery of any desired portion of the reserved fixed capacity at an additional
proportional purchasing cost. (See [127] for the traditional case that has only the
lump-sum cost.) If the buyer has enough on hand stock, less than the reserved
capacity may be ordered to avoid additional holding and purchasing costs. Indeed,
through this contract the buyer initially buys the option to order (any combination
of the two products) up to a certain level from the supplier and later decides how
to exercise this option by specifying the ordering quantity for each of the products.
Moreover, based on the terms of the contract, the flexible backup supplier guarantees
any amount of delivery up to the reserved capacity. Therefore, from the firm’s point
of view, this secondary supplier works as a reliable flexible backup (that can mitigate
the risk of disruption in primary suppliers while reducing the cost of keeping excess
inventory) with a limited flexible capacity in proportion to the up-front lump-sum
investment.
Similar capacity reservation arrangements designed to provide the buyer with
flexibility in the order quantity are observed in different high-tech industries such
as semiconductors, consumer electronics, telecommunications, and pharmaceutical
(where the demand for high-tech products is highly volatile and difficult to forecast)
as well as in some automakers ([65]) and the textile and garment industry ([42]).
Capacity reservation is also regarded as one of the counter-measures of the “bullwhip
effect” ([95]).
In addition to providing insights into purchasing flexible backup capacity (through
a capacity reservation contract), we investigate the value of the firm’s monitoring of
unreliable suppliers to obtain a more accurate perception of disruption risks. Our
analyses quantify the financial impact of the misperception of the true reliabilities of
suppliers.
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To perform our analysis, we consider a two-stage setting where the firm is en-
dowed with a recourse possibility to selectively utilize the capacity reserved with the
secondary flexible backup supplier after monitoring the risk of primary suppliers. Us-
ing our two-stage setting, we also investigate the value of implementing flexibility in
the backup system. The value of information on disruption risks is computed, op-
timal ordering decisions are identified, and the optimal capacity reservation level is
quantified (including bounds).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We review the literature
in next section, then in Section 6.3 we describe our model. Section 5.4 considers
the problem in a two-stage setting with recourse. To gain insights into the value of
recourse, in Section 5.5 we provide some benchmark analysis by considering the case
where benchmark is not allowed. In Section 5.6, we use our framework to provide
insights into the value of recourse, backup flexibility, and disruption risk information.
Finally, we summarize our main findings in Section 5.7 and conclude.
5.2 Related Literature
This chapter considers all-or-nothing supply: when the supplier is up it delivers an
order in full, while nothing can be supplied when it is down. By contrast, in models
with yield uncertainty or random yield, the quantity received is a random fraction of
the quantity ordered (see [41] for an comprehensive review of the literature).
The majority of supply-disruption papers focus on a single-supplier problem (see,
for instance, [104], [19], [111], [112] , [57], [133], [107], [110], and [108]). [113] and [58]
are among the supply disruption papers that consider more than one supplier. Both
papers consider a firm that faces constant demand and sources from two identical-cost,
infinite-capacity suppliers. [10] studies a finite-horizon, discrete-time, i.i.d. stochas-
tic continuous demand model in which there are two zero lead time random-yield
suppliers.
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More recent related supply disruption papers with multiple suppliers include [14],
[13], [145], [146], [32], [25], [43], [158], and [73]. [13] studies the effects of disrup-
tion risk in a supply chain where one retailer deals with competing risky suppliers
who may default during their production lead-times.[14] uses a single-period model
of a two-echelon supply chain with competing risky suppliers and a single firm and
investigates how the supplier default risk and default co-dependence affect firm pro-
curement and production decisions. [145] sheds light on some effective disruption
risk mitigation mechanism by considering a single-product setting in which a firm
can source from two suppliers, one that is unreliable and another that is completely
reliable but more expensive and may possess volume flexibility. [146] investigates the
value of a threat advisory system and develops multi-period models in which the firm
has a single unreliable supplier, as well as models in which a second, perfectly reliable
supplier is available. [32] considers a newsvendor that is served by multiple suppliers,
where any given supplier is identified to be either perfectly reliable or unreliable. [25]
considers the effect of decoupling delays (recurrent risk) and disruption risks in a
model with two suppliers: an unreliable supplier and a perfectly reliable supplier that
is under a capacity reservation contract. [43] considers supply diversification under
general supply risk for a single product and a single demand season. [158] uses two-
stage stochastic programming settings and investigates the value of two disruption
mitigation mechanisms: dual sourcing and process improvement.
The effect of disruption information has also been studied under different settings
in some recent papers (see, for example, [144], [163], and the references therein).
All the above-mentioned papers examine a single product setting. However, a
single product setting does not allow us to capture the mix flexibility of a backup
supplier such as Somic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
develops two-product analyses to simultaneously consider the option of implementing
mix flexibility in supply and the possibility of obtaining disruption risk information.
For reviews of flexibility, we refer readers to [128], [49], and [139]. In fact, the mix
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flexibility of production operations has been studied in many papers including [46],
[85], [154], [93], [53], [147], [82], and [79]. Our study contributes to this literature by
considering the value of a flexible supplier/resource to compensate for the unreliability
of dedicated suppliers. Similar contributions, but in the context of design of queueing
systems with flexible resources, can be found in [124], and the references therein.
5.3 Model and Notation
Consider a centralized model of the contracting and ordering decisions of a firm
(a manufacturer or retailer) in a two-echelon make-to-stock supply chain which pro-
duces/sells two types of products (namely 1 and 2) and has two dedicated suppliers,
each capable of supplying units (components, final products, or raw materials) for
one of the products. Denote the dedicated supplier of units of product j as supplier
j (for j = 1, 2). The firm also has a flexible backup supplier (namely f) that can
produce (under a capacity reservation contract) units for both products 1 and 2, the
sum of which cannot exceed a reserved capacity, Q̄f . The capacity reservation con-
tract explicitly allows the purchase of a flexible backup capacity, Q̄f . We typically use
subscripts for products, superscripts for suppliers, and employ the following notation:
hj : Holding cost per unit of product j; (j = 1, 2)
pj : Lost sale penalty cost per unit of unmet demand of product j; (j = 1, 2)
rj : Revenue per unit of product j sold; (j = 1, 2)
cj : Per unit purchasing cost of product j from dedicated supplier j; (j = 1, 2)
cfj : Per unit purchasing cost of product j from flexible supplier; (j = 1, 2)
uf : Per unit capacity reservation cost of the flexible backup supplier;
ufj : ( = u
f + cfj ) unit cost of product j from the flexible backup supplier; (j = 1, 2)
qj : Order quantity from dedicated supplier j; (j = 1, 2)
qfj : Order quantity from the flexible backup supplier for product j; (j = 1, 2)
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Figure 5.1: The two-echelon supply chain under consideration.
Fig. 1 depicts the two-echelon supply chain model. We assume the firm has
a price-only contract with its unreliable dedicated suppliers, i.e., the firm pays cj
(≤ rj) per unit delivered by dedicated (and unreliable) supplier j. Moreover, it has
a generalized capacity reservation contract with its flexible backup supplier, i.e., the
firm chooses the capacity level of Q̄f units and pays the flexible backup supplier a cost
of uf × Q̄f at time 0 to reserve its capacity. The flexible backup supplier, in return,
agrees to deliver any order of products 1 and 2 (qf1 and q
f




2 ≤ Q̄f ,






2 . We allow u
f
j = u
f + cfj to be
greater or less than rj. However, to avoid the trivial case where single sourcing from
the flexible backup supplier is always optimal, we shall assume ufj = u
f + cfj > c
j.
This corresponds to practice, because the contract can be regarded as an investment
in the flexible supplier’s technology which is not cheaper than inflexible ones. We also
note that the flexible supplier in our framework could be an in-plant flexible resource
that requires an upfront investment of uf per unit of capacity.
For j (j = 1, 2), let Lj(x) = hj[x]+ + pj[−x]+ and
Lj(x) = EDj [Lj(x−Dj)] = hj
∫ x
0
(x− ξ)dFj(ξ) + pj
∫ ∞
x
(ξ − x)dFj(ξ), (5.1)
where [x]+ = max {0, x}, and Fj(·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the demand for product j (random variable Dj). We assume Fj(·) (for both j = 1, 2)
is differentiable and has Fj(x) = 0 for all x ≤ 0 and Fj(x) > 0 for all x > 0.
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Denoting the survival function (i.e., the complementary CDF) of demand of product
j by F̄j(·) = 1− Fj(·), we define the inventory cost function Gj(·) as:




where the last expression can be obtained via integration by parts. In these defini-
tions, Lj(·) is the expected total inventory cost of product j (holding plus shortage)
and Gj(·) is the expected cost minus the expected revenue obtained from product j.
We note that a firm may not accurately perceive the disruption risk of its unreliable
suppliers. However, we can model the firm’s best estimate of the reliability of supplier
j (i.e., the probability that supplier j is up) by θj. We define Θ = (θ1, θ2) as the vector
of perceived reliabilities and Π = (1 − π10 , 1 − π20) as the vector of true reliabilities.
Also, we let Υ = (ε1, ε2) denote the firm’s error in estimating the true reliability
vector where Θ = Π + Υ (i.e., θj = 1− πj0 + εj for both j = 1, 2).
5.4 Analyses with Recourse (Two-Stage Setting)
To generate insights into effective disruption mitigation mechanisms for firms, we
start by analyzing the case where the firm can first monitor the “availability” (i.e., up
or down) state of its primary suppliers and then utilize a recourse option of ordering
from the secondary flexible backup supplier. Note that the availability state may
be construed as the ability of a supplier to deliver the requested products within a
required time. In other words, one can also think of up (down) state in terms of on
time (late) delivery.
The sequence of events in this two-stage scenario is as follows. The firm first
decides to reserve a capacity of Q̄f units from the secondary flexible backup supplier
and pays uf × Q̄f to do so (Stage 1). Then the firm observes the state of its primary
suppliers, purchases from the available ones, and uses the flexible backup supplier
subject to the reserved capacity (Stage 2). Then demands are realized and inventory
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costs (inventory shortage or holding minus the sales revenue) accrue. Observe that in
Stage 1, the firm can insure the supply stream against possible disruptions through
investment in a flexible backup capacity. It can then monitor the suppliers and use
this information to make better ordering decisions. Indeed, in Stage 1, the firm can
purchase the (recourse) option to benefit from flexible backup capacity proportional
to its investment. In stage 2, after observing the disruption states, the firm can
exercise this option at a cost of cfj per mix of type j. After analyzing this sequence of
events, in Section 5.4.3, we will introduce an alternative sequence of events to allow
consideration of offshore unreliable suppliers.
Using the above-mentioned framework we seek to answer the following questions.
Question 1 If the reserved capacity in Stage 1 is limited, how would the firm dis-
tribute the available flexible backup capacity among its products based on the obtained
information?
Question 2 How much would a firm invest in the flexible supplier as a backup for
possible disruptions? Does obtaining a recourse option result in a reduction in such
an investment?
Also, comparing the scenario with recourse to the benchmark setting described in
Section 5.5 (i.e., when the firm cannot observe the states of unreliable suppliers before
ordering), we can ask the following question.
Question 3 How beneficial is having a recourse option for firms, and can it be re-
garded as a strong risk mitigation mechanism?
Moreover, it is interesting to compare a scenario with two dedicated backup suppliers
(one for each product) with the one with a single but flexible backup supplier to
answer the following question.
Question 4 How beneficial is the flexibility of a backup supplier, and for what firms
should implementing flexibility (in the backup system) be more attractive?
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Finally, similar to our no-recourse setting, we want to investigate the value of disrup-
tion risk information (that can reduce the risk belief errors) and address the following
question.
Question 5 How valuable is obtaining disruption risk information (under a recourse
option) for firms, and can it be regarded as a strong risk mitigation mechanism?
To answer such questions, let CU,U(Q̄
f ), CU,D(Q̄
f ), CD,U(Q̄
f ), and CD,D(Q̄
f ) (U:
Up, D: Down) denote the minimum expected cost of the firm in the second stage, if
both suppliers are up, only the first supplier is up, only the second supplier is up, and
when none of them are up, respectively. These costs can be computed as follows.
CU,U(Q̄











































































Now, if CStage 2(Q̄
f ) represents the optimal expected cost of Stage 2 as is perceived
by the firm at the beginning of Stage 1, we have: CStage 2(Q̄
f ) =
θ1 θ2CU,U(Q̄
f )+θ1 (1−θ2 )CU,D(Q̄f )+(1−θ1) θ2CD,U(Q̄f )+(1−θ1)(1−θ2)CD,D(Q̄f ).
(5.7)
Then, the firm can determine the optimal capacity reservation level (Q̄f∗) at the
beginning of Stage 1 by solving the following program:
min
Q̄f≥0
uf Q̄f + CStage 2(Q̄
f ). (5.8)
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To determine the behavior of the firm, we must first optimize non-linear programs
(5.3)-(5.6) of Stage 2 for a given capacity reservation level; thereafter, the optimal
ordering policy can be used to derive the optimal contracting level as is perceived
by the firm by solving program (5.8). This optimal capacity reservation level (a
strategic decision) then determines the tactical ordering behavior in each case (i.e. the
minimizers of (5.3)-(5.6)). To solve programs (5.3)-(5.6), we note that the objective
functions are all jointly convex in their variables (see Appendix C for the proof of
Lemma 7 and of our other results), and the constraints are linear. Hence, the KKT
conditions are sufficient and necessary to characterize the optimal solutions. To gain
some insights, we first start by considering a single-product setting as a special case,
and next solve (5.3)-(5.6) to derive the optimal policy of the firm under the original
two-product setting.
5.4.1 Single–Product Special Case
Consider a single-product version of the problem discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Since there is only one product and one unreliable supplier, we suppress both
the product index, j, and the index of unreliable suppliers. However, we continue
to use index f to denote the backup supplier. To characterize the firm’s optimal
capacity reservation level from the backup supplier as well as its optimal ordering
policy, we need to first solve the problem in Stage 2 (i.e., derive the firm’s optimal
ordering policy) for any level of capacity reserved with the backup supplier in Stage
1. Subsequently, we can use the obtained results to solve Stage 1 to find the optimal
capacity reservation level.
Proposition 8 (Single-Product) Given that the firm reserves Q̄f units of capacity
from the backup supplier in Stage 1, the optimal ordering policy of Stage 2 is as
follows.
(1) If cf > c and the unreliable supplier is observed to be up, then qf∗ = 0, and








(3) If cf ≤ c and the unreliable supplier is observed to be up, then







then qf∗ = F−1(p+r−c
f
p+r+h
) and q∗ = 0.









then qf∗ = Q̄f and q∗ = 0.
(iii) If Q̄f ∈
[




then qf∗ = Q̄f and q∗ = F−1( p+r−c
p+r+h
)− Q̄f .
(4) If cf ≤ c and the unreliable supplier is observed to be down, then


















then qf∗ = Q̄f .
Parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 8 describe that when exercising the option from the
backup supplier is more expensive than purchasing from the unreliable supplier, the
firm orders only from a single source: it only uses the unreliable supplier if it is up, and
only uses the backup supplier (as much as required or the reserved capacity allows)
otherwise. As parts (3) and (4) of Proposition 8 show, when exercising the option
from the backup supplier is cheaper than purchasing from the unreliable supplier,
if the unreliable supplier is observed to be up, then the firm either orders nothing
from the unreliable supplier or exhausts the capacity reservation option (unless the
reserved capacity is sufficient) and only orders the rest of its requirement from the
unreliable supplier. On the other hand, when the unreliable supplier is observed to be
down, the firm exhausts the capacity reservation option (unless the reserved capacity
is sufficient). In fact, the firm’s problem in a single-product setting is much easier
than the two-product setting, since it is not facing the complex problem of rationing
the available limited flexible backup capacity between the two products in an effective
way. As we will show, in the two-product setting, even when only one of the suppliers
is down, the firm may need to ration the backup flexible capacity between the two
products (see Theorem 8 part (ii)).
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Remark. A special case of the single-product version of our model presented in this
section is the case where the cost of reserving capacity in Stage 1 (uf ) is negligible.
In this very special case where (1) the backup supplier is not endowed with mix
flexibility (since it is a single-product setting), and (2) backup capacity is unlimited
(i.e., Q̄f is large enough) and does not need to be reserved in advance, the role of the
backup supplier can be construed via the second opportunity quick response models
studied thoroughly in papers such as Fisher and Raman (1996) (the Sport Obermeyer
case), Eppen and Iyer (1997), Milner and Kouvelis (2002), and Li et. al (2009). The
main difference between our work and such models, even under the special case of a
single-product setting, is that the firm must optimize the amount of backup capacity
to be reserved in advance (i.e., in an anticipation of potential future disruptions)
subject to a reservation cost. Indeed, the firm in our model can insure the supply
stream by buying backup capacity in advance. Note that this investment greatly
affects the ordering ability of the firm in the second stage. Furthermore, another
main feature of our model that differentiates it from such studies is the mix flexibility
of the backup flexible supplier that we will consider in the sequel. In the presence
of a backup capacity that is (a) limited and (b) flexible, we provide insights into the
question of how to effectively benefit from a recourse option and ration the limited
backup capacity between products to compensate for the disruption risk of primary
suppliers. Comparing our setting with a setting where the backup capacity is not
flexible (i.e., a setting with two independent products), we will see that the mix
flexibility in the backup system provides a significant advantage for the firm in the
presence of unreliable suppliers. Another distinct and novel objective of our research
is to provide insights into the value of obtaining disruption risk information as we
will discuss in Sections 5.5.2 and 5.6.3.
Having the ordering policy in hand, we can now use Proposition 8 to determine
the optimal capacity reservation level of Stage 1.
Proposition 9 (Capacity Reservation Level) The optimal capacity reservation
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level (as perceived by the firm) can be characterized as:
(1) If cf > c, then
Q̄f∗ = F−1([
p+ r − u
f+(1−θ)cf
1−θ
p+ r + h
]+).
(2) If cf ≤ c, then
Q̄f∗ = F−1([
p+ r − uf+cf−θc
1−θ
p+ r + h
]+).
Part (1) and (2) of the above proposition can be combined and summarized as
follows. Let c̄ = max{c, cf} and ĉ = (uf+cf−θc̄)/(1−θ). Then Q̄f∗ = F−1([ p+r−ĉ
p+r+h
]+),
which can be construed as a single-source (and single-stage) traditional newsvendor
setting with a perfectly reliable source and a purchasing cost ĉ. However, note that
this new purchasing cost, ĉ, is affected by the reliability perception of the firm, θ, as
well as the backup capacity reservation costs, uf and cf . For instance, the firm will
not reserve any backup capacity in Stage 1 if its reliability perception of the unreliable
supplier is greater than a threshold (that depends on the inventory, purchasing, and
capacity reservation costs), even though it might be truly beneficial to reserve some
backup capacity.
5.4.2 Two–Product Case
We now consider our original two-product setting to provide insights into Ques-
tions 1-5. The following three theorems solve programs (5.3)-(5.6) to define the
optimal ordering policy of the firm and provide insight into Question 1. For brevity,
we only consider the most interesting situation where cfj ≤ cj throughout this section,
but other situations can be analyzed in a similar way (see Appendix D for the case
where cfj > c
j).
Theorem 7 (Both Suppliers Up) Let k = argmax{cj − cfj : j = 1, 2} denote the
product with the higher difference in purchasing cost, and l = 3− k be the other prod-
uct. If both suppliers are observed to be up, then the following cases fully characterize
the optimal ordering policy of the firm, given a reserved flexible backup capacity of
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Q̄f :














) and qj∗ = 0
(j = k, l).
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f , qf∗l = 0, q
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(v) If Q̄f ∈
[





then qf∗k = Q̄
f , qf∗l = 0, q








Theorem 7 part (i) shows that if the firm has already reserved more than enough
capacity (in Stage 1), it would not order anything from the primary suppliers (in
Stage 2) and will only use the available flexible capacity, ordering the optimal level
for each of the products. The rest of the reserved capacity is wasted to avoid paying
extra holding or purchasing costs. Even if the reserved capacity is below the level
identified in part (i), but it is in the range described by part (ii), the firm will only use
the reserved capacity. However, in this case, it will appropriately ration Q̄f between
the products. Indeed, t can be viewed as a fictitious additional ordering cost that
is applied to optimally ration the available flexible capacity. Part (iii) states that if
the available capacity is enough to fulfill a prescribed amount of product k, but not
enough for both of the products, the firm should use the flexible capacity to satisfy
all of the optimal ordering amount of product k. Hence, it would not order anything
from primary supplier k, and use the rest of the reserved capacity as well as primary
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supplier l to satisfy the requirement product l. In the case that the reserved capacity
is not enough to meet the prescribed level for any of the products, but still is relatively
large, part (iv) shows that the firm should set aside all the reserved flexible capacity
for product k (and not order from dedicated supplier k). Hence, in this case, it is
optimal to only use primary supplier l to optimize the service level of product l. If
the reserved flexible capacity is very low, as is presented in part (v), it is optimal
to use all Q̄f units of the limited flexible capacity for the “expensive” product (i.e.,
product k), and also procure the rest of requirements of this product from its primary
supplier. Moreover, similar to case (iv), product l is sourced only through its primary
supplier. We now treat the case when exactly one of the suppliers is observed to be
disrupted.
Theorem 8 (One Supplier Up) Let m ∈ {1, 2} denote the dedicated supplier that
is observed to be up, and n = 3 − m be the disrupted supplier. Then the following
cases fully characterize the optimal ordering policy of the firm, given a reserved flexible
backup capacity of Q̄f :
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]+), qf∗m = Q̄
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then qf∗n = Q̄







It is noteworthy that Theorem 8 can be interpreted via Theorem 7. In fact, by
considering the disrupted supplier as a supplier with a sufficiently large purchasing
cost, Theorem 8 coincides with Theorem 7. However, in Theorem 8 the operator [·]+
is used (whenever necessary) to assure that the ratios are within appropriate domain
of functions F−1j (·). This is redundant in Theorem 7 because of the assumption
rj ≥ cj = cfj + (cj − c
f
j ) (for both j=k,l), which also implies rk ≥ c
f
k + (c
l − cfl ) since
ck − cfk ≥ cl − c
f
l . To conclude, the following theorem treats the case when both
primary suppliers are disrupted, and similarly can be interpreted via Theorem 7 with
sufficiently large cj (j = 1, 2).
Theorem 9 (Both Suppliers Disrupted) The following cases fully characterize
the optimal ordering policy of the firm when both primary suppliers are observed to
be disrupted, given a reserved flexible backup capacity of Q̄f :
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]+) = Q̄f .
Theorems 7, 8, and 9 solve programs (5.3)-(5.6). Note that the separability of
the ordering policy between products as reflected in Theorem 13 no longer applies.
However, to answer Question 2, one can use Theorems 7, 8, and 9 to solve program
(5.8) and obtain the optimal capacity reservation level (for any parameter setting and
any demands distributions F1(·), F2(·)). For brevity, and to further analytically char-
acterize the optimal contracting level, however, we only consider the case where the
following mild assumption holds. For simplicity of presentation, it is also convenient
to fix the labeling of the products such that product 2 is the product with higher
difference in purchasing cost (i.e., argmax{cj − cfj : j = 1, 2} = 2).
Assumption 1 Demand distributions F1(·), F2(·) are such that:
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Notice that the above assumption is not critical, since (1) if it does not hold, anal-
ysis will follow similar lines, and (2) it holds for most settings where products are not
extremely different in their procurement and inventory costs as well as their demand
distributions. For instance, a completely symmetric scenario where the parameters
are product-independent satisfies conditions (a) and (b).
The following proposition further helps to characterize the optimal capacity reser-
vation level with the flexible backup supplier. It states that Q̄f∗ can only take one
of six possible values. Therefore, it can be found by comparing the cost of these six
options.
Proposition 10 (Capacity Reservation Level) Under Assumption 1, Q̄f∗ ∈ {Q̄fk :
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Q̄f6 = argmin
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We now present a corollary of the above proposition which provides two upper bounds
on the optimal capacity reservation (or investment) level with the flexible backup
supplier. The first upper bound is the sum of optimal orders to two separate, reliable,
and dedicated suppliers with purchasing costs cfj (j = 1, 2). This bound shows that
the flexibility of the backup supplier offers competitive advantage to the firm. The
second bound is the optimal capacity reservation level without the recourse option
(see Section 5.5 for analysis without the recourse option). Indeed, the second part of
the following corollary provides more insights to Question 2 by presenting a condition
under which obtaining a recourse option will result in a non-strict reduction in the
capacity reserved (or the investment level) with the flexible supplier.
Corollary 2 (Bounds) The optimal capacity reservation level with the flexible backup







), and (ii) the op-
timal capacity reservation level without recourse, if disruption risks are such that
θj (cj − cfj ) ≥ uf for j = 1, 2.
To provide more insights, we now characterize the optimal backup capacity reservation
level under a symmetric scenario where the two products have similar characteristics
(demand distributions, procurement and inventory costs, and revenues – but not
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necessarily supplier reliabilities). Such a symmetric scenario allow us to completely
characterize the optimal capacity reservation level and gain some sharp insights. To
this end, the following theorem considers a symmetric scenario and characterizes
both cases where the flexible secondary supplier is more expensive or cheaper than
the primary ones.
Theorem 10 (Symmetric Scenario) Consider a symmetric scenario where all pa-
rameters except (perhaps) the supplier reliabilities are product-independent. Further,
assume that product demands follow a uniform distribution between 0 and d (with
d > 2 (p+r−u
f−cf )
p+r+h
to ensure full linearity of the demand CDFs in the working range).
Then, if c− cf ≥ uf ,we have:
Q̄f∗ =
2d (p+ r − uf − cf )
p+ r + h
. (5.9)
However, if c−cf < uf , consider the following conditions on the reliability of suppliers:




p+r−c , and Condition 2 (C2): θ




(i) when both C1 and C2 do not hold: Q̄f∗ = 0,




(1− θ1θ2)(p+ r) + θ1θ2c− uf − cf
)
(θ̄1θ2 + θ1θ̄2 + θ̄
1θ̄2
2
)(p+ r + h)
, (5.10)








p+ r + h
. (5.11)
The above theorem describes that, when the procurement cost from the flexible sup-
plier (uf + cf ) is sufficiently cheap, the optimal capacity reservation level is inde-
pendent of disruption risks. Furthermore, similar to the case without recourse (see
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Theorem 13), there is a separation of the joint capacity reservation in this case; the op-
timal capacity reserved presented in (5.9) is the sum of the orders to two independent
newsvendors with a procurement cost of uf + cf . However, when the procurement
cost from the flexible supplier is not cheap, the separation phenomenon no longer
exists. For instance, (5.11) shows that the optimal capacity reservation level with a
recourse option is a function of θ̄1 × θ̄2. However, as we will see in the case without
recourse (see Theorem 13), the optimal capacity reservation level is the sum of two
independent terms: one a function of θ̄1 and the other a function of θ̄2.
5.4.3 Recourse Analysis with Offshore Unreliable Suppliers
In some situations, a firm may not be able to monitor its unreliable suppliers before
placing the orders. For instance, unlike our motivating examples discussed in the
Introduction, there might be geographical or other barriers between such suppliers and
the firm which prevent the firm from effectively monitoring its unreliable suppliers.
Thus, we now assume that the firm first places the orders with unreliable suppliers,
observes the delivered quantities, and then places orders with the backup supplier.
Specifically, the firm first decides to reserve a capacity of Q̄f units from the secondary
flexible backup supplier and pays uf × Q̄f to do so. Simultaneously, the firm places
orders with the dedicated unreliable suppliers (Stage 1). If the corresponding supplier
is up, the orders are fully delivered, and the firm pays the full purchasing price to the
supplier. Otherwise, nothing is delivered, and therefore, the firm does not pay the
purchasing price (i.e., as before, the firm pays only per item delivered). The firm can
then use its flexible backup supplier subject to the reserved capacity, Q̄f , by paying
the capacity reservation exercise prices (Stage 2). Then demands are realized and
either inventory shortage cost or holding minus the sales revenue accrue.
Let CU,U(Q̄
f , q1, q2), CU,D(Q̄
f , q1), CD,U(Q̄
f , q2), and CD,D(Q̄
f ) (U: Up, D: Down)
denote the minimum expected cost of the firm in the second stage, if both suppliers
deliver (i.e., has been up), only the first supplier delivers, only the second supplier
208
delivers, and when none of them delivers, respectively. Analogous to (5.3)-(5.6), these
costs can be computed as follows.
CU,U(Q̄














1 + qf1 ) +G2(q
2 + qf2 ) (5.12)
CU,D(Q̄
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(5.14)
CD,D(Q̄

















Next, if CStage 2(Q̄
f , q1, q2) denotes the optimal expected cost of Stage 2 as is perceived
by the firm at the beginning of Stage 1, we have: CStage 2(Q̄
f , q1, q2) =
θ1 θ2CU,U(Q̄
f , q1, q2) + θ1 (1− θ2 )CU,D(Q̄f , q1)
+(1− θ1) θ2CD,U(Q̄f , q2) + (1− θ1)(1− θ2)CD,D(Q̄f ). (5.16)
Then, the firm can determine Q̄f∗ as well as q1∗, q2∗ at the beginning of Stage 1 via:
min
q1,q2,Q̄f≥0
uf Q̄f + CStage 2(Q̄
f , q1, q2). (5.17)
Notice that the solution to (5.15) is already given in Theorem 9, although the value
of Q̄f may differ. Hence, we now need to solve programs (5.12) - (5.14).
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The above theorem states that, if the reserved capacity from the backup supplier




otherwise, to set the order-up-to level, the firm rations the available backup capacity
between the two products using parameter t. Here, t can be thought of an additional
fictitious capacity reservation exercise cost that rations the limited capacity. In each of
these cases, and for both products, if the delivered order from the dedicated supplier is
more than the order-up-to level, the firm will not use the backup capacity. Otherwise,
the firm brings its inventory level to the order-up-to level by reordering the rest of its
requirement from the backup supplier and paying the capacity reservation exercise
cost.
Next, we solve programs (5.13) and (5.14) to analyze the case where exactly one
of the dedicated suppliers fails to deliver.
Theorem 12 (One Supplier Up) Let m ∈ {1, 2} denote the dedicated supplier




















]+), where t is the solution to
∑
j=m,n βj = Q̄
f . If Q̄f ∈[∑
j=m,n αj , ∞
)
, then qf∗j = αj for j ∈ {m,n}. Otherwise, q
f∗
j = βj.
The above result states that the firm will set the order-up-to levels as if both
unreliable suppliers have delivered. However, unlike the case where both suppliers
deliver, the firm can only reach the order-up-to level for product n via the flexible
backup supplier. Hence, for instance, if the reserved capacity is enough, the firm
will always order a positive amount from the backup supplier for product n. When
the reserved backup capacity is not enough, the firm will ration the available limited
backup capacity, considering the amount delivered for product m.
Since the solution to (5.15) is already given in Theorem 9, we have completely
solved programs (5.12) - (5.15), and hence, CStage 2(Q̄
f , q1, q2) is completely computed.
It is then straightforward to solve (5.17) to characterize the firm’s behavior in the
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first stage. Furthermore, it should be clear that because of the early orders placed
with the unreliable suppliers, the optimal cost in (5.17) provides an upper bound for
the optimal cost in the previous section.
5.5 Benchmark Analyses: No Recourse
To generate insights into the value of the recourse option for firms (Questions 2
and 3 ) and provide some benchmark analyses for Section 5.4, we now consider the
much simpler case where recourse is not allowed. We present the main results here
and provide further details about this setting in Appendix C.
Theorem 13 Without the recourse option, the perceived optimal ordering and con-








pj + rj + hj
]+) (j = 1, 2), (5.18)
qj∗ = F−1j (
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)− F−1j ([
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pj + rj + hj
]+). (5.20)
Theorem 13 shows in Eq. (5.20) the amount of capacity that the firm reserves, where
ufj = u
f + cfj . For each of the products, the firm will order in total (from both
suppliers of that product) the same amount that it would order if it had a single,
reliable, dedicated supplier with linear ordering cost cj. However, its perceived optimal
ordering quantity from the flexible supplier is modified to include its unreliability
beliefs about dedicated suppliers. It will then procure the rest of its requirements from
the unreliable dedicated supplier. Theorem 13 also proves a separability phenomenon
in capacity reservation for the two products. As the reader may have expected, the
flexible backup supplier in this benchmark setting has capacity reserved at the same
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levels as if there are two separate backup suppliers. This is intuitive because the joint
backup capacity is not decided a priori in this section, but is part of the optimization.
However, as we observed in Section 5.4, this separability disappears where recourse
is allowed.
5.5.1 Benchmark Setting: The Value of the Secondary Flex-
ible Backup Supplier
We denote the true (and not the perceived) value of the flexible backup supplier
for the firm by V f and define it as:
V f = CT (q




where CT (·) (as is defined in Eq. (5.96) of Appendix C) denotes the true expected
cost of the firm under its perceived optimal decisions, and q′j∗ represents the firm’s
perceived optimal ordering quantity to dedicated supplier j in the absence of the
flexible supplier.
Using the perceived optimal ordering and contracting levels presented in Theorem
13, we now derive the true value of the flexible backup supplier for the firm in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5 The true value of the flexible backup supplier for the firm under the ca-








j − (1− π
j
0)c
j)qf∗j ] , (5.22)
where Gj(·) and qf∗j are defined in Eq’s. (5.2) and (5.18) respectively.
Now that we have a measure for the value of the flexible backup supplier, we can
answer an interesting question:
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Question 6 If a firm perceives the capacity reservation contract with a flexible backup
supplier to be valuable (and hence will wish to form a contract), will such a contract
be also truly valuable or not (and vice versa)?
Theorem 14 (i) The firm perceives the capacity reservation contract with the flexible
backup supplier to be valuable, if and only if, its reliability belief vector Θ = (θ1, θ2)
satisfies:
∃j ∈ {1, 2} : θj <
pj + rj − ufj
pj + rj − cj
. (5.23)
(ii) The capacity reservation contract with the flexible backup supplier is not truly
valuable for the firm if for both j = 1, 2:
max {θj, 1− πj0} ≥
pj + rj − ufj
pj + rj − cj
. (5.24)
From Theorem 14, we observe that if
pj+rj−ufj
pj+rj−cj ≤ θ
j for both j = 1, 2, the firm is
lucky that its belief is true (regardless of whether it is underestimating or overestimat-
ing): contracting with the flexible backup supplier is neither perceived to be valuable
nor is truly valuable for the firm. Also, a firm that overestimates the reliabilities of
both of dedicated suppliers (i.e, εj > 0 for both j = 1, 2) perceives the flexible backup
supplier to be valuable if, and only if, it is truly valuable (for the only if part, follow
the proof of Theorem 2). In fact, we have the following observation:
Observation 9 Overestimating reliabilities does not have the danger of mismatching
perception and reality regarding the decision of whether or not to reserve some flexible
backup capacity.
While the above observation presents a nice property of overestimating, it does
not mean that it is more profitable to overestimate the reliabilities. Indeed, we
can rigorously prove the following theorem which verifies the intuitive notion that
firms with a more accurate reliability belief (achievable through monitoring unreliable
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suppliers) can benefit more from contracting with a flexible backup supplier in terms
of actual cost reduction.
Proposition 11 The true value of the flexible backup supplier based on the firm’s
errors in its reliability belief, denoted by V f (ε1, ε2), is non-increasing in the degree of
disruption risk perception error. That is, for j ∈ {1, 2} if εj > 0, let 0 ≤ δj < εj and
if εj < 0, let εj < δj ≤ 0; then V f (ε1, ε2) ≤ V f (δ1, δ2).
The (numerical) Study 4 of Appendix C generates more insights into the value of
the flexible backup supplier. In particular, the following observation from this study
is of interest:
Observation 10 Even with large errors in its reliability perception of the primary
suppliers, a firm with sufficiently high profit margin can greatly benefit from reserving
some flexible backup capacity (despite the fact that the quality of information is poor).
5.5.2 Benchmark Setting: The Value of Disruption Risk In-
formation
As the previous section suggested, a firm gains additional benefit if it obtains
disruption risk information and removes the uncertainty about the disruption risks
of its suppliers. For instance, in the example of Boeing’s supply chain discussed in
Section 1, monitoring the production problems of AIT in 2006 could help Boeing to
protect against the disruption.
Clearly, obtaining disruption risk information is costly (e.g. the cost of establishing
a threat level advisory system, providing suppliers with incentives to collaboratively
share their related private information, or placing some of the firm’s employees at
the supplier’s site). Hence, there is a trade-off between the cost of obtaining such
information and the savings due to better contracting and ordering decisions. To
examine this trade-off, we denote by V i
j
the value of obtaining perfect information
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where superscript # on decision variables describes that they are the firm’s perceived
optimal decisions with respect to the new information (i.e., ij), and CT (·|ij) is the
true expected cost of the firm under such decisions (given that dedicated supplier j is
in state ij). The value of the information on the disruption risk of unreliable supplier
j (j = 1, 2) can then be computed by:
V Ij = P (1 (ij=+) = 1)V
+j + P (1 (ij=0) = 1)V




where we have used P (1 (ij=0) = 1) = π
j
0. (Recall that Π = (1 − π10, 1 − π20) is the
vector of true reliabilities.) It is noteworthy that the value of information on dedicated
supplier j (V Ij) defined in (5.26) also represents an upper bound for the amount of
money that a risk-neutral firm should be willing to pay to obtain information about
the disruption risk of dedicated supplier j.
To compute the total value of information, we can define the aggregate value of
information for the firm as V I =
∑2
j=1 V I
j, representing the savings that the firm
can obtain in its true expected costs by moving from a no-information situation to a
full/perfect information one, as computed in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 The values of the information on the disruption risk of the dedicated sup-
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plier j (j = 1, 2) under the capacity reservation contract for the firm are:
V +
j










j∗)− cj(qf∗j + qj∗)] , (5.27)
V 0
j
= (1− πj0) [cjqj∗ +Gj(qj∗ + q
f∗
j )−Gj(F−1j (
pj + rj − ufj
pj + rj + hj
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))]− ufj (F−1j (
pj + rj − ufj
pj + rj + hj
)− qf∗j ) , (5.28)








pj + rj − ufj
pj + rj + hj
))
− ufjF−1j (
pj + rj − ufj
pj + rj + hj
)] , (5.29)
where Gj(·), qf∗j , and qj∗ are defined in Eq’s. (5.2), (5.18), and (5.19) respectively.
Now that we have a measure for the value of disruption risk information, we can
answer two interesting questions:
Question 7 When is obtaining disruption risk information a better risk mitigation
mechanism than contracting with a flexible backup supplier?
Question 8 For which firms should obtaining disruption risk information be more
appealing?
We first provide insight into Question 7.
Proposition 12 There exists thresholds π̂j0 on the true unreliability of the primary
suppliers such that V I ≥ V f whenever πj0 ≤ π̂
j
0 (j ∈ {1, 2}). That is, when suppliers
are (truly) reliable enough, obtaining information is more valuable than contracting
with a flexible backup supplier.
When primary suppliers are reliable enough, investing in an expensive backup supplier
is not advantageous. However, obtaining information is still (relatively) advantageous
because it helps the firm to make better ordering decisions.
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The following proposition (and later Observation 11) provide answers to Question
8. First, as is intuitively expected, firms that currently do not have an accurate vector
of reliability belief can achieve larger savings in their true costs through obtaining risk
information. Hence, monitoring suppliers should be more attractive for such firms.
Proposition 13 The value of information based on the firm’s errors in its reliability
belief, denoted by V I(ε1, ε2), is non-decreasing in the degree of disruption risk per-
ception error. That is, for j ∈ {1, 2} if εj > 0, let 0 ≤ δj < εj and if εj < 0,
let εj < δj ≤ 0; then V I(ε1, ε2) ≥ V I(δ1, δ2). Furthermore, if |δj| ≥ |εj|, then
V I(ε1, ε2) ≤ V I(δ1, δ2).
The (numerical) Study 5 of Appendix C provides the following observations about
disruption risk information.
Observation 11 Disruption risk information is more attractive to firms with lower
profit margins.
Observation 12 The sensitivity of the value of information to belief errors is much
higher for firms that tend to overestimate reliabilities than those who underestimate.
5.6 The Value of Recourse, Flexibility, and Infor-
mation
We now use our framework with recourse to gain insights into the value of three
disruption mitigation mechanisms: obtaining (i) a recourse option, (ii) flexibility in
the backup supply system, and (3) disruption risk information on primary suppliers.
5.6.1 The Value of Recourse
To reveal the benefit of recourse and provide insights to Question 3, we now
compare the optimal cost of the model with the recourse to the benchmark setting of
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Section 5.5 (where the firm cannot observe the state of the unreliable suppliers before
ordering).
Study 1 (Recourse) As in Studies 4 and 5 (described in details in Appendix C),
consider a firm which is facing Normally distributed demands of N(5000, 12002) and
N(3000, 8002), respectively, for products 1 and 2. Table 5.1 describes the percentage
benefit of recourse as well as the percentage reduction in optimal investment in the
flexible capacity based on the parameter settings of Table 5.4 (see Appendix B). To
focus on the effect of recourse, we assume (1) the firm has no error in its risk belief,
and (2) cfj (j = 1, 2) is negligible compared to u
f . By comparing the settings with
recourse and without it in Table 5.1, we gain the following insights into Questions 2
and 3.
Observation 13 Recourse is a strong mitigation technique for firms with a cost
reduction that is always positive and averages 37.7% in our study.
Since this reduction in cost is due to making more effective procurement decisions as
a consequence of observing disruption states, the above analysis gives quantitative
evidence of the value of postponing ordering decisions (to the extent possible) until
after monitoring the state of unreliable suppliers. Another interesting observation is
the following.
Observation 14 Investment in the flexible backup capacity may be greater or smaller
with recourse.
One might think that a firm with recourse would always invest less in the flexible
capacity, since later it can benefit from its disruption observation to flexibly utilize the
reserved pooled capacity (a risk pooling effect). However, this is not true in Settings
3, 4, and 7. For instance, in Setting 4, the firm without recourse, does not invest in
the flexible capacity (according to Theorem 14). With a recourse option, however,
it knows that if in the second stage it observes that (at least) one of the suppliers
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Table 5.1: The Value of Recourse and the Difference in Investment in the Flexible
Backup Capacity with and without Recourse.
Setting No.
Recourse No Recourse
Reduction in Q̄f∗ (%) Value of Recourse (%)
Q̄f∗ Opt. Cost Q̄f∗ Opt. Cost
1 3,314 -6,766.7 6,845 -3,156.0 51.59 114.41
2 3,287 -6,673.4 5,415 -3,563.2 39.30 87.29
3 3,214 -7,196.0 2,571 -4,771.7 -25.01 50.81
4 2,459 -7,495.7 0 -7,050.8 −∞ 6.31
5 5,206 -93,662.7 8,308 -90,893.4 37.34 3.05
6 5,095 -26,510.3 8,495 -25,588.9 40.02 3.60
7 3,233 -26,484.6 2,436 -23,940.9 -32.72 10.62
8 3,520 -24,025.0 6432 -19,086.8 45.27 25.87
Average 37.744
is down, it has much to gain by channeling the reserved capacity to the appropriate
product(s). Hence, it prefers to invest in the secondary supplier to reduce the risk.
5.6.2 The Value of Flexibility
We now use our analytical framework to provide insights into Question 4.
Study 2 (Flexibility) To capture the value of implementing flexibility in the backup
system, we compare two scenarios: (1) one with two dedicated (i.e., inflexible) backup
suppliers, where the dedicated backup supplier of product j has a capacity reservation
cost of udj , and (2) one with a single flexible backup supplier. Notice that, for com-
putational purposes, the first scenario is a special case of our modeling framework,
and to analyze it, one can simply use the results provided in Section 5.4 twice (i.e.,
separately for each product), each time setting the demand for one of the products to
0. To investigate the value of flexibility, we assume udj = (1 + ∆)c
j, where ∆ repre-
sents a “backup premium.” Then, to fairly price the capacity of the flexible supplier,
we consider uf as a weighted average (based on quantities demanded for each) of ud1







j]. The other parameter
settings and assumptions are the same as those used in Study 1. The results presented
in Table 5.2 lead to the following two observations.
Observation 15 The (mix) flexibility of a backup supplier is highly beneficial to a
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Table 5.2: The Value of Flexibility and the Reduction in Investment in the Backup
Capacity due to Flexibility.
Setting No.
Value of Flexibility (%) Reduction in Total Capacity Reserved (%)
∆ ∆
0% 5% 10% 15% AVG. (%) 0% 5% 10% 15% AVG. (%)
1 0.5 16.6 28.0 44.0 22.3 31.6 36.6 16.6 36.0 30.2
2 8.3 16.5 31.6 36.2 23.2 24.9 45.2 16.5 39.6 31.5
3 4.6 13.1 24.9 37.5 20.0 22.3 46.7 13.1 55.8 34.5
4 6.8 16.0 22.3 17.6 15.7 1.6 49.7 16.0 5.1 18.1
5 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.1 1.3 9.3 13.5 1.0 36.4 15.0
6 0.0 3.6 9.3 9.9 5.7 104.9 0.0 3.6 40.3 37.2
7 101.7 103.2 104.9 107.4 104.3 104.0 -54.1 103.2 -48.6 26.1
8 96.7 97.4 104.0 105.8 101.0 40.8 -100.6 97.4 -55.7 -4.5
AVG. (%) 27.4 33.4 40.8 45.1 36.78 42.4 4.6 33.4 13.6 23.52
firm that is procuring from unreliable primary suppliers, with an average cost reduc-
tion of 36.7% in our study. Moreover, the value of implementing flexibility in the
backup system increases as the backup premium increases.
Observation 16 The capacity reserved with a single flexible backup supplier is not
always less than the total capacity reserved with two dedicated backup suppliers.
However, the flexibility results in an average reduction of 23.5% (in our study) in the
total backup capacity purchased.
5.6.3 The Value of Disruption Risk Information
Finally, we use our analytical framework to gain insights into Question 5 of the
introduction to Section 4.
Study 3 (Information) Consider the parameter settings of Study 1 (Table 5.4 of
Appendix B), but assume the firm’s disruption risk belief (θ1, θ2) is subject to errors
as presented in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 presents the value of (perfect) information by
comparing the cost of the firm when its decision is based only on its belief (Imperfect
Information) with a scenario where it obtains risk information and decides based on
the true risk of its suppliers (Perfect Information). From Table 5.3 we see that obtain-
ing information may decrease or increase the firm’s investment level in flexible backup
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Table 5.3: The Value of Disruption Risk Information Under Recourse.
Setting
Belief Error Perfect Info. Imperfect Info.
Reduction in Q̄f∗(%) Value of Info. (%)
ε1 ε2 Q̄f∗ Opt. Cost Q̄f∗ Opt. Cost
1 0.1 0.1 3,886 -7,028.4 3,314 -6,956.7 -17.26 1.03
2 -0.1 -0.1 0 -7,861.4 3,287 -7,334.1 ∞ 7.19
3 0.1 -0.1 3,965 -6,136.1 3,214 -6,003.4 -23.40 2.21
4 0.2 0.15 3,924 -6,581.8 2,459 -5,701.4 -59.58 15.44
5 0.15 0.2 7,463 -91,331.9 5,206 -90,117.2 -43.37 1.35
6 -0.1 0.2 3,755 -26,660.9 5,095 -26,548.1 26.29 0.42
7 0.2 0.2 4,664 -26,504.6 3,233 -25,654.2 -44.29 3.31
8 0.15 0.2 4,486 -24,457.9 3,520 -23,977.1 -27.46 2.01
Average 4.121
capacity, depending on whether the firm has been overestimating or underestimating
the risks. Furthermore, we gain the following insight into Question 8.
Observation 17 Obtaining perfect disruption risk information with a recourse op-
tion results in an average cost reduction of 4.12%, and it is not a very strong risk
mitigation technique compared to obtaining a recourse option and/or implementing
flexibility in the backup system.
In other words, once the firm obtains a recourse option to benefit from the flex-
ible backup capacity, the additional benefit of reducing risk belief errors is modest.
Additional insights regarding the role of profit margin on the value of disruption
information are found in Appendix C.
5.7 Summary of Findings and Conclusion
We developed a rigorous quantitative methodology to capture the value of two key
supply risk mitigation mechanisms: (1) contracting with a secondary flexible backup
supplier, and (2) obtaining disruption risk information through monitoring primary
suppliers. We derived analytical measures for the true value of a flexible backup
supplier as well as the value of obtaining disruption risk information. These measures
determine upper bounds for the amount of money that a risk-neutral firm should
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be willing to invest to implement either of these strategies in order to increase the
reliability and responsiveness of its supply chain.
In both settings with and without a recourse option, we analytically characterized
the firm’s behavior by explicitly identifying the jointly optimal size of the backup
capacity reservation contract and the inventory ordering policy for both products.
This characterization was based upon the firm’s perception of the primary suppliers’
disruption risks.
We observed that investing in a secondary flexible backup capacity can be harmful
if the current information about the risk of primary suppliers is not perfect. We
showed that monitoring unreliable suppliers to make better risk estimates enhances
the benefit of purchasing flexible backup capacity. We also identified conditions under
which a firm is lucky in the sense that regardless of whether it is overestimating or
underestimating the reliabilities, it perceives investing in a flexible backup capacity
to be valuable only if it is truly valuable. For instance, we found that overestimating
supplier reliabilities does not have the danger of mismatching perception and reality
regarding a decision to reserve some flexible backup capacity. Moreover, we showed
that contracting with a flexible backup supplier is more beneficial for firms with
low perception errors about the reliability of their suppliers than those with high
errors. By contrast, disruption risk information is more valuable for firms with higher
perception errors. Additionally, we observed that disruption risk information is more
attractive to firms with low profit margins than those with high ones. We also showed
that when suppliers are (truly) reliable enough, obtaining information is a better risk
mitigation technique than contracting with a flexible supplier. We also found that
the value of disruption risk information is much more sensitive to the misperception
errors for firms who tend to overestimate (rather than underestimate) the reliabilities.
Next, comparing the scenarios with and without the recourse option, our study
found that having the recourse option can be regarded as an effective risk mitigation
technique for firms with an average cost reduction of 37%. This observation sheds
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more light on the benefit of monitoring suppliers and provides further evidence that
firms with unreliable suppliers should try to postpone (to the extent possible) their
ordering decisions until after monitoring the disruption state of their suppliers. We
also observed that the amount of investment in the flexible backup capacity may or
may not be reduced when a firm obtains a recourse option. Further, we showed that
when the perceived reliability of the suppliers is larger than a critical fraction, having
a recourse option reduces the optimal investment in the flexible backup capacity.
We investigated the value of implementing flexibility in the backup system: con-
tracting with a single flexible backup supplier rather than two inflexible ones. Our
study showed an average cost reduction of 36%, so flexibility can indeed be highly
beneficial; further, it becomes more beneficial as the backup premium increases.
We evaluated the benefit of obtaining risk information under the recourse option,
but our results suggest that it is not a strong mitigation mechanism. Without re-
course, it is potent. We also extended our two-stage analyses to a similar setting with
offshore unreliable suppliers, where the availability of unreliable suppliers can only be
identified by observing the delivered quantities.
We leave it to future research to investigate the effects of dynamic changes in
the reliability of the suppliers on the results provided in this study. Future research
may also investigate the multi-period trade-offs in carrying inventory over time and
dynamically monitoring suppliers to hedge against such dynamically changing risks.
Another possible direction for future research is to investigate the effect of correla-
tion in disruption risk across different suppliers and/or correlation in demand across
different products.
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5.8 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 8: Note that the KKT conditions are sufficient and necessary
for characterizing the optimal solution (i.e., the optimal ordering policy). Let µ,
λf , and λ denote the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints qf ≤ Q̄f , qf ≥ 0, and
q ≥ 0, respectively. First consider the case where the unreliable supplier is observed
to be up. Using the Leibniz rule to get the derivative of the objective function,
cfqf + cq +G(q + qf ), the KKT conditions can be written as:
qf ≤ Q̄f
c+ (h+ p+ r)F (q + qf )− p− r = λ
cf + (h+ p+ r)F (q + qf )− p− r = λf − µ
µ(qf − Q̄f ) = 0
λq = 0
λfqf = 0
q, qf , µ, λ, λf ≥ 0,
or equivalently
qf ≤ Q̄f
c− λ = µ− λf + cf
q + qf = F−1(
p+ r − (c− λ)
p+ r + h
)
µ(qf − Q̄f ) = 0
λq = 0
λfqf = 0
q, qf , µ, λ, λf ≥ 0,
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Similarly, when the unreliable supplier is down, the KKT conditions are:
qf ≤ Q̄f
qf = F−1(
p+ r − (cf + µ− λf )
p+ r + h
)
µ(qf − Q̄f ) = 0
λfqf = 0
qf , µ, λf ≥ 0.
To prove Part (1), set qf∗ = µ = λ = 0, λf = cf−c, and q∗ = F−1( p+r−c
p+r+h
), and observe
that the KKT conditions are satisfied. To prove Part (2), if Q̄f ≥ F−1(p+r−cf
p+r+h
), then
set qf∗ = F−1(p+r−c
f
p+r+h
), µ = λf = 0, and observe that KKT conditions are satisfied.
Otherwise, choose µ such that Q̄f = F−1(p+r−(c
f+µ)
p+r+h
). Then observe that setting
qf∗ = Q̄f and λf = 0 satisfies the KKT conditions. For Part (3) (i), set µ = λf = 0,
λ = c − cf , q∗ = 0, and qf∗ = F−1(p+r−cf
p+r+h




) and set λf = 0, λ = c− cf +µ, qf∗ = Q̄f , and q∗ = 0. For Part
(3) (iii), set µ = c − cf , λf = λ = 0, qf∗ = Q̄f , q∗ = F−1( p+r−c
p+r+h
) − Q̄f . Similarly, to
prove Part (4) (i), set µ = λf = 0 and qf∗ = F−1(p+r−c
f
p+r+h
), and to prove Part (4) (ii),
choose µ such that Q̄f = F−1(p+r−(c
f+µ)
p+r+h
) and set λf = 0, and qf∗ = Q̄f . 
Proof of Proposition 9: Recall that the optimal capacity reservation level, similar
to 5.8, is Q̄f∗ = arg minQ̄f≥0 u
fQ̄f + θCU(Q̄f ) + (1− θ)CD(Q̄f ), where CU(·) (CD(·))
denotes the cost of Stage 2 if the unreliable supplier is observed to be up (down). For
the ease of notation, let l = F−1(p+r−c
f
p+r+h
) and l′ = F−1( p+r−c
p+r+h
). When cf > c, from
Proposition 8 Part (1), CU(·) = a for some constant a. Moreover, from Proposition
8 Part (2), CD(Q̄f ) = c
f (l ∧ Q̄f ) + G(l ∧ Q̄f ), where x ∧ y = min{x, y}. Thus, the
optimization problem when cf > c is minQ̄f≥0 u
fQ̄f + (1− θ)[cf (l ∧ Q̄f ) +G(l ∧ Q̄f )].




]+), which is always less than, the proof of Part (1) is
225
complete. When cf ≤ c, we need to consider three cases: (a) Q̄f ∈ [l,∞), (b)
Q̄f ∈ [l′, l], and (c) Q̄f ∈ [0, l′]. In case (a), from Proposition 8 Parts (3) (i) and (4)
(i), we have CU(Q̄f ) = CD(Q̄f ) = c
f l + G(l). Thus, in this case, the optimization
problem is minQ̄f≥l u
fQ̄f + cf l + G(l), which has the solution Q̄f∗ = l. In case (b),
from Proposition 8 Parts (3) (ii) and (4) (ii), CU(Q̄f ) = CD(Q̄f ) = c
fQ̄f + G(Q̄f ).
Hence, the optimization problem is minl′≤Q̄f≤l u
fQ̄f + cfQ̄f + G(Q̄f ). Note that the




where the inequality holds since by our modeling assumption uf + cf > c. Hence, the
optimizer in case (b) is Q̄f∗ = l′, since the objective function is convex. In case (c),
from Proposition 8 Parts (3) (iii) and (4) (ii), CU(Q̄f ) = c
fQ̄f + G(l′) + c(l′ − Q̄f )
and CD(Q̄f ) = c
fQ̄f + G(Q̄f ). Thus, the optimization problem in this case is
equivalent to min0≤Q̄f≤l′(u






]+) ≤ l′, where the inequality holds since by our modeling assump-
tion uf + cf > c. Next observe that the optimizer in case (a) is a feasible point in
case (b), and also, the optimizer of case (b), is a feasible point in case (c). Hence, the
optimizer of case (c) gives the global optimal solution to the problem, and the proof
is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 7: Consider program (5.3). Notice that it is a convex program
with linear constraints. Hence, the KKT conditions are sufficient and necessary.





cj + (hj + pj + rj)Fj(q
j + qfj )− pj − rj = λj (j = 1, 2) (5.30)
cfj + (hj + pj + rj)Fj(q
j + qfj )− pj − rj = λ
f
j − µ (j = 1, 2) (5.31)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0
λjqj = 0 (j = 1, 2)
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2)
qj, qfj , µ, λ
j, λfj ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2)
Conditions (5.30) and (5.31) result that:
cj − λj = µ− λfj + c
f
j (j = 1, 2)
qj + qfj = F
−1
j (
pj + rj − (cj − λj)
pj + rj + hj
). (j = 1, 2)
Hence, the KKT conditions can be written as follows:
qf1 + q
f
2 ≤ Q̄f (5.32)
cj − λj = µ− λfj + c
f
j (j = 1, 2) (5.33)
qj + qfj = F
−1
j (
pj + rj − (cj − λj)
pj + rj + hj
) (j = 1, 2) (5.34)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0 (5.35)
λjqj = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.36)
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.37)
qj, qfj , µ, λ
j, λfj ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2) (5.38)
Now, it is sufficient to show that the optimal solution in each part satisfies the above
conditions.
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set µ = λfj = 0 and λ
j = cj − cfj (j = 1, 2).





) and qj∗ = 0 (j = 1, 2) satisfy the KKT condi-
tions.

















, set µ = t, λk =
ck−cfk−µ, λl = cl−c
f




















) = Q̄f .




















l = 0 and λk = (ck − cfk) − (cl − c
f







), qf∗l = Q̄





) − qf∗l sat-
isfy the KKT conditions.











, suppose t ∈ (cl − cfl , ck − c
f
k ] is
a solution to Q̄f = F−1k (
pk+rk−cfk−t
pk+rk+hk
). Then set µ = t, λk = ck − cfk − µ, λl = λ
f
k = 0
and λfl = µ − (cl − c
f
l ). Then observe that q
f∗
k = Q̄
f , qf∗l = 0, q
k∗ = 0, and
ql∗ = F−1l (
pl+rl−cl
pl+rl+hl
) satisfy the KKT conditions.
(v) If Q̄f ∈
[





, set µ = ck − cfk , λl = λk = λ
f
k = 0, and λ
f
l =
(ck− cfk)− (cl− c
f
l ). Then observe that q
f∗
k = Q̄
f , qf∗l = 0, q




and ql∗ = F−1l (
pl+rl−cl
pl+rl+hl
) satisfy the KKT conditions. 
Proof of Theorem 8: Consider program (5.4) or (5.5) depending on whether m = 1
or 2 (respectively). Notice that both programs are convex with linear constraints.
Hence, the KKT conditions are sufficient and necessary. Using Leibniz rule and
similar to the derivation of the KKT conditions in the proof of Theorem (7) these
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conditions are as follows (see the proof of Theorem 1 for more details on the derivation




cm + (hm + pm + rm)Fm(q
m + qfm)− pm − rm = λm (5.39)
cfm + (hm + pm + rm)Fm(q
m + qfm)− pm − rm = λfm − µ (5.40)
cfn + (hn + pn + rn)Fn(q
f
n)− pn − rn = λfn − µ (5.41)
µ(qfm + q
f














Conditions (5.39)-(5.41) result in:
cm − λm = µ− λfm + cfm
qm + qfm = F
−1
m (
pm + rm − (µ− λfm + cfm)





pn + rn − (µ− λfn + cfn)
pn + rn + hn
).





2 ≤ Q̄f (5.42)
cm − λm = µ− λfm + cfm (5.43)
qm + qfm = F
−1
m (
pm + rm − (µ− λfm + cfm)





pn + rn − (µ− λfn + cfn)
pn + rn + hn
) (5.45)
λmqm = 0 (5.46)
λfmq
f
m = 0 (5.47)
λfnq
f






n ≥ 0. (5.49)
Now, it is sufficient to show that the optimal solution in each part satisfies the above
conditions.









, set λm = cm, µ = λfm = λ
f
n = 0 and





) (for both j = n,m) and qm∗ = 0 satisfy the KKT
conditions. 

















, set µ = t,
















]+) = Q̄f .















, set µ =





f − qf∗n , and qm∗ = F−1m (
pm+rm−cm
pm+rm+hm
)− qf∗m satisfy the KKT conditions.
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(iv) If Q̄f ∈
[









]+) = Q̄f . Set µ = t, λfm = µ− (cm− cfm) and λfn = λm = 0. Then ob-
serve that qf∗n = Q̄
f , qf∗m = 0, and q
m∗ = F−1m (
pm+rm−cm
pm+rm+hm
) satisfy the KKT conditions.

Proof of Theorem 9: Consider program (5.6). Notice that this program is convex
with linear constraints. Hence, the KKT conditions are sufficient and necessary.
Using Leibniz rule and similar to the derivation of the KKT conditions in the proof




cfj + (hj + pj + rj)Fj(q
f
j )− pj − rj = λ
f
j − µ (j = 1, 2) (5.50)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2)
qfj , µ, λ
f
j ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2)
By rewriting condition (5.50), KKT conditions are:
qf1 + q
f




pj + rj − (µ− λfj + c
f
j )
pj + rj + hj
) (j = 1, 2) (5.52)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0 (5.53)
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.54)
qfj , µ, λ
f
j ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2) (5.55)
Now, it is sufficient to show that the optimal solution of each part satisfies the above
KKT conditions.
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, set µ = λf1 = λ
f






) (for both j = 1, 2) satisfies the KKT conditions.











set µ = t and λf1 = λ
f
2 = 0. Then observe





]+) (for both j = n,m) satisfies the KKT conditions, where
t ∈
(
0 , maxj{pj + rj − cfj }
]







]+) = Q̄f . 







),∞) and notice that⋃7
k=1 Ik = [0,∞). Thus, defining
Q̄fk = argmin
Q̄f∈Ik





uf Q̄f + CStage 2(Q̄
f ) = argmin
Q̄f∈{Q̄fk ,k=1,...,7}
uf Q̄f + CStage 2(Q̄
f ) . (5.56)
It remains to identify Q̄fk for k = 1, 2, ..., 7 using Theorems 7, 8, and 9. First, using
part (i) of these theorems, notice that on I7:
CStage 2(Q̄
f ) = K1
for some constant K1. (We use K,K1, ..., K8 to represent constants throughout this
proof.) Thus, since uf ≥ 0, we have:
Q̄f7 = argmin
Q̄f∈I7
uf Q̄f + CStage 2(Q̄






pj + rj − cfj
pj + rj + hj
).
Hence, Q̄f7 ∈ I6. Thus, from (5.56), Q̄f∗ ∈ {Q̄
f
k , k = 1, ..., 6}. Next, on I6, using
part (ii) of Theorems 7, 8, and 9: CU,U(Q̄
f ) = CU,U(Q̄
f ) = CU,D(Q̄




f ) = Γ(Q̄f ). (Notice that although Theorems 7, 8, and 9 are presented based
on open end intervals, one can consider closed intervals, since CStage 2(·) is continuous
at end points.) Therefore,
CStage 2(Q̄
f ) = θ1 θ2CU,U(Q̄
f ) + θ1 (1− θ2 )CU,D(Q̄f )





uf Q̄f + CStage 2(Q̄
f ) = argmin
Q̄f∈I6
uf Q̄f + Γ(Q̄f ).
Next, if Q̄f ∈ I5 then, using part (iii) of Theorem 7, CU,U(Q̄f ) = (cf − c) Q̄f +K2 for
some constant K2. Moreover, from Theorem 8 parts (iii) and (ii) (respectively) we
have : CU,D(Q̄
f ) = (cf1 − c1)Q̄f +K3, and CD,u = Γ(Q̄f ). Also, from Theorem 9 part





− θ1(c1 − cf1)
)
Q̄f + θ̄1Γ(Q̄f ) +K,




uf − θ1(c1 − cf1)
)
Q̄f + θ̄1Γ(Q̄f ).
Next, if Q̄f ∈ I4 then, using part (iii) of Theorems 7 and 8, CU,U(Q̄f ) = (cf −
c) Q̄f +K2, CD,U(Q̄
f ) = (cf2−c2)Q̄f +K4 (for some constants K2, K3, K4). Also, from









Q̄f + θ̄1θ̄2Γ(Q̄f ).
Similarly, on I3, from part (iv) of Theorems 7 and 8: CU,U(Q̄





f ) = cf2Q̄
f+G2(Q̄
f )+K6. Moreover, from part (iii) of Theorem 8, CD,U(Q̄
f ) =









f ) + θ̄1θ̄2Γ(Q̄f ).
Next, on I2, from part (v) of Theorem 7, CU,U(Q̄
f ) = (cf2−c2)Q̄f +K7. Also, from
Theorem 8, CU,D(Q̄
f ) = cf2Q̄
f + G2(Q̄
f ) + K6. Moreover, from part (iii) of Theorem
8, CD,U(Q̄










f ) + θ̄1θ̄2Γ(Q̄f ).
Finally, on I1, from part (v) of Theorem 7, CU,U(Q̄
f ) = (cf2 − c2)Q̄f + K7. Also,
from Theorem 8, part (iv), CU,D(Q̄
f ) = cf2Q̄
f +G2(Q̄
f ) +K6 and CD,U(Q̄
f ) = cf1Q̄
f +
G1(Q̄











f ) + θ1θ̄2G2(Q̄
f )
+θ̄1θ̄2Γ(Q̄f ),
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 2: To prove part (i) notice that, from Proposition 10, Q̄f∗ ∈
{Q̄fk , k = 1, ..., 6}. Moreover, Q̄
f
k ∈ Ik (see Proposition 10 for definition of Ik for
k = 1, ..., 6). Thus, since every member of I6 is greater than or equal to any member
of Ik for k = 1, ..., 5, we have:






pj + rj − cfj
pj + rj + hj
).
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To prove part (ii) notice that, when θj (cj − cfj ) ≥ uf (for j = 1, 2), the optimal
capacity reservation level without recourse presented in Theorem 13 is greater than
or equal to the upper bound of capacity reservation level with recourse obtained in
part (i) (since CDFs Fj(.) are nondecreasing). Hence, when θ
j (cj − cfj ) ≥ uf (for
j = 1, 2), the optimal capacity reservation level with recourse is less than or equal to
the optimal capacity reservation level without recourse. 
Proof of Theorem 10: Notice that when parameters are product-independent, each
of the intervals I2, I3 and I5 in Proposition 10 only include a single point. Moreover,





Additionally, using symmetric parameters in Proposition 10, Γ(Q̄f ) = 2 [cf Q̄f/2 +
G(Q̄f/2)] = cf Q̄f + 2G(Q̄f/2).
Next notice that since G(·) is a convex function (G′′(·) = (p + r + h)f(·) ≥ 0 using
Leibniz rule), Γ(·) is a convex function. Thus, Q̄f1 , Q̄
f
4 , and Q̄
f
6 are minimizers of
convex functions on convex (and compact) sets. Thus, we can characterize them










f ) + θ1θ̄2G2(Q̄
f )
+θ̄1θ̄2Γ(Q̄f ),
Therefore, to characterize Q̄f1 , using Leibniz rule and setting the derivative of the




(1− θ1θ2)(p+ r) + θ1θ2c− uf − cf
)
(θ̄1θ2 + θ1θ̄2 + θ̄
1θ̄2
2
)(p+ r + h)
.
But Q̂f1 ∈ I1 only if C1 does not hold but C2 holds, Q̂
f
1 is less than any point in I1 if




0 : if C2 does not hold,
Q̂f1 : if C2 holds but C1 does not hold,
d (p+ r − c)/(p+ r + h) : otherwise.
(5.57)








Q̄f + θ̄1θ̄2Γ(Q̄f ).
Thus, using Leibniz rule and setting the derivative of the objective function equal








p+ r + h
.
But Q̂f4 is in I4 only if C1 holds and c − cf < uf , Q̂
f
4 is less than any point in
I4 if C1 does not hold and c − cf < uf , and Q̂f4 is greater than any point in I4 if
c− cf ≥ uf . Thus,
Q̄f4 =

d (p+ r − c)/(p+ r + h) : if C1 does not hold and c− cf < uf ,
Q̂f4 : if C1 holds and c− cf < uf ,
2 d (p+ r − c)/(p+ r + h) : if c− cf ≥ uf .
(5.58)
Similarly, to characterize Q̄f6 , using Leibniz rule and setting the derivative of the








p+ r + h
. (5.59)
But Q̂f6 ∈ I6 only if c − cf ≥ uf , Q̂
f
6 is less than any point in I4 if c − cf < uf , and
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Q̂f6 cannot be greater than all points in I6 (since u
f ≥ 0). Thus,
Q̄f6 =
 2 d (p+ r − uf − cf )/(p+ r + h) : if c− cf ≥ uf ,2 d (p+ r − c)/(p+ r + h) : if c− cf < uf . (5.60)




6}, it remains to compare the cost
of Q̄f1 , Q̄
f
4 , and Q̄
f
6 under different conditions. First, if c − cf ≥ uf , then C1 and C2
trivially hold. Therefore, Q̄f1 = d (p+r−c)/(p+r+h) (from (5.57)), Q̄
f
4 = 2d (p+r−c)/
(p+r+h) (from (5.58)), and Q̄f6 = 2d (p+r−uf−cf )/(p+r+h) (from (5.60)). Thus,
we notice that I1 = [0, Q̄
f




4 ], and I6 = [Q̄
f
4 , 2 d (p + r − c)/(p + r + h)].






4 has a lower cost than Q̄
f
1 . More-
over, since Q̄f6 is the optimizer over I6 = [Q̄
f
4 , 2 d (p + r − c)/(p + r + h)], Q̄
f
6 has a
lower cost than Q̄f4 . Hence, Q̄
f
6 = 2d (p+r−uf−cf )/(p+r+h) is the optimal solution.
Second, consider the case where c − cf < uf . If (i) both C1 and C2 do not hold
then Q̄f1 = 0, Q̄
f
4 = d (p+ r− c)/(p+ r+h), and Q̄
f
6 = 2d (p+ r− c)/(p+ r+h). Next




6 ] and hence has a lower cost than Q̄
f
6 .
Also, Q̄f1 = 0 is a minimizer over I1 = [0, Q̄
f
4 ] and hence has a lower cost than Q̄4.
Thus, in this case, Q̄f∗ = Q̄f1 = 0. However, if (ii) C1 does not hold but C2 holds




4 = d (p + r − c)/(p + r + h), and Q̄
f
6 = 2d (p + r − c)/(p + r + h).




6 ] and hence has a lower cost
than Q̄f6 . Also, Q̄
f
1 = 0 is a minimizer over I1 = [0, Q̄
f
4 ] and hence has a lower cost
than Q̄4. Thus, in this case, Q̄
f∗ = Q̂f1 .
Next if (iii) C1 holds, first consider the case where C2 holds as well. In this case,






6 = 2d (p+r−c)/(p+r+h). Next since
Q̄f4 = Q̂
f













Thus in this case Q̄f∗ = Q̂f4 . To complete part (iii) now suppose C1 holds but C2




4 , and Q̄
f
6 = 2d (p+ r− c)/(p+ r+ h). Next, similar
to the previous case, since Q̄f6 ∈ I4 and Q̄
f






lower cost than Q̄f6 . Therefore, Q̄
f∗ ∈ {0, Q̂f4}. To determine Qf∗ in this case, hence,
it is sufficient to compare the cost of options Q̄f = 0 and Q̄f = Q̂f4 . To compute
CStage2(Q̄
f
1 = 0), using part (v) of Theorem 7, part (iv) of Theorem 8, and part (ii)
of Theorem 9 we have:
CU,U(0) =
2 c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+ 2G(
d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
),
CU,D(0) =
c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+G(
d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
) +G(0),
CD,U(0) =
c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+G(
d(p+ r − c)




CStage 2(0) = θ
1 θ2CU,U(0) + θ
1 (1− θ2 )CU,D(0)
+ (1− θ1) θ2CD,U(0) + (1− θ1)(1− θ2)CD,D(0)
= (θ1θ̄2 + θ̄1θ2 + 2θ1θ2)
[c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+G(
d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
)
]
+ (θ1θ̄2 + θ̄1θ2 + 2θ̄1θ̄2)G(0).
Moreover, since Q̄f = 0, ufQ̄f + CStage 2(0) = CStage 2(0). Next, we compute cost of
the option Q̄f = Q̂f4 , and compare it with the cost of Q̄
f = 0 computed above. Since
Q̂f4 ∈ I4, we shall use part (iii) of using Theorems 7, 8, and part (i) of Theorem 9.





f − c)Q̂f4 + 2[
c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+G(
d(p+ r − c)





f − c)Q̂f4 + 2[
c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+G(
d(p+ r − c)





f − c)Q̂f4 + 2[
c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+G(
d(p+ r − c)















1 (1− θ2 )CU,D(Q̂f4)
+ (1− θ1) θ2CD,U(Q̂f4) + (1− θ1)(1− θ2)CD,D(Q̂
f
4)
= [cf − (1− θ̄1θ̄2)c]Q̂f4 + 2(1− θ̄1θ̄2)[
c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+G(
d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
)]
+ 2θ̄1θ̄2G(Q̂f4/2),
and the total optimal cost with Q̄f = Q̂f4 is u
fQ̂f4 + CStage 2(Q̂
f
4). Thus, denoting
the optimal cost with Q̄f = Q̂f4 minus the optimal cost with Q̄
f = 0 by ∆, (after
simplification) we have :
∆ =
(
(1− θ1θ2) + θ̄1θ̄2
)[c d(p+ r − c)
p+ r + h
+G(
d(p+ r − c)






uf + cf − (1− θ̄1θ̄2)c)Q̂f4 + 2θ̄1θ̄2
[
G(Q̂f4/2)−G(0)]. (5.62)
Next notice that both (5.61) and (5.62) are nonpositive. To see that (5.61) is
nonpositive, define g(x) = cx − G(x) − G(0) and notice that (5.61) is equal to(
(1 − θ1θ2) + θ̄1θ̄2
)




. Hence, (5.61) is non-
positive, since g(0) = 0 and q∗ is the minimizer of g(·) (G(·) is convex and q∗ is the
solution to the first order condition). Next, to see that (5.62) is nonpositive, define
ĝ(x) =
(




and notice that (5.62) is equal to ĝ(Q̂f4). Thus, (5.62) is nonpositive, since ĝ(0) = 0
and ĝ(·) is a convex function minimized at Q̂f4 (see the definition of Q̂
f
4 or check the
first and second order conditions of ĝ(·)). Hence, ∆ ≤ 0. Thus, Q̄f∗ = Q̂f4 , and the
proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 11: Notice that program (5.12) is convex with linear constraints,
and therefore KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize the optimal
solution. Assume λfj (j = 1, 2) and µ represent the Lagrangian multipliers correspond-









cfj + (hj + pj + rj)Fj(q
j + qfj )− pj − rj = λ
f
j − µ (j = 1, 2) (5.63)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2)
qfj , µ, λ
f
j ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2)




pj + rj − cfj + λ
f
j − µ
pj + rj + hj
)− qj. (j = 1, 2)
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Hence, the KKT conditions can be written as follows:
qf1 + q
f




pj + rj − cfj + λ
f
j − µ
pj + rj + hj
)− qj (j = 1, 2) (5.65)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0 (5.66)
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.67)
qfj , µ, λ
f
j ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2) (5.68)
Now, it is trivial to show that the optimal solutions αj and βj satisfy conditions (5.64)
- (5.68) in the appropriate range of Q̄f defined in the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 12: The proof follows from Theorem 11 after setting qn = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 13:
Let µ, λj and λfj for (j = 1, 2) denote the Lagrangian multipliers, respectively, for
constraints (5.94)-(5.95). KKT conditions are then:
qf1 + q
f
2 ≤ Q̄f (5.69)
∂CP/∂q





j + µ = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.71)
∂CP/∂Q̄f − µ = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.72)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0 (5.73)
λjqj = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.74)
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.75)
qj, qfj , µ, λ
j, λfj ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2) (5.76)
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Moreover, using Leibniz rule we have:
∂CP/∂q
j = θj[cj + (hj + pj + rj)Fj(q






j[(hj + pj + rj)Fj(q
j + qfj )− pj − rj]
+ (1− θj)[(hj + pj + rj)Fj(qfj )− pj − rj] (j = 1, 2)
∂CP/∂Q̄f = u
f
j . (j = 1, 2)




θj[cj + (hj + pj + rj)Fj(q
j + qfj )− pj − rj] = λj (j = 1, 2)
cfj + θ
j[(hj + pj + rj)Fj(q
j + qfj )− pj − rj]
+ (1− θj)[(hj + pj + rj)Fj(qfj )− pj − rj] = λ
f
j − µ (j = 1, 2)
µ = ufj (j = 1, 2)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0
λjqj = 0 (j = 1, 2)
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2)
qj, qfj , µ, λ




j∗ + qf∗j ) =
λj
θj
+ pj + rj − cj
pj + rj + hj






1−θj + pj + rj
pj + rj + hj
(j = 1, 2) (5.78)
Q̄f
∗
= qf∗1 + q
f∗
2
λjqj∗ = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.79)
λfj q
f∗
j = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.80)
qj, qfj , λ
j, λfj ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2) (5.81)
Since by assumption ufj > c













≥ 0, setting λj = λfj = 0 (for every j ∈ {1, 2} that satisfies this








pj + rj + hj
) (j = 1, 2)
qj∗ = F−1j (
pj + rj − cj
pj + rj + hj
)− F−1j (




pj + rj + hj






















< 0, Eq. (5.78) can not be satisfied with λj = λfj = 0. In
this case, however, setting qf∗j = λ
j = 0 satisfies all KKT conditions and hence is
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pj + rj + hj
]+) (j = 1, 2)
qj∗ = F−1j (
pj + rj − cj
pj + rj + hj
)− F−1j ([




pj + rj + hj














pj + rj + hj
]+)
and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Lemma 5: To obtain optimal decisions in the absence of the flexible sup-
plier, set qf1 = q
f
2 = Q̄
f = 0 in (5.92) and use Leibniz rule to derive first order
condition (or simply use the results of a basic newsvendor model with lost sales).
Doing that we get q′j∗ = F−1j (
pj+rj−cj
pj+rj+hj
). Then using Eq. (5.96) we have
CT (q




pj + rj − cj




pj + rj − cj
pj + rj + hj
))) + πj0Gj(0)].
Also, to obtain CT (q
1∗, q2∗, qf∗1 , q
f∗
2 , Q̄
f∗), substitute the perceived optimal values (de-
rived by Theorem 13) in Eq. (5.96). Hence, using Eq. (5.21) and after simplification
we have
V f = CT (q













Now, replacing Gj(0) = pjE(Dj) in above equation completes the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 14: To prove part (i), note that the value of the flexible supplier









where for simplicity we have removed subscript P to denote that V f here is a perceived
value. We first show that V f as perceived by the firm is positive if and only if
∃j ∈ {1, 2} : qf∗j = F−1j ([




pj + rj + hj
]+) > 0.
To show this, for x ∈ [0,∞) let V fj (x) = (1− θj)(pjE(Dj)−Gj(x))− (u
f
j − θjcj)x
denote the perceived value of the flexible supplier with respect to product j if the
firm orders x units of product j from the flexible supplier. Then we have
∂(V fj )
∂x






) = −(1− θj) (hj + pj + rj)fj(x) ≤ 0. Therefore, V fj (·) is concave and
first order condition yields





Additionally, because Gj(0) = pjE(Dj), we get V
f








> 0 for x ∈ [0, qf∗j ) shows that V
f





j ) > 0 if, and only if, q
f∗
j > 0. Now, note that the value of the flexible supplier






j ). Therefore, V
f > 0 if, and only if,
∃j ∈ {1, 2} : qf∗j = F−1j ([




pj + rj + hj
]+) > 0.
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Moreover, because Fj(·) is non-decreasing and Fj(x) > 0 for all x > 0, the above
condition is equivalent to




which is equivalent to
∃j ∈ {1, 2} : (1− θj)(pj + rj) > ufj − θjcj,
or similarly
∃j ∈ {1, 2} : pj + rj − ufj > θj(pj + rj − cj).
This is equivalent to (5.23) (as rj > c
j and hence (pj + rj − cj) > 0).
We prove part (ii) by contradiction. First, note that by Lemma 5, the true value












Now suppose V f > 0 . Because qf∗1 = q
f∗
2 = 0 results in V
f = 0, we then have: ∃j ∈
{1, 2} : qf∗j > 0 or equivalently (by proof of part (i)): ∃j ∈ {1, 2} : θj <
pj+rj−ufj
pj+rj−cj .
Since the proof for other cases can be obtained in the same way (merely a change of
notation), without loss of generality suppose this is true for j=1, i.e., we have
θ1 <
p1 + r1 − uf1
p1 + r1 − c1
(5.82)
and qf∗2 = 0. We then show that it yields
max{θ1, 1− π10} <
p1 + r1 − uf1
p1 + r1 − c1
, (5.83)
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which is a contradiction with the condition given in (5.24) that for both j = 1, 2 :
max {θj, 1− πj0} ≥
pj+rj−ufj
pj+rj−cj . To show that we get (5.83), note that using (5.82), we
just need to show that we get
1− π10 <
p1 + r1 − ufj
p1 + r1 − c1
(5.84)





j − (1− π
j
0)c
j)x for x ∈ [0,∞) denote the true value of the
flexible supplier with respect to product j if the firm orders x units of product j from
the flexible supplier. Now, consider the fact that
∂(V fj )
∂x









) = −πj0 (hj + pj + rj)fj(x) ≤ 0 . Hence, V
f
j (·) defined above is concave
and the first order condition yields











pj + rj + hj
)).
Now, since θ1 < 1− π10, we have






pj + rj + hj
<




pj + rj + hj
≤ Fj(qf∗j ).


























),+∞), V fj (x) is
strictly decreasing in this interval. Hence, considering the initial assumptions that
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V f > 0 and qf∗2 = 0 we have
0 < V f = V f1 (q
f∗















pj + rj + hj
)) + 0.
Now because V f1 (0) = 0 and Fj(·) is non-decreasing and Fj(x) > 0 for all x > 0, the
above condition yields






pj + rj + hj
> 0,
which is equivalent to (5.84), which in turn implies (5.83). But this is a contradiction
and hence the proof is complete. 




if εj > 0 and ∂(V
f )
∂εj
≥ 0 otherwise. To show this note that by Lemma (5) we have





















pj + rj + hj
]+). (5.85)





(pj + rj + hj)(π0 − εj)2fj(qf∗j )
≤ 0 (5.86)
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is not negative if εj ≥ 0 and is not positive if εj ≤ 0. Hence, using inequality (5.86)
and Eq. (5.87), the proof is complete. 
Proof of Lemma 6: If the firm knows that dedicated supplier j is up, it would
not reserve the flexible supplier’s capacity for product j and would just order from
dedicated supplier j because this supplier is cheaper than the flexible one. The
optimal ordering quantity of this product in this case can be determined using a
simple single source newsvendor problem. This quantity is the same as total optimal
ordering quantity for product j in the general no-information case, i.e., qf∗j +q
j∗ where





1∗, q2∗, qf∗1 , q
f∗
2 , Q̄



















Then, simplification results in Eq. (5.27). To derive V 0
j
, note that if the firm knows
that dedicated supplier j is in the down state (i.e., is disrupted), it procures only from
the flexible supplier (for product j) and will solve a single source newsvendor problem











). Then, using Eq. (5.25) and simplification





of information on the threat level of dedicated supplier j (V Ij) can be obtained using
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its definition (i.e., V Ij = (1 − πj0)V +
j
+ πj0 V
0j). Using this and simplification then
results in Eq. (5.29) and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Proposition 12: From Lemmas 5 and 6 (and after simplification) we have:




















pj + rj − ufj
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pj + rj − ufj



































Proof of Proposition 13: To show the first part, it is sufficient to show that for
both j = 1, 2: ∂(V I)
∂εj
≤ 0 if εj < 0 and ∂(V I)
∂εj

















pj + rj + hj
]+). (5.88)





(pj + rj + hj)(π0 − εj)2fj(qf∗j )
≤ 0, (5.89)
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since ufj ≥ cj for both j = 1, 2. Therefore, to show the result, it is sufficient to show
that ∂(V I)
∂qf∗j
≤ 0 if εj > 0 and ∂(V I)
∂qf∗j
≥ 0 if εj < 0. But from Lemma 3 we have








pj + rj − ufj
pj + rj + hj
))−ufjF−1j (
pj + rj − ufj
pj + rj + hj
)]
(5.90)
and V I =
∑2
j=1 V I




= [(hj + pj + rj)Fj(q
f∗
j )− pj − rj].
Hence, using Eq. (5.90) and replacing qf∗j from Eq. (5.88) in addition to replacing π
j
0







Therefore, since ufj ≥ cj and θj < 1 for both j = 1, 2, we have
∂(V I)
∂qf∗j
≤ 0 if εj > 0 and
∂(V I)
∂qf∗j
≥ 0 if εj < 0 for both j = 1, 2. Hence, the proof of the first part is complete.
To show the second part (i.e., to show that V I(·, ·) is non-decreasing in yj = |εj| for






. Thus, to show ∂(V I)
∂yj
≥ 0, it is sufficient
to show that (for both j = 1, 2) ∂(V I)
∂εj
≤ 0 if εj < 0 and ∂(V I)
∂εj
≥ 0 if εj > 0, which is
shown above. 
5.9 Appendix B: Parameter Settings
The different parameter settings considered to illustrate the different behaviors,
results, and insights in the two Studies of Appendix C are as follow. In Table 5.4,
setting 2 represent a case with much higher marginal revenues for the products than
setting 1. Setting 3 includes changes in other parameters which result in different
critical ratios.
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Table 5.4: Suite of Parameter Settings in Studies 4 and 5.
Setting No. uf1 = u
f





1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.15 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.12 3.5
2 4.0
1 5.5 15.0 0.5 0.15 3.0
2 4.0 20.0 0.7 0.12 3.5
3 4.0
1 5.0 8.0 0.5 0.08 3.0
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.03 3.5
The parameter settings considered for Study 1 is as follows. The first four settings
are identical except for the reliability beliefs. The other settings include variations
on other parameters as well.
Table 5.5: Suite of Parameter Settings in Study 1.
Setting No. uf j pj rj hj θ
j cj
1 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.80 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.80 3.5
2 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.85 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.90 3.5
3 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.90 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.85 3.5
4 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.95 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.95 3.5
5 4.0
1 5.5 15.0 0.5 0.85 3.0
2 4.0 20.0 0.7 0.90 3.5
6 4.2
1 5.0 8.0 0.5 0.85 4.0
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.90 4.0
7 4.5
1 7.0 8.0 0.9 0.95 3.8
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.90 3.5
8 5.0
1 7.0 8.0 0.9 0.85 3.8
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.85 3.5
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5.10 Appendix C: Optimal Capacity Reservation
Levels in Study 1




the random variable denoting the one period cost of the firm if it reserves flexible
backup capacity Q̄f and orders qj (j = 1, 2) units from the dedicated supplier j and
qfj (j = 1, 2) units from the flexible backup supplier for product j. Then, if we let
ij ∈ {0,+} denote the current state of the supplier j, where ij = 0 if supplier j is
down and ij = + otherwise, we have: ED2ED1 [C̃(q









j + 1 (ij 6=0)(c
jqj +Gj(q
j + qfj )) + 1 (ij = 0)Gj(q
f
j )], (5.91)
where Gj(·) is defined in (5.2). Hence, the expected cost as perceived by the firm is:
CP (q
1, q2, qf1 , q
f
2 , Q̄
f ) = Ei2Ei1ED2ED1 [C̃(q











j + qfj ))
+ (1− θj)Gj(qfj )], (5.92)
where the subscript P on C(·) describes that it is the perceived (and not the true)
value.
The problem for the firm then is to optimize the ordering and contracting decisions














2 ≤ Q̄f (5.94)
qj, qfj ≥ 0 (j = 1, 2). (5.95)
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Moreover, using Eq. (5.91), the true expected cost of the firm based on any given
ordering and contracting decisions can be computed using the true reliabilities as:
CT (q
1, q2, qf1 , q
f
2 , Q̄















Note that while the firm’s decisions are based on its perceived reliabilities, the true
cost defined in (5.96) depends both on the perceived and true reliabilities. In fact,
we need to solve model (5.93)-(5.95) to derive the firm’s optimal perceived decisions
and implement them in Eq. (5.96) to determine the associated true total cost.
To solve our nonlinear model (5.93)-(5.95), we first need the following lemma.
Lemma 7 The objective function CP (q
1, q2, qf1 , q
f
2 , Q̄
f ) is jointly convex in its vari-
ables. Moreover, with θj ∈ (0, 1) (j = 1, 2) and uf 6= 0, the convexity is strict.
Proof of Lemma 7: To show convexity, we need to show that the Hessian matrix
(H) of the function CP (·) is positive semi-definite. Using Leibniz rule, G′j(x) =
(hj + pj + rj)F (x)− (rj + pj) and G′′j (x) = (hj + pj + rj) f(x). Therefore, the Hessian
matrix can be written as
H =

a1 0 a1 0 0
0 a2 0 a2 0
a1 0 b1 0 0
0 a2 0 b2 0
0 0 0 0 uf

,
where aj = θ
j (hj + pj + rj) fj(q
j + qfj ) and bj = a
j + (1− θj) f(qfj ) (j = 1, 2). Next,





(h1 + p1 + r1)
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(h1 + p1 + r1)
[














(h2 + p2 + r2)
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(h2 + p2 + r2)
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Now notice that since (1) fj(·) is a probability density function, (2) θj ∈ [0, 1],
and (3) rj, pj, hj, u
f ∈ [0,+∞), all the above eigenvalues are nonnegative. Therefore
H is positive semi-definite and hence CP (·) is jointly convex. Moreover, if θj 6= 0, 1
and uf 6= 0, all the eigenvalues are positive; hence, H is positive definite. Thus, with
θj 6= 0, 1 and uf 6= 0, CP (·) is also strictly convex. 
Study 4 Consider a firm facing two Normally (and independently) distributed de-
mands for its products. Particularly, let D1 and D2 respectively follow N(5000, 1200
2)
and N(3000, 8002), where N(µ, σ2) denotes a Normal distribution with mean µ and
a standard deviation of σ. To illustrate different cases, we consider three sets of dif-
ferent parameter settings presented in Table 5.4 in Appendix B. Fig. 2 depicts the
corresponding Improvement Percentages (IP’s) in the firm’s true expected costs due
to contracting with the flexible supplier versus its reliability belief error Υ = (ε1, ε2).
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We denote by IP(F )% the cost improvement percentage due to the existence of the
flexible backup supplier: IP(F )% =
V f
|CT (q′1∗,q′2∗,0,0,0)|
× 100. Note that IP(F )% > 0
implies that contracting is profitable and IP(F )% ≤ 0 indicates a non-profitable con-
tracting situation. The former case can be seen in parts (a) and (b), and the latter
can be seen in part (c) of Fig. 2. The corresponding capacity reservation levels for
each parameter setting are depicted in Fig. 1.C (in Appendix C). As one specific
example, a firm with parameter setting 1 (see Table 5.4 in Appendix B) and with a
reliability belief of Θ = (0.8, 0.9) (i.e., with belief error Υ = (−0.05,+0.02) based on
π1 and π2 presented in Table 5.4) will form a contract and reserve a capacity level
of Q̄f
∗
= 6238.9 units. Based on this decision, the firm would be able to reduce its
expected total true costs by IP(F )% = 29.5%. However, as can be seen in Fig. 2 part
(a), if this firm has large errors in its reliability belief, it will not be able to greatly
reduce its costs by contracting with the flexible backup supplier. (For instance, IP(F )
is less than 1% with Υ ≈ (−0.8,−0.8).) However, a firm with parameter setting 2 and
with the same reliability belief (Θ = (0.8, 0.9)) will reserve a capacity of Q̄f
∗
= 8945.5
units and will be able to reduce its expected total true costs by IP(F )% = 14.6%. Al-
though the percentage benefit for this firm is less than the first one, even with large
errors in its reliability belief (e.g. with Υ ≈ (−0.8,−0.8)), as can be seen in Fig.
2 part (b), it will still be able to reduce its true expected costs approximately by
14%. In other words, accuracy in estimating the dedicated suppliers’ reliabilities is
critical for the former firm, but not for the latter (see also Study 4 for more details).
This is due to the high profit margins in setting 2 which makes a secondary backup
flexible supplier still highly valuable, even with large errors in belief. This results in
Observation 10 presented in the main body of the chapter.
Study 5 Consider a firm facing two Normally distributed demands for its prod-
ucts as discussed in Study 4. Let IP(I)% denote the Improvement Percentage (IP)
in the firm’s expected true costs due to obtaining information about disruption


























































Figure 5.2: The Value of a Flexible Backup Supplier (IP(F )%) in Settings 1-3 for







×100, where CT (q1∗, q2∗, qf∗1 , q
f∗
2 , Q̄
f∗) is the firm’s expected true
cost under its perceived optimal decisions before obtaining information. Fig. 3 illus-
trates different values of IP(I)% for the parameter settings 1-3 (presented in Table 5.4
in Appendix B) versus the errors in the firm’s reliability belief. As some particular
examples, considering the cases discussed in Study 4. A firm with parameter setting 1
and with a reliability belief vector of Θ = (0.8, 0.9) (Υ = (−0.05,+0.02)) can greatly
reduce its true costs by IP(I)% = 148.9%, if it obtains full-information about its un-
reliable suppliers’ disruption risk. However, a firm with parameter setting 2 and with
same belief (and same error as the previous firm) Θ = (0.8, 0.9) (Υ = (−0.05,+0.02))
can only reduce its cost by IP(I)% = 6.9%. Finally, a firm with parameter setting























































Figure 5.3: The Value of Information (IP(I)%) for Different Values of Firm’s Relia-
bility Belief Error (ε1, ε2).
by an amount equal to IP(I)% = 19.2% of its current (no-information) true cost.
Therefore, if this latter firm is risk-neutral and if establishing a system to obtain such
information adds its costs by 10%, it should choose to establish such a system and
hence reduce its true expected total cost by 9.2%.
This study reveals additional interesting insights. First, notice that the informa-
tion is much more valuable in setting 1 than setting 2. Since setting 1 represents
lower profit margins than setting 2, this suggests Observation 11 presented in the
main-body of the chapter.
This observation is consistent with what we observed in Study 4 and can be
explained as follows. When profit margins are tight, overinvesting in the expensive
secondary supplier (resulting from underestimating the reliabilities) is very costly,
and cannot be justified by the profit obtained from higher potential sales in the
case of a disruption. On the other hand, underinvesting in the flexible resource
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(resulting from overestimating the reliabilities) is more harmful in the case of high
profit margins than low ones only when a disruption actually occurs and because
of the lost sales. However, the probability of facing a disruption is low. Thus, in
expectation, underinvesting is also percentage-wise more costly when profit margins
are low than when they are high.
Second, as can be seen in Fig. 3, when a firm is overestimating the reliability of its
primary supplier (i.e., when εj > 0), the value of information is much more sensitive
to belief errors than the case of underestimating. This results in Observation 12
presented in the main body of the chapter.
Notice that when a firm overestimates the reliability of its suppliers, it invests
less in the secondary flexible backup capacity. In such a situation, with a little
better estimation (less error), the firm will invest a little more in the backup capacity.
Although the change in investment is relatively small, the cost benefit is large since
the backup capacity can work as an insurance in the event of pernicious disruptions.
5.11 Appendix D: Further Results on the Two-
Product Setting with Recourse
In this appendix, we derive the optimal ordering behavior of the firm (under the
two-product setting with recourse) in Stage 2 for the case where cfj > c
j for both
j = 1, 2. Note that the analysis in this case is much simpler than the case cfj ≤ cj
provided in the main body of this chapter.
We start with the case where the firm observes both unreliable suppliers to be up.
Proposition 14 (Both Suppliers up) Given any reserved flexible backup capacity
of Q̄f , when cfj > c





unreliable suppliers are observed to be up.
When the firm only observes one of the unreliable suppliers to be up, the optimal
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ordering policy is as follows.
Proposition 15 (One Supplier up) Let m ∈ {1, 2} denote the dedicated supplier
that is observed to be up, and n = 3 − m be the disrupted supplier. Given a re-
served flexible backup capacity of Q̄f , when cfj > c









When the firm observes both unreliable suppliers to be disrupted, the ordering
policy is the same as Theorem 9. From these results we have the following:
Observation 18 Unlike the case studied in the main body, when cfj ≥ cj, rationing
the limited backup capacity only occurs when both unreliable suppliers are observed
to be down.
Proof of Proposition 14: Please note that, as before, the KKT conditions are nec-
essary and sufficient to characterize the optimal solution. Moreover, the KKT condi-
tions are the same as those in the proof of Theorem 7:
qf1 + q
f
2 ≤ Q̄f (5.97)
cj − λj = µ− λfj + c
f
j (j = 1, 2) (5.98)
qj + qfj = F
−1
j (
pj + rj − (cj − λj)
pj + rj + hj
) (j = 1, 2) (5.99)
µ(qf1 + q
f
2 − Q̄f ) = 0 (5.100)
λjqj = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.101)
λfj q
f
j = 0 (j = 1, 2) (5.102)
qj, qfj , µ, λ
j, λfj ≥ 0. (j = 1, 2) (5.103)
Observe that setting λj = 0, µ = 0, λfj = c
f
j − cj, q
f∗





satisfy the above KKT conditions. 
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Proof of Proposition 15: Note that the KKT conditions for this case are the same
as those in the proof of Theorem 8:
qf1 + q
f
2 ≤ Q̄f (5.104)
cm − λm = µ− λfm + cfm (5.105)
qm + qfm = F
−1
m (
pm + rm − (µ− λfm + cfm)





pn + rn − (µ− λfn + cfn)
pn + rn + hn
) (5.107)
λmqm = 0 (5.108)
λfmq
f
m = 0 (5.109)
λfnq
f






n ≥ 0. (5.111)








Q̄f . Next, observe that setting λfm = µ + c
f





)}, qf∗m = 0, and qm∗ = F−1(
pj+rj−cm
pj+rj+hj
) satisfy the KKT con-
ditions, which are sufficient and necessary to characterize the optimal solution. 
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CHAPTER 6
Supply Chain Disruption Risk Management:
Dynamic Analyses
6.1 Introduction
We have observed many pernicious supply disruptions occurring in different in-
dustries in recent years. Perhaps the most recent one is the 2011 earthquake and
tsunami in Japan that affected virtually all of the automakers in the world. Learn-
ing from such events, companies try to adopt better strategies for disruption risk
mitigation. One obvious strategy is to have backup suppliers for different products.
For instance, according to Reuters, after the recent 2011 disaster in Japan, Toyota
is taking several steps to reduce its exposure to such disasters, and the first one is
to make sure that the items have backup suppliers ([89]). This can be achieved for
instance by standardizing parts across suppliers and users or by establishing backup
supplier/manufacuturing capacities. Another recent example of establishing backup
capacities can be seen in the case of disruption in the German company, Merck, that
produces 100% of supply of a pearl-luster pigment called Xirallic ([37]). According
to Wall Street Journal, the production plant located at the northeastern Japan was
hit hard by the March 2011 quake and caused problems for many of the auto makers
([37]). Learning from the disaster, the company is now setting up a second production
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line in Germany ([37]).
A second rather obvious mechanism to implement is to carry more inventory so
that disruptions do not raise havoc in the supply chain. As an example, a second step
taken by Toyota after the recent 2011 earthquake in Japan, according to Reuters,
is to ask suppliers to hold extra inventory ([89]). Another example of the use of
this strategy can be seen in the case of Johnson & Johnson that provides medical
supplies for the Pentagon. Since the Pentagon knows that in the case of a war or a
major disaster it will require huge amounts of medical supplies, Johnson & Johnson
is under contract by the U.S. government to maintain certain inventory levels of
medical supplies ([129]). Carrying inventory, however, can be very costly for firms,
and is commonly thought to violate the principles of lean production.
A third mechanism that can substitute stockpiling inventory or establishing sepa-
rate backup capacities for each of the products is to inject flexibility into the backup
system (see, e.g., [122]). The benefit of flexibility in the backup system can be ob-
served from the case of the disruption in the Toyota supply chain in 1997 when a
fire at the Aisin Seiki Co. destroyed most of the capacity to manufacture P-valves.
According to the Wall Street Journal, Toyota officials called different suppliers to
obtain P-valves, including Somic ([115]). Somic did not have any contract to allocate
part of its production capacity to produce P-valves, but it did have the flexibility to
do so. It flexed its production line to make P-valves and it delivered its first P-valves
to Toyota right on time ([115]).
A forth mechanism that is used in practice is to monitor suppliers in an effort to
create visibility by obtaining some information about the progression of disruption
risk over time. An example of using this mechanism is the practice of the Critical
Material Council (CMC) that monitors the semiconductor material supply chain. It
watches the shifting patterns in capital expenditures and R&D investments and look
for potential shortages in supply ([129]). It provides a venue of information sharing
between material suppliers and material customers, and develops alternative sources
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of supply when there is a potential for a disruption.
Disruption risk information can be obtained in several different ways. For instance,
Open Rating is a leading provider of supply risk management solutions that enables
firms to collect disruption risk information and adopt suitable actions. The benefit
of monitoring suppliers and obtaining disruption risk information can be understood
from the disruption case in Boeing’s inflexible supply chain in 2007. Advanced Inte-
gration Technology (AIT) faced a disruption and fell behind supplying parts needed
to assemble Boeing’s 787 (Dreamliner). Evidence showed that AIT had been facing
serious production problems in the year before (see, for instance, [55]), and if Boe-
ing had carefully monitored AIT, it might have made better procurement decisions
([122]).
In this chapter, we consider a firm that procures from several suppliers, and study
the above mentioned practices in mitigating disruption risks. We provide insights
into the effectiveness of such mechanisms as well as their interplay. For realism, we
allow for disruption risks to dynamically change over time. We model dynamics of
disruption risks as a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) with several threat levels
indicating the “health level” of suppliers. As an example, the S&P credit risk rat-
ing system with states {1=AAA, 2=AA, 3=A, 4=BBB, 5=B/BB, 6=CCC/CC/C}
∪ {0 = Default} is an analogous system for which Markov chain modeling is com-
monly used. These threat levels may also represent weather forecasts, potential eco-
nomical sanctions, security levels, etc. It is noteworthy that our Markov model is
a step forward from the prevalent assumption of i.i.d. Bernoulli disruptions in the
literature which does not model the effect of the length of a disruption.
We consider a firm that procures several products from unreliable suppliers, and
first analyze the case in which the firm can perfectly monitor its suppliers, i.e., a case of
full-information on disruption threat levels. We show how to quantify and optimize
several interrelated policy issues: an upfront investment level in a flexible backup
capacity, dynamic ordering from different suppliers considering their disruption threat
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levels, and carrying inventory of different products (over time). We next consider the
case in which the firm cannot effectively monitor its unreliable suppliers, and hence,
does not have information on their disruption risk levels. By differentiating between
the firm’s perception and reality, we generate several insights for firms that suffer
from lack of disruption risk information (disruption visibility) in their supply system.
Furthermore, comparing scenarios with and without disruption risk information, we
quantify the value of monitoring suppliers. We also consider the value of flexibility
in the backup system in the sense of using a single flexible backup supplier instead
of multiple dedicated backup ones. Our study results in several insights for both
researchers and practitioners that we summarize in Section 6.5.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We review the literature
in the next section, then in Section 6.3 we describe our model. Section 6.4 presents
our analyses under two cases of information availability, and provides several insights
into the value of different disruption risk mitigation mechanisms. Finally, Section 6.5
summarizes the insights gained and concludes.
6.2 The Literature
The awareness of the damage done by disruptions has motivated an increasing
number of papers that study different mechanisms to mitigate disruption risks. Dis-
ruption risks can be modeled as either static (e.g. single-shot or repeated settings) or
dynamic events, and can be classified in eight categories: dynamic or static random
disruptions (i.e., all-or-nothing), dynamic or static random yield, dynamic or static
random capacity, and dynamic or static financial default. In this chapter, we consider
the first category, i.e., dynamic random disruptions.
For studies that consider the case of random disruptions, we refer interested read-
ers to [113], [58], [108] and [38] [145], [13], [122], and the references therein. Studies
that consider the case of random yield include [48], [10], [1], [140], [59], [43], [32],
265
and [23], and a review can be found in [41]. For the stream of research that deals
with random capacity in the supply system, we refer readers to studies such as [27],
[24], [20], and the references therein. Examples of modeling disruptions as financial
defaults can be found in [14], [13], and [141]. Finally, some studies including [158]
consider the effect of allowing for a few of the above-mentioned types of disruptions.
While in reality most disruption risks evolve dynamically over time, most of the
above-mentioned studies have focused on the static disruption cases. However, there
are a few studies in the literature that consider dynamics of disruptions. Authors of
[146], for instance, develop multi-period models with dynamic disruptions in which
the firm has a single unreliable supplier, as well as models in which a second, per-
fectly reliable supplier is available. In addition to such studies, the inventory control
literature with Markovian supply availability is also relevant to our study, although
it usually studies single-sourcing settings without any supply flexibility. Within this
literature, [133] presents a fundamental and excellent study with periodic review in-
ventory control where information about the evolution of the supply system is modeled
as a Markov chain. [112] addresses a periodic-review setting with setup costs, where
the probability that an order placed now is filled in full depends on whether supply
was available in the previous period . We contribute a new perspective by modeling
both complete and incomplete information about the dynamic disruption process,
and by allowing for flexibility in the backup system. We compare scenarios with and
without disruption state information to obtain the value of monitoring suppliers. We
also capture the value of flexibility, and its interactions with information.
Some part of the literature models disruptions as static events, including multi-
period models but with repeated disruptions. [144] uses a Bayesian approach for
supply learning (i.e., reliability-forecast updating) with i.i.d. Bernoulli disruptions
and characterizes the firm’s optimal sourcing and inventory decisions. [10] studies
a finite-horizon, discrete-time, i.i.d. stochastic continuous demand model in which
there are two zero lead time random-yield suppliers.
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The literature on supply-disruption research can also be viewed from the perspec-
tive of single versus multi-supplier models. Single supplier studies include [104], [19],
[111], [112], [57], [133], [107], [110], [108], and [38]. Multi supplier studies can be
found in [10], [113],[58], [14], [13], [144], [146], [32], [158], and [122]. In this chapter,
we allow for an arbitrary number of products/suppliers to generate insights for firms
that procure several items from various unreliable supplier.
In addition to considering a multi-period dynamic disruption model with arbitrary
number of suppliers, another distinct feature of our modeling framework is that we
allow for product mix flexibility in the backup system, and study how such flexibility
can be used to mitigate disruptions. Reviews of flexibility can be found in studies such
as [128], [49], and [139]. Operational mix flexibility has been studied in papers such as
[46], [85], [154], [93], [53], [147], [82], and [122]. Our study contributes to this literature
by considering the value of a flexible backup supplier/resource to compensate for
unreliability of dedicated suppliers, particularly in the more complex dynamic setting.
Roughly similar contributions in the context of control of flexible queueing networks
can be found in [6] and [124].
6.3 The Model
Consider a firm that produces/sells n = |N | types of products (where N =
{1, 2, · · · , n} denotes the set of underlying products) and has n dedicated unreli-
able suppliers, each capable of supplying an important component (or raw material)
for one of the products. We assume the production and inventory levels are continu-
ous. Denote the dedicated supplier of raw material of product j ∈ N as supplier j.
To insure the supply stream against future disruptions, the firm can also establish (or
contract with) a flexible backup resource, namely f , at a limited capacity Q̄f ∈ (0,∞)
that can produce quantities of underlying products, the sum of which cannot exceed
Q̄f . Establishing such a capacity, however, is costly. Let g(uf , Q̄f ) denote the invest-
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ment cost at the flexible backup capacity, which depends on the capacity level Q̄f as
well as the “per unit” investment cost uf . We allow for a general class of investment
costs represented through the cost function g(uf , Q̄f ). However, to represent a “well-
behaved” investment cost function, we assume g : R2+ → R+ is continuous, increasing
in uf with g(0, ·) = 0, increasing convex in capacity Q̄f with g(·, 0) = 0, and super-
modular (twice differentiable with positive cross partials). We note that a special
case of this type of investment is that of reserving some backup capacity through a
capacity reservation contract (also known as an option contract), where paying an
up-front cost of g(uf , Q̄f ) = ufQ̄f will let the firm to reserve a backup capacity of Q̄f
units. This type of contract is prevalent in many industries including semiconductors,
consumer electronics, telecommunications, and pharmaceutical (where the demand is
highly volatile and difficult to forecast), automakers, textile and garment industry
(for more details on this contract see [127], [122], and the references therein). For
convenience, we use subscripts for products, superscripts for suppliers, and employ
the following notation, where each variable is in [0,∞):
hj : Holding cost per unit of product j per period; (j ∈ N)
pj : backorder penalty cost per unit of unmet demand of product j; (j ∈ N)
cj : Per unit purchasing cost of product j from dedicated supplier j; (j ∈ N)
cfj : Per unit purchasing cost of product j from the flexible backup supplier;(j ∈ N)
uf : Per unit capacity reservation cost of the flexible backup supplier;
qj : Order quantity from dedicated/primary supplier j; (j ∈ N)
qfj : Order quantity from flexible backup supplier for product j; (j ∈ N)
Q̄f : Reserved capacity from flexible backup supplier.
Fig. 6.3 depicts the two-echelon supply chain model under consideration. The firm
operates a periodic-review inventory system where unmet demand is backlogged, and
it has to pay the purchasing cost cj and cfj per order of product j ∈ N delivered by
dedicated (and unreliable) supplier j and the flexible backup resource, respectively.
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Figure 6.1: The general model under consideration.




j ≤ Q̄f , when it is
established (or contracted) at a capacity level of Q̄f . To match reality and eliminate
trivial cases, we shall assume none of the products in set N can be procured for free;
cfj + u
f > 0 and cj > 0 for j ∈ N .
For j ∈ N , let Lj(x) = hj[x]+ + pj[−x]+ and define the expected one-stage cost
Gj(x) = EDj [Lj(x−Dj)] = hj
∫ x
−∞
(x− ξ)dFj(ξ) + pj
∫ ∞
x
(ξ − x)dFj(ξ), (6.1)
where [x]+ = max {0, x}, and Fj(·) is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f) of
the demand for product j, Dj. We assume that demands for each product j across
periods are i.i.d. random variables, and further, Dj and Dj′ are independent (for all
j, j′ ∈ N s.t. j 6= j′). For the most part of the chapter, we consider the case where
unmet demand in a period is backlogged. However, we will also investigate a closely
related model in the numerical analyses (at the end of Section 6.4) where we assume
unmet demand is lost. The above model with backordering and penalties for such is
very similar conceptually to one with lost sales and a revenue per unit sold. While
they are different in the precise details of the inventory policies, for the purposes of
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our study, they are not much different with respect to the themes of the value of
information and backup supplier flexibility. The backordering formulation is superior
for analysis. On the other hand, the smaller state space of the lost sales model makes
it more tractable for numerical experiments so we use it for that purpose. However,
it should be noted that the computational methodology we develop does not differ
significantly between the two.
We model the disruption risk processes of the dedicated suppliers via a discrete
time Markov process. Let sj denote the threat level of dedicated supplier j (as an
indicator of its health), where sj = 0 means dedicated supplier j is in the down
(default) state and sj = k > 0 denotes that it is in threat level k. We assume that the
dynamics of disruptions can be modeled as a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC)
with state space Sj = {0, 1, . . . , kj} for dedicated supplier j. Let Wj = [wjlm] denote
the transition probability matrix of DTMC of supplier j, where wjlm is the probability
that it will be in risk level m in the next period given that the current risk level is
l. The set W = {Wj, j ∈ N} completely describes the dynamics of disruptions of
unreliable suppliers. For every j ∈ N , we assume wjk0 < w
j
k′0 for every 0 < k < k
′
in Sj (i.e., the higher the threat level, the higher the risk of disruption). We assume
every element of W is aperiodic and irreducible. Thus the underlying DTMC’s are
all ergodic and have a steady state distribution which for supplier j we denote by
the vector πj = (πj0, π
j
1, . . . , π
j
kj
). Hence, πj0 is the long-run disruption probability of
dedicated supplier j and (1− πj0) is its reliability: the long-run fraction of time that
it is not disrupted. When the information on the threat levels are not perfect, we
denote the firm’s (steady-state) reliability perception error about unreliable supplier
j by εj, and let Υ = (εj, j ∈ N) denote the vector of reliability perception errors.
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6.4 Analyses
As discussed in the Introduction, one way to mitigate the risk of supply disruptions
is to carry inventory over time. This practice is, however, costly. Hence, there is a
trade-off for a firm between investing in a backup supplier and carrying inventory.
Also, disruption risk of a supplier may change over time. Moreover, firms in practice
pay attention to the length of a disruption (in addition to its probability of occurring).
These latter observations highlight the need to carefully develop a dynamic setting.
Such observations cannot be captured even if one models disruptions as i.i.d. Bernoulli
variables (which is prevalent in literature).
We contribute a modeling and analysis framework in which disruption risk levels
may change dynamically over time. We assume that the firm has an option to establish
(or reserve) a backup flexible capacity at time 0 to insure the supply stream against
future disruptions. The firm then exercises a periodic review inventory control in
every future period during which it can procure either from the primary suppliers
or from the reserved secondary flexible capacity. Unmet demand is backordered and
supply lead times and production cycles are negligible in comparison with the review
period. We assume the following order of events within each review period: (1) The
firm observes the state of the system subject to an information constraint. (2) The
firm decides the order sizes and orders from all suppliers subject to the contracts.
(3) Product demands are realized. (4) Holding cost or shortage cost accrue. (5) The
state of the system is updated, including the inventory and disruption risk levels.
In this setting, we capture the value of the flexible supplier and consider different
scenarios of information availability, where the disruption risk levels of suppliers may
or may not be observable by the firm. Comparing these scenarios reveals the value
of disruption risk information for the firm.
Let the vector x(t) = (xj(t) : j ∈ N) denote the inventory on hand of the
underlying products at period t. Also, let q(t) = (qj(t) : j ∈ N) and qf (t) = (qfj (t) :
j ∈ N), respectively, denote the vectors of order sizes from the primary suppliers and
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the flexible supplier at period t. Additionally, let β ∈ (0, 1) be the discount factor
and s(t) = (sj(t) : j ∈ N, sj(t) ∈ Sj) denote the state of disruption risk levels of the
dedicated suppliers at period t. In practice, risk levels of unreliable suppliers are less
than perfectly assessable by firms (i.e., the vector s(t) may not be observable for a
firm). Obtaining such information requires a careful monitoring of suppliers. Key
questions include the value of information, the value of a flexible backup supplier,
and the interplay between flexibility and information. To answer such questions, we
first analyze and discuss the full-information scenario where the vector of disruption
threat levels, s(t) (for t = 1, 2, ...) is observable (and assessable) for the firm. Then
we consider the case where this vector is not observable and develop a Partially
Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). Comparing these scenarios reveals
the benefit of monitoring unreliable suppliers.
6.4.1 Full Information on Disruption Risk Levels
Let J̃(x(0), s(0)) denote the optimal expected infinite-horizon discounted cost of
the firm (including the investment cost at period t = 0) if the initial disruption risk
levels are s(0) and the firm starts with an inventory on-hand vector of x(0). This
value can be computed by the following program:
J̃(x(0), s(0)) = min
Q̄f∈R+
g(uf , Q̄f ) + JQ̄f (x(0), s(0)), (6.2)
where JQ̄f : Rn × (Πj∈NSj) → R+ is the optimal infinite-horizon discounted cost
of the firm given the established capacity Q̄f . JQ̄f (·, ·) can be computed using the
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where the inventory transition rule from x(t) to x(t+ 1) is:
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + qf (t) + (1 {s1(t)≥0}, 1 {s2(t)≥0}, · · · , 1 {sn(t)≥0}).q(t)− d(t), (6.4)
and threat level transitions from s(t) to s(t+1) are defined through Markov processes
governed by set of t.p.m’s W .
Now, solving program (6.2)-(6.3) derives the firm’s optimal expected infinite-
horizon discounted cost as well as its optimal investment level under full-information.
This in turn yields a measure for the true value of the flexible backup resource under
full-information:
∆f (x(0), s(0)) = J0(x(0), s(0))− J̃(x(0), s(0)).
For instance, ∆f (x(0) = 01×n, s(0) = 11×n) provides a good measure for investigating
the value of the backup resource by setting all initial inventory levels to zero and
placing all suppliers in their most reliable state.
We start our investigations by answering the following questions.
Question 9 How should firms update their inventory level safeguards to effectively
mitigate against dynamic risks of disruption?
We notice that even without the unreliable suppliers and partial information, the
problem of managing inventories with the existence of a shared limited capacity is
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known to be difficult (see, e.g., [38]). The answer to the above question is hard in gen-
eral; however, we are able to show that under some conditions a simple state-dependent
base-stock policy is optimal. That is, the firm should set inventory safeguards for each
of the products, where the inventory safeguard of product j depends on the state
of the unreliable supplier of this product. Furthermore, under some conditions, for
each product (a) the safeguard is independent of the threat levels of suppliers of
other products, (b) in each period, the firm should reach the inventory safeguard
either through the primary unreliable supplier or through the backup capacity, but
not both (a single-sourcing strategy at any given period), and (c) the firm should
implement higher safeguards when the unreliable supplier is in a higher threat level,
assuming the process governing disruptions is monotone as formalized below.
To define a monotone disruption process, we first need the following definition.
Definition 4 (Stochastically Monotone DTMC, Daley [36]) A DTMC
{Xn, n = 0, 1, · · · } is defined to be stochastically monotone when its one-step transi-
tion probability function Pr{Xn+1 ≤ y|Xn = x} is non-increasing in x for every fixed
y.
We next consider a relabeling of states so that the disruption state, state 0, of
a k-level threat system is considered to be state k+1. Specifically, for the DTMC
{sjn, n = 0, 1, · · · } defined on space Sj = {0, 1, . . . , kj}, consider the relabeled DTMC
{s̃jn, n = 0, 1, · · · } defined on space S̃j = {1, . . . , kj, kj + 1}, where s̃jn = sj1 (sj>0) +
(kj + 1)1 (sj=0). We denote the relabeled version of the t.p.m. W
j = [wjlm] by W̃
j =
[w̃jlm]. Finally, using the above definition, we say that the relabeled DTMC governed
by W̃j is stochastically monotone if Pr{s̃jn+1 ≤ y|s̃jn = x} is non-increasing in x for
every fixed y.
Theorem 15 (State-Dependent Base-Stock Policy) Suppose the demand ran-
dom variables are non-negative integers. There exists double thresholds uf and ūf on
the backup capacity investment fee, uf , such that if uf ≤ uf or uf ≥ ūf , then for each
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product:
(i) A state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal.
(ii) The state-dependent base-stock level of product j ∈ N depends on the threat level
of supplier j, but not other suppliers’ threat levels or other products’ inventory levels.
(iii) A single-sourcing policy is optimal: for each product and in each period, the firm
should procure either from the backup supplier or from the primary supplier, but not
both.
(iv) If W̃j is monotone, the time-stationary but state-dependent base-stock level of
product j is non-decreasing in the threat level of supplier j.
Notice that the above results on the optimality of a state-dependent base-stock
policy may not necessarily hold when uf is in a middle range. This is due to the fact
that the limited backup capacity needs to be rationed among different products, and
the rationing may depend on the threat level of the suppliers.
We next provide insights into the following question.
Question 10 How much capacity in the backup system is enough?
To answer the above question, we consider the objective function of program (6.2)
and establish the following lemma.
Lemma 8 The infinite-horizon cost function (which the backup investment cost),
JQ̄f (x, s), is convex and non-increasing in Q̄
f .
The above lemma enables us to show that the optimal level of the up-front in-
vestment in the backup capacity can be easily computed using only the first order
condition.
Proposition 16 The optimal investment level, Q̄f∗, is the solution to the first-order-
condition: ∂
∂Q̄f
{g(uf , Q̄f ) + JQ̄f (x, s)}|Q̄f∗ = 0
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Notice that JQ̄f (x, s) cannot usually be derived analytically and needs to be nu-
merically computed for different values of investment level, Q̄f , using the Bellman
Eq. (6.3). However, the above result significantly reduces the computational effort
required to find the optimal capacity investment level, Q̄f∗, in program (6.2). After
an appropriate discretization of the possible values of Q̄f , the search can be stopped
the first time the benefit of going to the next investment level is negative, or bisection
search can be used with guaranteed optimality gap.
The next result provides insights into the value of the flexible backup supplier for
environments in which all products are similar with respect to the modeled parameters
(i.e., a fully symmetrical case). Firms that procure relatively more products benefit
more from establishing the backup supplier, but the marginal benefit diminishes as
the number of products increases.
Proposition 17 (Diminishing Rate of Return) The value of the flexible backup
supplier has a diminishing rate of return (increasing concave) in n in the case of
complete symmetry.
We now provide further insights into environments that enhance the value of the
flexible backup supplier.
Question 11 What characteristics of a firm make establishing a flexible backup sys-
tem relatively more valuable?
A partial answer is provided in the following proposition: high procurement costs
from the dedicated/primary suppliers or low procurement costs (variable or fixed/up-
front investment) from the flexible supplier.
Proposition 18 (Backup Flexibility Attractiveness) The investment in the backup
capacity, Q̄f∗, and the value of the backup flexible resource are increasing in vector c,
but decreasing in vector cf and in uf .
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To provide more insights into Question 11, we first need to define the following
notion of reliability dominance.
Definition 5 (Reliability Dominance) We say the t.p.m. set W (weakly) dom-
inates the t.p.m. set W ′ in reliability, and denote it by W ′ ≤R W , if Pr{sj(t) =
0|sj(0)} for all j ∈ N and t ∈ Z+ under W is not greater than that under W ′.
Using this definition, we can show that a firm with less reliable supply system (a)
would optimally establish the backup flexible supplier at a greater (or equal) capacity,
and (b) benefits more from establishing such a backup capacity:
Proposition 19 If W ′ ≤R W , then (i) Q̄f∗W ≤ Q̄
f∗





Furthermore, we can answer the following question:
Question 12 Can establishing a secondary flexible resource be regarded as a mech-
anism to compensate for the risk of disruptions in the primary suppliers?
The following result answers the above question as a qualified yes by showing that
there exists a range of supply reliability improvements over which a greater or equal
benefit can be achieved only by establishing a backup flexible resource (compared to
only improving the reliability).
Proposition 20 Fix all cost parameters and consider a system working under re-
liability governed by W ′ and assume there is no established flexible backup resource.
There exists a capacity establishment level Q̄f , and a redesigned system with improved
reliability W , W ′ ≤R W , such that establishing a backup capacity of Q̄f under the
current system is (weakly) better than the redesigned system which has an improved
reliability but no established backup capacity.
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6.4.2 No Information on Disruption Risk Levels
To model the current lack of visibility in supply chains, we now consider the case
where the firm cannot observe the risk levels of its unreliable suppliers. The firm,
however, may have its own belief. Here, we develop a POMDP to capture the trade-off
between (a) carrying inventory of different products, (b) investing in the secondary
flexible supplier, and (c) obtaining disruption information. Let Θ(t) = (θj(t), j ∈ N)
be the perceived reliability distribution of the firm about its unreliable suppliers’
disruption risk levels at period t, where θj(t) = (θjl (t), l ∈ Sj), and θ
j
l (t) is the
firm’s perceived probability that supplier j is in threat level l at period t satisfying∑
l∈Sj θ
j
l (t) = 1 (∀t ∈ Z+, ∀j ∈ N). Then (x(t),Θ(t)) can be considered as the state
(or information state to be more precise) of the system at time t.
Now, let Ṽ∗(P )(x(0),Θ(0)) represent the optimal expected total infinite-horizon
discounted cost (including contracting at t = 0, inventory, and shortage costs) as
perceived by the firm, if it starts with an inventory vector x(0) and reliability belief
distribution Θ(0). This value can be computed by the following program:
Ṽ∗(P )(x(0),Θ(0)) = min
Q̄f≥0
g(uf , Q̄f ) + V∗(P ) Q̄f (x(0),Θ(0)) , (6.5)
where V∗
(P ) Q̄f
(·, ·) denotes the firm’s perceived expected infinite-horizon discounted
cost given a established capacity of Q̄f at time t = 0. This term (i.e., the second
term in (6.5)) can be obtained using a POMDP model with the following optimality
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where the inventory transition rule is the same as before.
278
In the last term of (6.6), the belief transition rule can be any Markovian updating
rule that models a firm’s behavior in updating its belief. Solving (6.6) can be very
difficult, because the state space (certainly the space of Θ(t)) is continuous. To
provide a general solution method, we present the following result which significantly
facilitates solving program (6.6) when the inventory state space is finite (which is not
very restrictive given that numerical computation requires a finite, possibly truncated
inventory state space anyway).
Proposition 21 (Smallwood and Sondik [131]) If the inventory state space is
finite with elements x1, · · · , xk, define bi = 1 {x=xi}, b = (bi, i = 1, 2, · · · , k) and
extended belief distribution b′ = (b,Θ). Then the value function in (6.6) for all
periods t, when written in terms of b′, is piece-wise linear convex, and hence can be













j) and l ∈ N, where b′i are the elements of b′.
The above result boils the Program (6.5)-(6.6) down to a discrete optimization
setting, allows one to compute costs as perceived by the firm, and provides the firm’s
perceived optimal actions. However, to evaluate the true value of the flexible supplier
and the information, we need to compute the firm’s true cost of these actions. Per-
ception, actions taken based on an imperfect perception, and the true realizations of
Nature must be interwoven to correctly evaluate this. Let Q̄f∗ and Γ∗ respectively
represent the firm’s perceived optimal established capacity level and ordering policy
derived from program (6.5)-(6.6). Then the firm’s true total expected infinite-horizon
discounted cost based on policy Γ∗ and capacity level Q̄f∗ is:
ṼΓ
∗
(T )Q̄f∗(x(0)) = g(u
f , Q̄f∗) + VΓ
∗




(·) defined above is a policy evaluation function based on the
firm’s perceived optimal contracting level (Q̄f∗) and ordering policy Γ∗, which de-




1(t), · · · ,P
j
kj
(t)), where Pjl (t) denotes the true probability that the threat
level of dedicated supplier j is l at period t. Because the disruption risk levels of unreli-
able supplier j (j = 1, 2) follow a Markov chain, P j(t) can be computed using its t-step
transition probability matrix (t.p.m.), denoted by (Wj)t, given the initial risk level of
this supplier. Also, let q∗(x(t),Θ(t)) =
(
qj∗(x(t),Θ(t)), j ∈ N
)
and qf∗(x(t),Θ(t)) =(
qf∗j (x(t),Θ(t)), j ∈ N
)
denote the perceived optimal ordering quantities of the firm
(from the dedicated suppliers and the flexible one) under Γ∗ for state (x(t),Θ(t))
at period t. Moreover, assume Z∗j = xj(t) + q
j∗(x(t),Θ(t)) + qf∗j (x(t),Θ(t)) and
Y ∗j = xj(t) + q
f∗
j (x(t),Θ(t)) show the firm’s possible inventory of product j right
after ordering at period t (where for simplicity we have removed indexes showing the
dependency of Z∗j and Y
∗



























































Now, we are able to compute the Improvement Percentage (IP) in the firm’s
true expected total discounted cost due to establishing the flexible backup resource
(IP(F )%) in a no-information infinite-horizon setting. For simplicity, we assume that
x(0) = 0, i.e., there is no initial on-hand inventory. Without information, IP(F )% , a











× 100 , (6.9)
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where Γ́∗ denotes the firm’s optimal perceived ordering policy in the absence of the
flexible supplier, i.e., when Q̄f = 0.
We illustrate these concepts and generate some managerial insights through a
numerical study. As mentioned in the model formulation, it is more numerically
tractable to use the lost sales variant of the model, eliminating states with a backlog.
Moreover, if we include a revenue of rj per unit of type j sold, then the behavior of
the lost sales model becomes similar to that of the original model. Hence, we use the
lost sales variant of the model for the remainder of the chapter. It should be noted
that the computational methodology developed above carries over to this variant.
Study 1 (No-Information) Consider the parameter settings presented in Table 6.4
of Appendix B for different firms in a market with two underlying products where
demand for both products (after possible discretization and scaling) follows a discrete
uniform distribution on [1; 5]. Settings 1-4 in Table 6.4 differ only in the reliability
beliefs. Settings 1-4 progressively increase from low reliability to high. Settings 5-8
include variations in the other parameters as well (see Appendix B for more details).
Here, for clarity of insights, we assume (1) the capacity investment is linear in the
capacity, (2) cfj (j = 1, 2) is negligible compared to u
f (we will drop this assumption
later in study 7), and (3) uf = ũf/(1− β) where ũf (presented in Table 6.4 ) denotes
the per period average cost of contracting with the flexible supplier so that the value
ũf in a single-period setting is equivalent to uf in this study. We also assume firms do
not change their beliefs over time; otherwise, the value of the flexible backup capacity
and the value of information will depend on the updating behavior implemented.
Moreover, we consider four different disruption risk transition probability matrices
(t.p.m.’s) as presented in Appendix B part (ii) for each parameter setting of Table
6.4. Table 6.1 illustrates the computational results for different parameter and t.p.m.
settings (32 different settings in all) with a discount factor of β = 0.9 as well as the
related errors in the firms’ reliability beliefs. For instance, a firm with parameter
setting 6 and unreliable suppliers with risk level dynamics based on t.p.m. setting
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3 has a reliability belief error of Υ = (−0.070, 0.085) and will choose to contract
with (or establish) the flexible supplier for Q̄f∗ = 4 units (out of a scaled maximum
demand of 5). Consequently, it can decrease its true infinite-horizon discounted costs
by IP(F )% = 16.34% through contracting with a flexible backup supplier. In fact,
this firm observes contracting to be valuable and is lucky that it is also truly valuable.
However, one may note that implementing a backup flexible supplier is not always
valuable. As an example, a firm with parameter setting 1 and with t.p.m. setting
3 perceives establishing (or contracting with) the flexible supplier to be valuable
and hence forms a contract for 3 (scaled) units. However, as Table 6.1 shows, this
decision not only does not reduce its cost, but will even increase it by 42.12% (i.e.,
IP(F )% = −42.12%). On the other hand, for a firm with parameter setting 8 and
under t.p.m. setting 4, a capacity reservation contract with a flexible supplier is a
strong mitigation technique that can result in a 152.50% total cost reduction (which
means that the cost of the current system is replaced with a profit roughly half as
large). The firms with parameter settings 2-4 (because of erroneous reliability belief)
do not perceive establishing the backup capacity to be valuable and hence cannot
benefit from a flexible supplier, even if they have the option to do so. Considering
that currently most firms do not monitor their suppliers carefully, and hence, there
is a lack of disruption risk information in most supply chains, we gain two important
observations from the this study:
Observation 19 Firms that do not monitor their suppliers on a regular basis should
be careful to analyze the opportunity to contract with (or invest in) a backup flexible
supplier, and this can be done using sensitivity analysis.
Observation 20 Implementing flexible backup supply capacity can be a potent way
to mitigate a lack of disruption information in supply chains.
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Table 6.1: Numerical Study 1 (No-Information.) [εj: firm’s reliability perception
error of unreliable supplier j].
Setting t.p.m.
ε1 ε2 Q̄f∗
Perceived True Perceived True IP(F )%







2 -0.015 -0.120 -64.60 284.91 122.69
3 -0.120 -0.015 404.91 284.91 -42.12







2 0.035 -0.020 -68.39 -68.39 0.00
3 -0.070 0.085 -70.80 -70.80 0.00







2 0.085 -0.070 -68.39 -68.39 0.00
3 -0.020 0.035 -70.80 -70.80 0.00







2 0.135 0.030 -68.39 -68.39 0.00
3 0.030 0.135 -70.80 -70.80 0.00







2 0.035 -0.020 -767.60 -748.00 2.62
3 -0.070 0.085 -769.46 -737.42 4.34







2 0.035 -0.020 -240.64 -215.77 11.52
3 -0.070 0.085 -240.04 -206.32 16.34







2 0.135 -0.020 -225.31 -223.36 0.87
3 0.030 0.085 -225.77 -216.48 4.29







2 0.035 -0.070 -221.26 -219.49 0.81
3 -0.070 0.035 -220.17 -220.24 -0.03
4 -0.070 -0.070 -236.19 449.91 152.50
6.4.3 The Value of Flexibility: A Single Flexible Backup
Supplier or Dedicated Ones?
In the previous sections, we examined the value of a reliable flexible secondary
supplier. Here, we investigate the value of supply flexibility as a mechanism to mitigate
supply risk, and we do so in environments with full disruption state information as
well as without it. To this end, we compare the performance of two systems, (A) and
(B). In addition to the existing unreliable dedicated suppliers, System (A) reserves a
dedicated reliable secondary supply capacity for each product, and System (B) invests
in a single reliable flexible backup supplier. The comparison of (B) relative to (A)
exposes the difference that flexibility makes. Moreover, to investigate the interplay
between the value of flexibility and information, we compare these two systems under
both full and no-information scenarios. The analytical framework to compute the
infinite-horizon perceived cost and the true cost is the same as described in Sections
(6.4.2) and (6.4.1). The only difference is that for System (A) one can compute the
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Table 6.2: The Value of Supply Flexibility under No-Information.





2 Prcvd. Cost True Cost Q̄







2 138.39 -64.60 146.68
3 183.46 404.91 -120.71







6 -68.4 -68.51 0.16
7 -35.05 -70.93 102.37







2 -674.31 -767.60 13.83
3 -682.32 -796.46 16.73







2 -171.86 -240.64 40.02
3 -210.08 -240.04 14.26







2 172.54 -225.31 230.58
3 -216.38 -225.70 4.31







2 209.91 -221.26 205.41
3 76.79 -220.17 386.72
4 57.9 -236.19 507.93
Average 87.316
costs separately for each product since there is no connection between them. The
following study investigates the value of information and flexibility, and generates
insights into their interactions.
Study 2 (Flexibility and the Effect of Information) Consider a firm that pro-
cures two products from existing unreliable primary suppliers, under the parameter
settings presented in Table 6.5 in Appendix B. The demand distributions and other
assumptions are the same as those in Study 1. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the opti-
mal cost of the firm without and with information, respectively. In these tables the
value of supply flexibility is reported as the percentage improvement in the cost of
the firm if it implements System (B) instead of (A). The last column of Table 6.3
also reports the pure percentage-wise value of information (i.e., information in the
absence of flexibility) by comparing the true cost of System (A) with and without
information. From these tables we gain several interesting strategic insights. First, a
flexible backup supplier is always more valuable than two dedicated backup ones for a
firm that can perfectly assess its suppliers’ risk levels. In other words, implementing
flexibility in a supply system cannot be harmful under perfect information, as one
would probably expect. However, it may surprise many that this is not the case for
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Table 6.3: The Value of Supply Flexibility with Full-Information and the Pure Value
of Information (without Flexibility).
Setting t.p.m. Two Inflex. Secondary One Flex. Secondary Value of Pure Value of
No. Setting Q̄f∗1 + Q̄
f∗
2 Cost Q̄
f∗ Cost Flexibility (%) Information (%)
1
1 1 -70.95 2 -77.77 9.61 65.85
2 0 -77.51 1 -80.29 3.59 156.01
3 1 -79.43 1 -81.81 3.00 143.30
4 0 -85.99 1 -86.02 0.03 123.58
2
5 1 -67.13 2 -76.69 14.24 209.21
6 0 -74.11 2 -79.39 7.12 8.35
7 1 -77.98 2 -80.87 3.71 122.48
8 0 -84.96 1 -85.48 0.61 3.94
3
1 2 -767.93 3 -786.86 2.47 13.94
2 1 -775.8 3 -791.23 1.99 15.05
3 2 -779.2 3 -791.80 1.62 14.20
4 1 -787.07 2 -796.17 1.16 15.29
4
1 4 -235.34 4 -248.00 5.38 14.04
2 3 -240.12 3 -249.91 4.08 39.72
3 3 -239.6 3 -249.22 4.02 14.05
4 2 -244.38 3 -251.29 2.83 39.18
5
1 1 -227.77 3 -243.53 6.92 15.78
2 1 -241.44 2 -249.19 3.21 239.93
3 0 -237.89 2 -247.26 3.94 9.94
4 0 -251.56 1 -254.16 1.03 264.55
6
1 0 -225.05 2 -232.64 3.37 12.25
2 0 -238.73 1 -241.26 1.06 213.73
3 0 -237.88 1 -239.32 0.61 409.78
4 0 -251.56 0 -251.56 0.00 534.47
Average 3.566 112.443
the firms with no-information. In fact, we can observe the following:
Observation 21 With the lack of disruption information, supply flexibility can be
harmful (up to 120.71% in our test suite). However, on average implementing sup-
ply flexibility for firms with no-information can be regarded as a strong mitigation
technique that resulted in a cost improvement of 87%, compared to the case of using
dedicated backup suppliers (see Table 6.2).
Another important observation from comparing the value of flexibility columns in
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 illuminates the effect of information on the benefit of flexibility.
Observation 22 Obtaining information may or may not augment the benefit of
supply flexibility. On average, however, supply flexibility is much more valuable
for firms that cannot monitor the risk levels of their suppliers than those with full
information.
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Next, it is worth considering the pure value of information and compare it with
the value of flexibility:
Observation 23 In contrast with implementing flexibility, obtaining information is
always valuable. The pure value of information (information without flexibility) is
on average higher than the pure value of flexibility (flexibility without information),
112% vs. 87% in our test suite.
The above observation suggests that obtaining information is a better insurance
against disruptions than flexibility. (This value of information without flexibility de-
rives from the ability of the system to dynamically adjust inventory safeguards as the
threat levels change.) However, considering the expensive costs (and technical diffi-
culty) of thoroughly and dynamically monitoring suppliers (e.g. cost of establishing
a threat level advisory system), one may observe that:
Observation 24 Implementing flexibility in the backup system can significantly,
though not completely, compensate for the lack of disruption information in supply
chains.
Finally, comparing the investment in the backup capacity with and without flex-
ibility, we observe the following:
Observation 25 A firm (with or without information) will reserve at least as much
capacity from a flexible secondary supplier than the amount reserved in total from
dedicated secondary ones.
In fact, the flexibility of a supplier provides the buyer with greater benefit, justifying
reserving more backup capacity because of the economic advantage of shifting the
orders whenever necessary (capacity pooling).
In the next study, we further investigate the capacity pooling advantage of the
flexible backup supplier in a full-information scenario and we analyze its sensitivity
with respect to the linear purchasing cost term of the capacity reservation contract.
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Study 3 (Capacity Pooling Advantage) Consider a firm procuring two products
from unreliable suppliers under a full-information scenario where cf1 and c
f
2 are, unlike
the previous studies, not negligible. Specifically, let ũf = 1.0, cf1 = 0.3, c
f
2 = ∆ c
2
(where ∆ scales the cost of dedicated supplier 2). Assume the dynamics of disruption
risks are defined by t.p.m. setting 1 (see Table 6.6 of Appendix B) and the demand
distributions and other assumptions are the same as in the previous study. Fig. 2
(left) reveals the insight that the value of the flexible secondary supplier is more than
the summation of benefits that can be obtained separately for each of the products
through dedicated secondary suppliers. This is mainly due to the capacity pooling
advantage of the flexible secondary supplier; when one of the primary suppliers is
in a high risk threat level and the other is in a low threat level, the reserved pooled
capacity can be used as needed. However, using the difference between the two curves
depicted in Fig. 2 (left), we have the following observation:
Observation 26 The pooling advantage is not monotone in ∆ and has its maximum
effect at ∆ = 0.5 . However, as ∆ increases, the pooling advantage vanishes: the
flexible supplier can only be used for product 1, performing as a dedicated supplier.
Fig.6.4.3 (right) depicts the corresponding optimal investment levels in the sec-
ondary suppliers. As this figure shows, the sum of optimal capacities required for
product 1 and 2 in the case of two dedicated backup suppliers is never larger than the
optimal capacity reserved with the flexible secondary supplier. This latter observa-
tion coincides with Observation 25 described in Study 2 (where the linear purchasing
costs of the capacity reservation contract were assumed to be negligible). These re-



















































































Figure 6.2: The Pooling Effect under Full Information (β = 0.9, c1 = c2 = 2, r1 =
r2 = 3.5, p1 = p2 = 2.5, h1 = 1, h2 = 1.2).
6.5 Summary and Conclusion
We addressed the strategic value of two powerful supply risk mitigation mech-
anisms: (1) contracting with (or establishing) a secondary flexible supplier, and
(2) monitoring the dynamic risk levels of primary suppliers. We modeled the dy-
namics of disruptions as discrete time Markov chains and considered different cases
of information availability with respect to the disruption risk levels, including scenar-
ios in which such information may or may not be possible to obtain..
We first studied how firms should update their inventory safeguards to effectively
mitigate against dynamic disruption risks. Under full disruption risk information, we
showed that when the investment cost in the backup supplier is not in a middle range,
a state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal. Furthermore, a single sourcing policy
becomes optimal for each of the products; the firm should either procure from the
flexible backup supplier or from the dedicated supplier, but not both. Moreover, if the
(transformed) Markov chain governing the disruption risk of a dedicated supplier is
stochastically monotone, then base-stock levels are non-decreasing in the threat levels.
We also showed how firms can effectively quantify the decision of the investment in
the backup capacity.
In cases of symmetry across the products, we showed that the flexibility in the
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backup system has a diminishing rate of return in the underlying number of products;
the flexibility in the backup system is more valuable for firms that procure several
products, but the marginal benefit diminishes as the number of underlying products
increases. We also formally proved that investing in the backup resource is more
valuable for firms that procure from relatively more expensive unreliable suppliers.
We next introduced a notion of reliability dominance and showed that a less
reliable supply system will require a greater backup capacity investment, and also
will result in greater benefits from such an investment. More importantly, we showed
that establishing a flexible secondary capacity can effectively compensate for the the
risk of disruptions in the primary suppliers.
We then studied the case where the firm cannot monitor its unreliable suppliers:
a no disruption information case. We model this case as a POMDP, differentiated
between perception and reality, and developed a methodology for computing the
firm’s true cost of its procurement strategy and imperfect perception of system state.
Using this framework, we developed measures to quantify (a) the value of investing
in a dedicated (inflexible) backup supplier for each product, (b) the value of a single
flexible backup supplier, and (c) the value of disruption information with or without
a flexible backup supplier.
We numerically used these measures and gained five main managerial insights:
(1) Benefiting from a flexible backup supplier can be a potent mitigation mecha-
nism against the current lack of disruption risk information in supply chains. (2)
Although implementing flexibility in supply system is always valuable under perfect
information, firms should be aware that supply flexibility can be even harmful when
disruption risk information is incomplete. (3) Obtaining information may or may not
further augment the benefit of supply flexibility. However, on average, implementing
supply flexibility is more valuable for the firms that cannot thoroughly monitor the
risk levels of their suppliers than those that can. (4) In contrast with implementing
flexibility, obtaining information is always purely valuable. Moreover, the pure value
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of information (information without flexibility) is on average higher than the pure
value of flexibility (flexibility without information). This suggests that information
is on average a better “insurance” against potential disruptions compared to supply
flexibility. However, considering the expensive costs (and intrinsic technical difficul-
ties) of thoroughly and dynamically monitoring suppliers, our observations strongly
suggest that supply flexibility is a potent substitute for the need of obtaining informa-
tion on dynamic risk levels of suppliers in supply chains. (5) A firm (with or without
info) will reserve at least as much capacity from a secondary flexible supplier as the
amount reserved in total from two dedicated secondary ones. Indeed, the flexibility of
a supplier provides the buyer with greater benefit, justifying reserving more backup
capacity because of the economic advantage of shifting the orders whenever necessary
(capacity pooling). This latter observation also justifies charging a higher cost by
flexible suppliers for reserving their flexible capacity.
The analyses, framework, and insights presented in this chapter can guide new
practices to effectively increase the resilience of supply chains, especially in an era
when supply chains face grave disruption risks. Increasing resilience in supply chains
can in turn enable firms to deliver products with better availability and better prices
to end customers, yielding social benefits. While in this study we focused on the cost
of a firm, future research may examine the possibility of creating such broader social
advantages.
6.6 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 15. (i) We first consider the case with uf = 0 (i.e., when the
backup capacity is unlimited) and show that a state-dependent base-stock policy is
optimal. For the ease of notation let JQ̄f = JQ̄f (x(0), s(0)), for any reserved capacity
Q̄f . Notice that by assumption cfj +u
f > 0 for all j ∈ N , and hence, cfj > 0 (for all j ∈
N) as uf = 0. Thus, there exists a finite capacity investment level M <∞ for some
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large enough integer M, such that the total optimal cost with Qf = M and Qf =∞
are equal. Since M is not necessarily unique, choose the smallest such M and denote
it by M∗. M∗ is then such that JM∗−1 > JM∗ , and hence, there exists ε > 0 such
that JM∗−1 − JM∗ = ε. To show that a state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal
for each product j ∈ N when uf = 0, consider the following analog inventory control
problem with a state-dependent ordering cost (and stationary demand). Suppose
the firm procures each product j from a single supplier where the ordering cost is
state-dependent and given by c′j(s
j) = min{cfj , cj}1 {sj>0} + c
f
j 1 {sj=0}. Next notice
that this inventory problem is a special case of the model considered in Section 9
of Song and Zipkin [133]. Following the result provided in Song and Zipkin [133]
for a single product setting, a state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal for each
product j ∈ N when uf = 0. Next, define ∆(uf ) = g(uf ,M∗)−g(uf ,M∗−1). Notice
that since with uf = 0, M∗ is an optimal capacity investment level but M∗−1 is not,
we have ∆(0) < ε = JM∗−1−JM∗ . Thus, since ∆(uf ) is increasing in uf (as g(uf , Q̄f )
is supermodular by assumption), define the threshold ūf = supuf ≥ 0 : ∆(uf ) < ε
(with the convention that sup ∅ = 0). Next observe that for all uf ≤ ūf , the optimal
capacity level is still M∗. That is for all uf ≤ ūf the optimal capacity investment
level is the same as that with uf = 0. Thus, the optimization problem (6.3) with
uf = 0 and any uf < ūf is the same, and hence, the optimal control policy for
any uf < ūf is the same state-dependent base stock policy that is optimal with
uf = 0. Next, define ∆′(uf ) = g(uf , 1) − g(uf , 0), since ∆′(uf ) is increasing, let
uf = inf uf : ∆′(uf ) > J0 − J1 (with the convention that inf ∅ =∞), and notice that
for all uf ≥ uf it is optimal to set the optimal investment level to Q̄f∗ = 0 (since
the cost of investing in Q̄f = 1 compered to Q̄f = 0, ∆′ is greater than its benefit,
J0 − J1). This completes the proof of part (i). The proof of part (ii) directly follows
from the proof of part (i), since it shows that when uf ≤ uf or uf ≥ uf , the system
decomposes to |N | single-product settings. The proof of part (iii) is trivial for the
case with uf ≥ uf , since it is optimal to set Q̄f = 0 from the proof of part (i). For
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the case where uf ≤ uf notice that as discussed in the proof of part (i), for each
product j, the system is equivalent to a system with a single procurement source
but with state dependent cost c′j(s
j) = min{cfj , cj}1 {sj>0} + c
f
j 1 {sj=0}. This shows
that when the unreliable supplier is up, the firm only orders from the source with
the minimum purchasing cost, and orders from the backup capacity, otherwise. To
prove part (iv), first consider the case where uf ≤ uf . From above, it follows that the
system transforms to a collection of single-product systems, where the purchasing cost
of product j is state-dependent and given by c′j(s
j) = min{cfj , cj}1 {sj>0} + c
f
j 1 {sj=0}.
The result then follow from Theorem 4 of Song and Zipkin [133]. Similarly, with
uf ≥ uf , the result for each product follows from Theorem 4 of Song and Zipkin
[133]. 
Proof of Lemma 8. To show convexity of function JQ̄f (·, ·) in Q̄f , first consider a
finite horizon version of (6.3), and let JQ̄f ,n(·, ·) denote the cost when there are n
periods to go. Since JQ̄f ,0(·, ·) = 0, using induction, suppose JQ̄f ,n(·, ·) is convex
in Q̄f . To observe JQ̄f ,n+1(·, ·) is then also convex in Q̄f , notice that since the set




j (t) ≤ Q̄f} for any Q̄f , and functions Gj(·) are convex, from
the finite horizon version of (6.3), JQ̄f ,n+1(·, ·) is a minimization of a convex function
over a convex set. Hence, JQ̄f ,n+1(·, ·) is convex in Q̄f by the preservation of convexity
under minimization (see , e.g., Lemma A.4. page 227 of Porteus 2002). Therefore,
JQ̄f ,n(·, ·) is convex in Q̄f for any n. It follows that the infinite-horizon cost, JQ̄f (·, ·),
is also convex in Q̄f . Moreover, JQ̄f (·, ·) is also non-increasing in Q̄f , since increasing
Q̄f will only enlarge the feasible set of the minimum operator (6.3). 
Proof of Proposition 16. Notice that the objective function of program (6.2) is
convex in Q̄f , since (1) g(uf , Q̄f ) is convex in Q̄f by assumption, and (2) JQ̄f (·, ·) is
convex in Q̄f by Lemma 8. Hence, the fist order condition characterizes the optimal
investment level, Q̄f∗. 
Proof of Proposition 17. Fix the initial state, suppose Q̄f∗ = ψ(n) for some func-
tion ψ, and let J̃n(Q̄f ) = g(uf , Q̄f ) + Jn(Q̄f ) denote the total optimal cost when
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the backup capacity is Q̄f (with its minimizer Q̄f∗) and there are n (symmetric)
products. We first show the concavity property of the value of the flexible backup
resource. Since the value of the backup resource is ∆f,n = J̃n(0) − J̃n(ψ(n)), and
J̃n(0) is trivially linear in n (due to decomposition of the system into n equivalent
systems when Q̄f = 0), to show that ∆f,n is concave in n, it is sufficient to show
that J̃n(ψ(n)) = g(uf , ψ(n)) + Jn(ψ(n)) is convex in n. To this end, it is convenient
to take n as a continuous variable (extending the definition in the case of complete
symmetry), and show that ∂Jn(ψ(n))/∂n ≥ 0 (notice that for a function f , if f(x) is
convex for x ∈ R+, then f(n) is convex in n ∈ N). Since g(uf , Q̄f ) is convex increas-
ing in Q̄f by assumption, and ψ(n) is convex increasing in n (due to the capacity
pooling effect), using the chain rule it can be seen that ∂g(uf , ψ(n))/∂n ≥ 0. Thus, it
is sufficient to show that Jn(ψ(n)) is convex in n, where Jn(ψ(n)) is defined by (6.3).
Convexity of Jn(ψ(n)) in n follows the preservation of convexity under minimization
(see , e.g., Lemma A.4. page 227 of Porteus 2002). To see this, consider the finite
horizon version of (6.3), and similar to the proof of Proposition 8 use induction on the
number of periods to go. Trivially, when there is k = 0 periods to go Jnk (ψ(n)) = 0,
and hence, Jnk (ψ(n)) in convex in n. Next suppose J
n
k (ψ(n)) is convex in n for some
number of periods to go, k ∈ N. To show that Jnk+1(ψ(n)) is also convex in n, observe
that Jnk+1(ψ(n)) can be written as a miny∈Y(n) f(n,y) for some convex function f ,
vector y, and convex set y ∈ Y(n) (i.e., minimum of a convex function over a convex
set). Hence, Jnk+1(ψ(n)), is convex in n, and therefore, J
n
k (ψ(n)) is convex in n for
any number of periods to go, k. It then follows that the infinite-horizon cost function,
Jn(ψ(n)) is convex. To show that ∆f,n = J̃n(0)− J̃n(ψ(n)) is increasing in n, notice
that J̃n(0) is linear in n but J̃n(ψ(n)) is less than linear in n due to the well-known
capacity pooling effect. Hence, it can be shown that ∆f,n is increasing in n which
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 18. Fix the state and consider From Bellman Eq. (6.3).
Notice that increasing cj will decrease the optimal q
∗






the optimizer of Gj(xj + qj + q
f
j ). With a a lower q
∗
j , wj is achieved with a higher q
f∗
j .
This will in turn require a (weakly) greater capacity investment level, Q̄f∗. Thus, Q̄f∗
is increasing in c. This also results in a (weakly) greater benefit due to establishing the
backup capacity (∆f ), i.e., comparing the cost with Q̄f∗ and that with Q̄f = 0. Using
a similar argument, notice that increasing cf will decrease Q̄f∗ and ∆f . To see the
effect of uf , consider program (6.2). Since by assumption g(uf , Q̄f ) is supermodular,
increasing uf will decrease Q̄f∗. It then follows that (∆f ) is also decreasing in uf . 
Proof of Proposition 19. From Bellman Eq. (6.3) and using the envelope theorem,
it can be seen that, at any capacity Q̄f , ∂JW/∂Q̄f ≤ ∂JW ′/∂Q̄f . That is the cost
reduction due to adding backup capacity (excluding the investment cost) is higher
under the less reliable system. Also, from Proposition 16, the optimal capacity in-
vestment levels Q̄fW and Q̄
f
W ′ are the solutions to ∂J
W/∂Q̄f = k and ∂JW
′
/∂Q̄f = k
(where k = −∂g(uf , Q̄f )/∂Q̄f ), respectively. Thus, the proof of part (i) is complete,
since ∂JW/∂Q̄f and ∂JW
′
/∂Q̄f are both non-decreasing functions of Q̄f (since J is
convex in Q̄f by Lemma 8). To prove part (ii), fixing the initial state, let JW (Q̄f )
and JW
′
(Q̄f ) denote the operational cost (i.e, not including the capacity investment
cost) when a backup capacity of Q̄f is established under radiabilities governed by W
and W ′, respectively. Also, let Q̄fW and Q̄
f
W ′ be the optimizers of Program (6.2) under





(Q̄fW ′) + g(u
f , Q̄fW ′) ≤ J
W ′(Q̄fW ) + g(u
f , Q̄fW ). (6.10)
Furthermore, since the difference in the operational costs is maximum when there
is no backup capacity (as backup capacity alleviates the impact of unreliability),
comparing the zero backup capacity with that of establishing a backup capacity of
Q̄fW for both systems, we have:
JW (0)− JW ′(0) ≤ JW (Q̄fW )− J
W ′(Q̄fW ). (6.11)
Adding inequalities (6.10) and (6.11) results in ∆fW ≤ ∆
f
W ′ , which completes the
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proof. 
Proof of Proposition 20. From Bellman Eq. (6.3), it is easy to show that for
any fixed state and capacity investment Q̄f , we have J
Q̄f
W (·, ·) ≤ JW ′
Q̄f
(·, ·). That
is, fixing the state and capacity level, the cost under the reliability governed by W
is not greater than that under the reliability governed by W ′. Then, if Q̄f∗W ′ de-
notes the optimal backup capacity level under W ′, choose W (W ′ ≤R W ) such that
J0W (x(0), s(0)) ∈ [g(uf , Q̄
f∗
W ′) + J
W ′
Q̄f∗
(x(0), s(0)), g(uf , 0) + JW
′
0 (x(0), s(0))]. Since
g(uf , Q̄f )+JW
′
Q̄f
(x(0), s(0)) is continuous in Q̄f , there exist a Q̄f1 such that JW0 (x(0), s(0)) =
g(uf , Q̄f1) + JW
′
Q̄f1
(x(0), s(0)). Next, since g(uf , Q̄f ) + JW
′
Q̄f
(x(0), s(0)) is (convex by
Lemma 1 and) decreasing in Q̄f in interval [Q̄f1, Q̄f∗W ′ ], choosing any Q̄
f ∈ [Q̄f1, Q̄f∗W ′ ]
together with W ′ satisfies the result of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 21. The proof directly follows that of Smallwood and Sondik
(1973) with a small change of notation. 
6.7 Appendix B: Parameter Settings
(i) Suite of Parameter Settings Considered in Numerical Studies
The parameter settings considered are as follow. The first four settings are iden-
tical except for the beliefs. The other settings include variations on other parameters
as well. It is noteworthy that in all tables of this appendix, ũf represents the average
cost per period per unit of capacity reservation cost with the flexible supplier.
The parameter settings considered for Study 2 are presented in Table 6.5, which
builds upon Table 6.4. The first two settings (similar to settings 1-4 of Table 6.4)
represent same firms but with different beliefs. It is noteworthy that, for instance,
Setting 2 together with t.p.m. setting 8 of Table 6.6 represents a special case where
the firm knows the steady state distribution of reliability of its supplier. However,
in real-world firms (in no-information environments) do not know the steady state
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Table 6.4: Suite of Parameter Settings in Study 1.
Setting No. ũf j pj rj hj θ
j cj
1 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.80 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.80 3.5
2 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.85 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.90 3.5
3 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.90 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.85 3.5
4 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.95 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.95 3.5
5 4.0
1 5.5 15.0 0.5 0.85 3.0
2 4.0 20.0 0.7 0.90 3.5
6 4.2
1 5.0 8.0 0.5 0.85 4.0
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.90 4.0
7 4.5
1 7.0 8.0 0.9 0.95 3.8
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.90 3.5
8 5.0
1 7.0 8.0 0.9 0.85 3.8
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.85 3.5
distribution of their unreliable suppliers. Hence, throughout the paper, we concen-
trate more on the cases where firms have errors in their steady state beliefs. Settings
3-6 include variations on the other parameters as well and, for consistency, are also
chosen to be the same as settings 5-8 of Table 6.4.
(ii) Suite of Transition Probability Matrix (t.p.m.) Settings
Let the state space for the Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) dynamics of the
threat levels of the unreliable suppliers be based on the S&P credit risk rating system
of the firms with state space
{1=AAA, 2=AA, 3=A, 4=BBB, 5=B/BB, 6=CCC/CC/C} ∪ {0 = Default}
for which Markov chain modeling is commonly used (it is noteworthy that Moody’s
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Table 6.5: Suite of Parameter Settings in Study 2.
Setting No. ũf j pj rj hj θ
j cj
1 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.80 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.80 3.5
2 4.0
1 5.5 5.0 0.5 0.92 3.0
2 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.92 3.5
3 4.0
1 5.5 15.0 0.5 0.85 3.0
2 4.0 20.0 0.7 0.90 3.5
4 4.2
1 5.0 8.0 0.5 0.85 4.0
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.90 4.0
5 4.5
1 7.0 8.0 0.9 0.95 3.8
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.90 3.5
6 5.0
1 7.0 8.0 0.9 0.85 3.8
2 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.85 3.5
bond rating system also has a similar seven state structure). Then let:
A =

0.10 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10
0.10 0.10 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.10
0.15 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.20
0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.20
0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.25





0.03 0.37 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.05
0.05 0.35 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.05
0.07 0.33 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.05
0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.10
0.12 0.28 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.10
0.20 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20

be two different transition probability matrices (t.p.m.’s) on this state space. Note
that by solving the balance equations for t.p.m. A we have π0 ' 0.185 but for t.p.m.
B we have π0 ' 0.080. Hence, A represents the dynamics of a relatively low steady
state reliability and B represents a higher steady state reliability. Moreover, notice
that in both t.p.m.’s A and B, a higher threat level represents a higher chance of
disruption in the next period. Also, these t.p.m.’s are chosen to reflect the real-world
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dynamics of disruptions of a firm where a firm may stay in the same disruption risk
level in the next period, go to a higher level, or to a lower one. Obviously, Bernoulli
dynamics are a special case of our general DTMC setting.
Table 6.6: Suite of t.p.m. Settings.
t.p.m. Setting W1 W2 1− π10 1− π20
1 A A 0.815 0.815
2 A B 0.815 0.920
3 B A 0.920 0.815
4 B B 0.920 0.920
5 C C 0.815 0.815
6 C D 0.815 0.920
7 D C 0.920 0.815
8 D D 0.920 0.920
For our analysis we consider a suite of t.p.m. settings as is illustrated in the fol-
lowing table, where Wj and 1− πj0, respectively denote the t.p.m. and steady state
reliability of supplier j. These settings in addition to the different reliability beliefs
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[62] J.M. Harrison and M.J. López. Heavy traffic resource pooling in parallel-server
systems. Queueing Systems, 33:339–368, 1999.
[63] E. Hay, L. Bekerman, G. Rosenberg, and R. Peled. Quality assurance of nurse
triage: Consistency of results over three years. American J. of Emrg. Med.,
19(2):113–117, 2001.
[64] K.B. Hendricks and V.R. Singhal. An empirical analysis of the effect of supply
chain disruption on long-run stock price performance and equity risk of the
firm. Prod. and Oper. Mang., 14(1):35–52, 2005.
[65] M. Henig, Y. Gerchak, R. Ernst, and D.F. Pyke. An inventory model embedded
in designing a supply contract. Management Sci., 43:184–189, 1997.
[66] A. Holdgate, J. Morris, M. Fry, and M. Zecevic1. Accuracy of triage nurses
in predicting patient disposition. Emergency Medicine Australasia, 19:341–345,
2007.
304
[67] L.L. Holland, L.L. Smith, and K.E. Blick. Reducing laboratory turnaround
time outliers can reduce Emergency Department patient length of stay. Amer.
J. Clin. Path., 124:672–674, 2005.
[68] J.C. Hollingsworth, C.D. Chisholm, B.K. Giles, W.H. Cordell, and D.R. Nelson.
How do physicians and nurses spend their time in the Emergency Department.
Annals of Emergency Medicine, 31(1):87–91, 1998.
[69] N. R. Hoot and D. Aronsky. Systematic review of Emergency Department
crowding: Causes, effects, and solutions. Annals of Emergency Medicine,
52(2):126–136, 2008.
[70] W.J. Hopp, S.M.R. Iravani, and B. Shou. Serial agile production systems with
automation. Oper. Res., 53(5):852–866, 2005.
[71] W.J. Hopp, E. Tekin, and M.P. Van Oyen. Benefits of skill chaining in produc-
tion lines with cross-trained workers. Management Sci., 50(1):83–98, 2004.
[72] W.J. Hopp and M.P. Van Oyen. Agile workforce evaluation: A framework for
cross-training and coordination. IIE Transactions, 36(10):919–940, 2004.
[73] W.J. Hopp and Z. Yin. Protecting supply chain networks against catasrophic
failures. Working Paper, IEMS Dept., Northwestern University, 2011.
[74] E.E. Howell, E.D.Bessman, and H.R. Rubin. Hospitals and innovative Emer-
gency Department admission process. Journal of General Internal Medicin,
19:266–2686, 2004.
[75] B. Hu and S. Benjafar. Partitioning of servers in queueing systems during rush
hour. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management, 11(3):416–428, 2009.
[76] K.V. Ierson and J.C. Moskop. Triage in medicine, part I: Concept, history, and
types. Annals of Emrg. Med., 49(3):275–281, 2007.
[77] Institute of Medicine. Hospital-Based Emergency Care: At the Breaking Point.
National Academies Press, London, 2007.
[78] S.M. Iravani, B. Kolfal, and M.P. Van Oyen. Capability flexibility: A decision
support methodology for production and service systems with flexible resources.
Working paper. Department of IE/MS, Northwestern University, 2006.
[79] S.M. Iravani, B. Kolfal, and M.P. Van Oyen. Capability flexibility: A decision
support methodology for production and service systems with exible resources.
IIE Trans., 43:363–382, 2011.
[80] S.M.R Iravani, B. Kolfal, and M.P. Van Oyen. Call center labor cross-training:
It’s a small world after all. Management Sci., 53(7):1102–1112, 2007.
305
[81] S.M.R. Iravani, M.P. Van Oyen, and K.T. Sims. Structural flexibility: A new
perspective on the design of manufacturing and service operations. Management
Sci., 51(2):151–166, 2005.
[82] S.M.R. Iravani, M.P. Van Oyen, and K.T. Sims. Structural flexibility: A new
perspective on the design of manufacturing and service operations. Management
Sci., 51(2):151–166, 2005.
[83] N.K. Jaiswal. Priority Queues. Academic Press, New York, New York, 1968.
[84] W.J. Jordan and S.C. Graves. Principles on the benefits of manufacturing
process flexibility. Management Sci., 41(4):577–594, 1995.
[85] W.J. Jordan and S.C. Graves. Principles on the benefits of manufacturing
process flexibility. Management Sci., 41(4):577–594, 1995.
[86] J.S. Kakalik and J.D.C. Little. Optimal Service Policy for the M/G/1 Queue
with Multiple Classes of Arrival. Rand Corporation Report, 1971.
[87] W.W. Keen. The Treatment of War Wounds. W.B. Saunders, Philadelphia,
PA, 1917.
[88] R.K. Khare, E.S. Powell, G. Reinhardt, and M. Lucenti. Adding more beds
to the Emergency Department or reducing admitted patient boarding times:
Which has a more significant influence on Emergency Department congestion?
Annals of Emergency Medicine, 53(5):575–585, 2008.
[89] C.R. Kim. Toyota aims for quake-proof supply chain. Reuters, Sep. 06, 2011.
[90] D. L. King, D. I. Ben-Tovim, and J. Bassham. Redesigning Emergency De-
partment patient flows: Application of lean thinking to health care. Emergency
Medicine Australasia, 18:391–397, 2006.
[91] L. Kinsman, R. Champion, G. Lee, M. Martin, K. Masman, E. May, T. Mills,
M.D. Taylor, P. Thomas, R.J. Williams, and S. Zalstein. Assessing the im-
pact of streaming in a regional Emergency Department. Emergency Medicine
Australasia, 20:221–227, 2008.
[92] P.R. Kleindorfer and G.H. Saad. Managing disruption risk in supply chain.
Prod. and Oper. Mang., 14(1):53–58, 2005.
[93] P. Kouvelis and G. Vairaktarakis. Flowshops with processing flexibility across
production stages. IIE Trans., 30:735–746, 1998.
[94] S.L. Kronick and J.S. Desmond. Blink: Accuracy of physician estimates of
patient disposition at the time of ED triage. SAEM Midwest Regional Meeting,
2009.
306
[95] H.L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, and S. Whang. Information distortion in a supply
chain: The bullwhip effect. Management Sci., 43:546–558, 1997.
[96] P. A.W. Lewis and G. S. Shedler. Simulation of nonhomogenous Poisson pro-
cesses by thinning. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 26(3):403–413, 1979.
[97] P. A.W. Lewis and G. S. Shedler. Simulation of nonhomogenous Poisson
processes with degree-two exponential polynomial rate function. Oper. Res.,
27(5):1026–1039, 1979.
[98] D. Liew, D. Liew, and M.P. Kennedy. Emergency Department length of stay
independently predicts excess inpatient length of stay. Medical Journal of Aus-
tralia, 179(17):524–526, 2003.
[99] S. Lippman. Applying a new device in the optimization of exponential queueing
system. Oper. Res., 23(4):687–710, 1975.
[100] S.W. Liu, S.H. Thomas, J.A. Gordon, and J. Weissman. Frequency of adverse
events and errors among patients boarding in the emergency department. Acad.
Emerg. Med., 12:49b–50b, 2005.
[101] A. Mandelbaum and M.I. Reiman. On pooling in queueing networks. Manage-
ment Sci., 44(7):971–981, 1997.
[102] A. Mandelbaum and A.L. Stolyar. Scheduling flexible servers with convex delay
costs: Heavy-taffic optimality of the generalaized cµ-rule. Oper. Res., 52(6):836–
855, 2004.
[103] L.F. McCaig and N. Ly. National hospital ambulatory medical care survey: 2000
Emergency Department summary. National Health Statistics Report, pages 1–
31, 2002.
[104] R.R. Meyer, Rothkopf M. H., and S. A. Smith. Reliability and inventory in a
productionstorage system. Management Sci., 25:799–807, 1979.
[105] Sean P. Meyn. Sequencing and routing in multiclass queueing networks part ii:
Workload relaxations. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 42(1):178–
217, 2003.
[106] O. Miro, M. Sanchez, G. Espinosa, B Coll-Veient, E. Bragulat, and J. Milla.
Analysis of patient flow in the Emergency Department and the effect of an
extensive reorganisation. Emergency Medicine Journal, 20:143–148, 2003.
[107] K. Moinzadeh and P. Aggrawal. Analysis of a production/ inventory system
subject to random disruptions. Management Sci., 43:1577–1588, 1997.
307
[108] K. Moinzadeh and P. Aggrawal. Inventory management under random disrup-
tions and partial back-orders. Naval Res. Logist., 45:687–703, 1998.
[109] J.C. Moskop and K.V. Ierson. Triage in medicine, part II: Underlying values
and principles. Annals of Emrg. Med., 49(3):282–287, 2007.
[110] M. Parlar. Continuous review inventory problem with random supply interrup-
tions. Eur. J. Oper. Res., 99:366–385, 1997.
[111] M. Parlar and D. Berkin. Future supply uncertainty in eoq models. Naval Res.
Logist., 38:107–121, 1991.
[112] M. Parlar and D. Perry. Analysis of a (q, r, t) inventory policy with deterministic
and random yields when future demand is uncertain. Eur. J. Oper. Res., 84:431–
443, 1995.
[113] M. Parlar and D. Perry. Inventory models of future supply uncertainty with
single and multiple suppliers. Naval Research Logistics, 43:191–210, 1996.
[114] S. R. Pitts, R. W. Niska, J. Xu, and C. W. Burt. National hospital ambulatory
medical care survey: 2006 Emergency Department summary. National Health
Statistics Report, 7:1–39, 2008.
[115] V. Reitman. Behind boeing 787 delays: problems at one of the smallest suppliers
in dreamliner program causing ripple effect. Wall Street Journal, (May. 08),
1997.
[116] D. Richardson. Reducing patient times in Emergency Department. Medical
Journal of Australia, 179(17):516–517, 2003.
[117] D. Richardson. Increase in patient mortality at 10 days associated with Emer-
gency Department overcrowding. Medical Journal of Australia, 184:213–216,
2006.
[118] M.H. Rothkopf and P. Rech. Perspective on queueing: Combining queues is
not always beneficial. Oper. Res., 35:906–909, 1987.
[119] S. Russ, I. Jones, and D. Aronsky et. al. Placing physician orders at triage:
The effect on length of stay. Annals of Emerg. Med., 56(1):27–33, 2010.
[120] S. Saghafian, W.J. Hopp, M.P. Van Oyen, J.S. Desmond, and S.L. Kronick.
Complexity-based triage: A tool for improving patient safety and operational
efficiency. Working Paper, Dept. of Industrial and Operations Eng., University
of Michigan, 2012.
308
[121] S. Saghafian, W.J. Hopp, M.P. Van Oyen, J.S. Desmond, and S.L. Kronick.
Patient streaming as a mechanism for improving responsiveness in Emergency
Departments. Oper. Res. (forthcoming), 2012.
[122] S. Saghafian and M.P. Van Oyen. The value of flexible backup suppliers and dis-
ruption risk information: Newsvendor analyses with recourse. IIE Transactions
(forthcoming).
[123] S. Saghafian and M.P. Van Oyen. Compensating for dynamic supply disruptions
with backup flexibility. Working paper, Univ. of Michigan, Dept. of Indust. and
Opers. Eng., 2012.
[124] S. Saghafian, M.P. Van Oyen, and B. Kolfal. The “W” network and the dynamic
control of unreliable flexible servers. IIE Transactions, 43(12):893–907, 2011.
[125] M.J. Schull, A. Kiss, and J.-P. Szali. The effect of low complexity patients
on Emergency Department waiting times. Annals of Emergency Medicine,
49(3):257–264, 2007.
[126] L.I. Sennott. Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing
Systems. Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, John Wiley and Sons, New
York, 1999.
[127] D.A. Serel, M. Dada, and H. Moskowitz. Sourcing decision with capacity reser-
vation contract. Eur. J. Opers. Res., 131:635–648, 2001.
[128] A.K. Sethi and S.P. Sethi. Flexibility in manufacturing: A survey. The Inter-
national Journal of Flexible Manufacturing Systems, 2:289–328, 1990.
[129] Y. Sheffi. The resilient enterprise: overcoming vulnerability for competitive
advantage. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007.
[130] K. Siddharathan, W.J. Jones, and J.A. Johnson. A priority queueing model to
reduce waiting times in emergency care. International J. of Health Care Quality
Assurance, 9(5):10–16, 1996.
[131] R. Smallwood and E. Sondik. The optimal control of partially observable
Markov processes over a finite horizon. Oper. Res., 21:1071–1088, 1973.
[132] L. I. Solberg, B. R. Asplin, and D. J. Magid R. M. Weinick. Emergency De-
partment crowding: Consensus development of potential measures. Annals of
Emergency Medicine, 42(6):824–834, 2003.
[133] J. Song and P. Zipkin. Inventory control with information about supply condi-
tions. Management Sci., 42(10):1409–1419, 1996.
309
[134] R. SoRelle. Homicide charges against Illinois ED stun EM. Emergency Medicine
News, 28(12):1,25, 2006.
[135] R. SoRelle. Breaking news: Health reform and the ED: Prepare for the surge.
Emergency Medicine News, 32(5):1,20, 2010.
[136] P.C. Sprivulis, J.A. Da Silva, and I.G Jacobs et al. The association between
hospital overcrowding and mortality among patients admitted via Western Aus-
tralian Emergency Departments. Medical Journal of Australia, 184:208–212,
2006.
[137] M. S. Squillante, C. H. Xia, D. D. Yao, and L. Zhang. Threshold-based priority
policies for parallel-server systems with affinity scheduling. Proc. 2001 Amer.
Control Conf., Arlington, VA, pages 2992–2999, 2001.
[138] S.J. Steindel and P.J. Howanitz. Changes in Emergency Department turnaround
time performance from 1990 to 1993. Arch. Path. & Lab. Med., 121:1031–1041,
1997.
[139] F.F. Suarez, M.A. Cusumano, and C.H. Fine. An empirical study of flexibility
in manufacturing. Sloan Management Rev., 37:25–32, 1995.
[140] J.M. Swaminathan and J.G. Shanthikumar. Supplier diversification: effect of
discrete demand. Oper. Res. Let., 25:213–221, 1999.
[141] R. Swinney and S. Netessine. Long-term contracts under the threat of supplier
default. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management, 11:109–127, 2009.
[142] E. Tekin, W.J. Hopp, , and M.P. Van Oyen. Pooling strategies for service center
agent cross-training. IIE Transactions, 41:546–561, 2009.
[143] E.J. Thomas, D.M. Studdert, and H.R. Burstin et. al. Incidene and type of ad-
verse events and negligent care in Utah and Colorado. Medical Care, 38(3):261–
271, 2000.
[144] B. Tomlin. The impact of supply-learning on a firms sourcing strategy and in-
ventory investment when suppliers are unreliable. Manufacturing Service Oper.
Management, 11:192–209, 2009.
[145] B. Tomlin and Lawrence Snyder. On the value of a threat advisory system for
managing supply chain disruptions. Working Paper, 2006.
[146] B. Tomlin and Lawrence Snyder. On the value of a threat advisory system for
managing supply chain disruptions. Working Paper, 2006.
310
[147] B. Tomlin and Y. Wang. On the value of mix flexibility and dual sourcing
in unreliable newsvendor networks. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management,
7(1):37–57, 2005.
[148] S. Trzeciak and E.P. Rivers. Emergency Department overcrowding in the United
States: an emerging threat to patient safety and public health. Emerg. Med.
J., 20(5):402–405, 2003.
[149] S.P. van der Zee and H. Theil. Priority assignment in waiting-line problems
under conditions of misclassification. Oper. Res., 9:875–885, 1961.
[150] N.M. Van Dijk and E. Van Der Sluis. To pool or not to pool in call centers.
Prod. Oper. Man., 17(3):296–305, 2008.
[151] J. A. Van Mieghem. Dynamic scheduling with convex delay costs: The gener-
alized cµ rule. Annals of Appl. Prob., 5(3):809–833, 1995.
[152] M.P. Van Oyen, E.G.S. Gel, and W. J. Hopp. Opportunity for workforce
agility in collaborative and non-collaborative work systems. IIE Transactions,
33(9):761–777, 2001.
[153] J. Vance and P. Spirvulis. Triage nurses validly and reliably estimate Emergency
Department patient complexity. Emergency Medicine Australasia, 17:382–386,
2005.
[154] J. A. VanMieghem. Investment strategies for flexible resources. Management
Sci., 44(8):1071–1078, 1998.
[155] Michael H. Veatch. A cµ rule for prallel servers with two tiered cµ preference.
Working Paper, Math. Dept., Gordon College, 2010.
[156] J. Walrand. An Introduction to Queueing Networks. Prentice-Hall, New York,
1988.
[157] Q. Wang. Modeling and analysis of high risk patient queues. Eur. J. of Oper.
Res., 155:502–515, 2004.
[158] Y. Wang, W. Gilland, and B. Tomlin. Mitigating supply risk: dual sourcing or
process improvement? Manufacturing Service Oper. Management, 12:489–510,
2010.
[159] S. J. Welch. Patient segmentation: Redesigning flow. Emergency Medicine
News, 31(8), 2008.
[160] S.J. Welch and S.J. Davidson. The performance limits of traditional triage.
Annals of Emerg. Med., 58(2):143–144, 2011.
311
[161] W. Whitt. Partitioning customers into service groups. Management Sci.,
45:1579–1592, 1999.
[162] R.W. Wolf. Stochastic Modeling and the Theory of Queues. Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1989.
[163] Z. Yang, G. Aydin, V. Babich, and D. Beil. Supply disruptions, asymmetric
information, and a backup production option. Management Sci., 55:192–209,
2009.
312
